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Empathy induced altruism is considered as the motivation of human 
cooperation, one of the most prominent pro-social behaviours in society. To explore 
the empathy-cooperation link, this thesis presents a series of empirical studies 
designed to uncover how reliable this association is. Specifically, the introductory 
chapters present an evidence-based systematic review and discussion of current 
theories, which take a critical view of the methodological approaches and provide the 
context and theoretical motivations for the empirical work of the thesis. The empirical 
chapters present four studies conducted in the laboratory to evaluate empathy-
cooperation association, as well as other potential mediating factors via Public Goods 
Game (PGG) reflecting collective action in society (total approx. 540 participants). 
Study 1 was a replication of a highly cited finding that has been often used to support 
theoretical claims regarding the positive empathy-cooperation link, which in the 
present case was not found when examined using the PGG set up. Study 2 further 
explored the empathy-cooperation link alongside the impact of personal values as an 
information signal to support cooperative behaviour, to this end, shared social values 
predicted cooperative behaviour above and beyond empathy. Study 3 examined the 
extent to which empathy could be used to support cooperation in heterogeneous group 
settings by manipulating the distribution of endowments and the origin of 
endowments; again empathy had a limited effect on levels of cooperation. Study 4 
was a replication of Study 3, but using a 2-player PGG, leading to differences 
between the patterns of results from the previous experiment. The concluding section 
considers the implications of the findings for current theories that build on the 




statement that empathy induction is an effective way of promoting cooperation in 
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Chapter 1  An Evidence-based Systematic Review 
Empathy and cooperation are considered to be interlinked, in both 
psychological theory and in a common understanding of the terms (Prot et al., 2014). 
The existence of the link between empathy and cooperation has been the subject of 
conceptual speculation for centuries, at least since A. Smith (1759) mentioned the 
connection in his book “The Theory of Moral Sentiments”. The idea proposed was 
that empathy has a critical role in maintaining peace and conflict resolution in society. 
However, does this strong assumption have an empirical basis to it? Indeed, how 
reliable is the connection between empathy and pro-social behaviour, particularly 
cooperative behaviour? Whether empathy is fundamental to cooperative behaviour, as 
had previously been considered by key thinkers, is the central interest and driving 
force of this project, which explores “empathy” and “cooperation” as two 
fundamental concepts for human interaction, and what the nature of the link between 
them is.  
The whole thesis presents a series of empirical studies designed to uncover 
how reliable this association is. There are many studies of empathy and pro-social 
behaviour, but the starting point for this thesis is that the methodological approaches 
used thus far leave a lot to be desired in terms of being able to draw firm theoretical 
conclusions. Therefore, the introductory chapters present an evidence-based 
systematic review that takes a critical view of the methodological approaches used to 
explore the association between empathy and cooperation, and provides the context 
for the empirical work of this thesis. Chapter 1 introduces the approach to tackling 
these issues, providing a justification for the later empirical work that was conducted 
in the thesis. In addition, it also presents a rationale for the methodological 
CHAPTER 1 A SYSTEMATIC REVIEW 
 
20 
approaches taken in the project. Thus Chapter 1 operationalizes empathy and 
cooperation and the different possible associations proposed in the literature. In 
Chapter 2, current theories concerning the empathy-cooperation link are discussed 
along with the issues regarding definitions of empathy, which have impacted theory 
and empirical practice. Driven by these theories, several new studies were designed 
and conducted to explore the association between empathy and cooperation, and the 
role of other variables such as value and status. The sections that follow present the 
four conducted empirical studies (Chapters 3, 4, 5 and 6). Study 1 uses the Public 
Goods Game (PGG) to replicates a highly cited finding often used to support 
theoretical claims regarding the empathy-cooperation. Study 2 further explores the 
empathy-cooperation link alongside the impact of personal values as information 
signals that support cooperative behaviour. Study 3 examines the extent to which 
empathy could be used to support cooperation in heterogeneous compared to 
homogeneous group settings (by manipulating both the financial endowments that 
participants received at the start of the game, and the origin of status). Study 4 is a 
replication of Study 3, but using a two-player version of the PGG, leading to 
identifiable differences between the patterns of results from the previous experiment. 
The concluding chapter presents a summary of the findings, discusses the 
methodological considerations, and reflects on the implications for current theories 
that build on the empathy-cooperation association. 
1.1. Introduction 
To provide a clear answer to the question “what is the association between 
empathy and cooperation?” a systematic review was conducted of the psychological 
research that has been geared towards answering this question. While there are several 
reviews that have critically evaluated the different theoretical perspectives on 
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cooperation (Colman, 2003; De Dreu, 2013; Fehr & Schmidt, 1999; Kollock, 1998; 
Sachs, Mueller, Wilcox, & Bull, 2004), to date, there are no reviews of the 
methodological approaches to investigate empathy, and in particular the relation 
between empathy and cooperation. More relevantly, only a few psychologists 
(Eisenberg & Miller, 1987; Underwood & Moore, 1982) have reviewed empirical 
investigations of the link between empathy and pro-social behaviours since 1970. 
However, these past reviews were neither systematic reviews nor, of course, provide 
coverage of research conducted since. Therefore, clearly such a review would help 
consolidate the literature enabling researchers to uncover general patterns in existing 
findings and, when there are inconsistencies, indicate where those inconsistencies are, 
and speculate upon the basis of their occurrence. There are other grounds for 
conducting a systematic review of the methodological and empirical findings 
concerning the connection between empathy and cooperation. Firstly, there is an 
assumed natural connection between empathy and pro-social behaviour; this is 
because the process of empathizing with others is expected to increase the likelihood 
of understanding another person’s feelings and responding to them in a sensitive 
manner. But given this strong assumption how well does the support it? Without a 
comprehensive systematic review of the findings, the question would remain 
unanswered. Secondly, there are a variety of pro-social behaviours of which 
cooperation is but one, yet up until now work looking at the relationship between pro-
social behaviours and empathy does not tend to distinguish between different types of 
pro-social behaviours. This means that it is worth looking at the specific evidence for 
one type of pro-social behaviours and its link to empathy, and then establishing if this 
is then generalizable to all forms of pro-social behaviours. Also, although there are 
many studies of empathy and pro-social behaviour, the methodological approaches 
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may contain limitations that make it difficult to draw firm theoretical conclusions. 
Therefore, the aim of this review is to examine the methodological and empirical 
findings of work examining the relationship between empathy and cooperation, to 
provide evidence-based insights for appropriate research communities, and offer 
guidelines for further empirical research studies and theoretical developments.  
Unlike traditional narrative reviews, an evidence-based systematic reviews 
strive to comprehensively identify, appraise, and synthesize all the relevant studies on 
a given topic, often used to test a single hypothesis (Petticrew & Roberts, 2008). In 
addition, it attempts to collate all relevant evidence that fits a pre-specified eligibility 
criteria to answer a specific research question (Moher et al., 2015). A systematic 
review can also provide reliable estimates about the effects so that conclusions are 
defensible, demonstrate where knowledge is lacking, and can be used to guide future 
research and inform policy. A meta-analysis (Balliet & Van Lange, 2013a, 2013b; 
Vachon, Lynam, & Johnson, 2014; Zelmer, 2003) is a statistical synthesis of similar 
quantitative studies, involving the calculation of standard effect sizes from each study 
and the pooling of summary data to produce a single overall effect size.  
In the present project, a meta-analysis was not conducted because the 
approach was to examine a broad conceptual idea regarding the type of relationship 
empathy and cooperation share, and in turn evaluating the way empirical studies 
explore this relationship. Moreover, the type of data generated from several different 
methodologies makes it difficult to carry out a meta-analysis, simply because there 
are too few studies that implement the same methodology to enable a sensible meta-
analysis. Therefore, given these considerations, a systematic review was conducted 
with the research question “What is the association between empathy and cooperation 
in adult populations?” 




As discussed, this systematic review was conducted in order to explore the 
relationship between empathy and cooperation according to the protocol of Preferred 
Reporting Items for Systematic review and Meta-Analysis protocols (Moher, Liberati, 
Tetzlaff, Altman, & Group, 2009; Moher, et al., 2015). 
1.2.1. Eligibility Criteria 
There were several criteria for the selection of studies included in this 
systematic review. First, studies had to be conducted on non-clinical adult participants 
(age 18 years and above). Second, only English Language publications from 1975 to 
2014 within the field of psychology research were considered. Third, only empirical 
laboratory studies that examined the relationship between empathy and cooperation 
were included. Finally, studies collecting behavioural or psychophysical responses 
were included, but neuropsychological evidence (e.g., EEG/ERP, fMRI, MEG) were 
omitted. The reason for this was to reduce unnecessary variability across experimental 
responses and ensure that the experimental studies employed in the present systematic 
review were directly comparable and focused on behavioural findings.  
1.2.2. Search Strategy & Study Records 
Databases widely used for multiple disciplines are “Web of Knowledge” and 
“Scopus”, and the specific psychology database typically used is “PsycINFO”. All 
three were used to search for relevant articles. The Boolean operator “AND” was used 
to search for the conjunction of both key words “empathy” and “cooperation”. The 
details of the search and selection of articles for this review are shown in Figure 1.  




Figure 1. The flow diagram of this systematic review (The search was conducted on articles 
on 24th March 2015) 
 




In this review the current findings concerning empathy and cooperation are 
discussed based on the logic of exploring their association. While a variety of ways in 
which empathy and cooperation have been investigated separately exist, there are just 
three clear groupings in the empirical work that examine the nature of their 
relationship. The following three approaches are: correlation between empathy and 
cooperation (E ∞1 C) (n=11); the effect of empathy on cooperation (EC) (n=13); 
the effect of cooperation on empathy (CE) (n=10). The general findings of each 
category are discussed as following.  
1.3.1. Category 1: Correlation between Empathy and Cooperation (E ∞ C)  
The correlational approach is used to explore whether an individual’s empathy 
ability is correlated with cooperative behaviours. Overall, 11 research studies were 
found and allocated to Category 1. Table 1 presents a summary of the evidence from 
these research studies. 
Five out of the 11 studies directly examined the correlation between empathy 
and cooperation (Edele, Dziobek, & Keller, 2013; Eisenberg, Fabes, et al., 1989; 
Eisenberg, Miller, et al., 1989; Paal & Bereczkei, 2007), as shown in Figure 2A. For 




1   This symbol ∞ here refers to conceptual “correlation”, although ∞ is usually 
reserved for “infinity” in mathematic context. (Andrew Colman, Personal communication) 
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these 5 studies, general findings revealed a positive correlation between empathy and 
cooperation (Edele, et al., 2013; Eisenberg, Fabes, et al., 1989; Eisenberg, Miller, et 
al., 1989; Marks, Penner, & Stone, 1982; Paal & Bereczkei, 2007). For example, Paal 
and Bereczkei (2007), using the social cooperation scale of Cloninger’s Temperament 
and Character Inventory, found that the better the mindreading skills people reported 
they had, which was taken as an index of empathy, the more willing they were to 
cooperate. However, in Edele, et al. (2013)’s study, because several measurements of 
empathy were used, there was no correlation between empathy and cooperation when 
empathy was measured by Movie for the Assessment of Social Cognition. 
Turning now to the experimental evidence from the rest of the studies (6 out 
of 11), they investigated a mediating effect of empathy on other factors and 
cooperation, in which empathy is considered as the mediating factor, demonstrated in 
Figure 2B. The mediating variables were behavioural, biological, psychological 
and/or social constructs that transmit the effect of one variable to another variable 
(MacKinnon, Fairchild, & Fritz, 2007; Rucker, Preacher, Tormala, & Pettey, 2011). 
This evidence showed that empathy was a mediator factor between similarity in 
personality/values and cooperation (Krebs, 1975); relationship contexts (kin member 
or stranger) and cooperation (Maner & Gailliot, 2007); individual differences 
regarding trust and cooperation (Irwin, McGrimmon, & Simpson, 2008); stress and 
cooperation (McGinley et al., 2009); listening to pro-social songs and cooperation 
(Greitemeyer, 2009); and personal contact and cooperation (Koschate, Oethinger, 
Kuchenbrandt, & Dick, 2012). These six studies provide indirect evidence for the 
positive correlation between empathy and cooperation.  
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In summary, exploring the correlation between empathy and cooperation was 
examined in both direct correlation (as Figure 2A) and indirectly through empathy as 
a mediating factor (as Figure 2B). Direct correlations between empathy and 
cooperation found a mixed and unstable correlation between these two constructs, and 
this was influenced by the measurements of empathy, based on the evidence presented 
in Table 1. More than half of the evidence indicated that empathy mediated the other 
variables and cooperation, which supported the positive correlation between empathy 
and cooperation.  
 
Figure 2. The graphical representation for A. the correlation between two dependent variables 
(empathy and cooperation); B. the indirect effect of the independent variable on the dependent variable 
(cooperation) through the mediator variable (empathy); C. the total effect of the independent variable 
(empathy) on the dependent variable (cooperation); D. the total effect of the independent variable 
(cooperation) on the dependent variable (empathy), partially based on figure from (M. S. Fritz & 
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Table 1 Studies included in Category 1: Correlation between Empathy (DV) and Cooperation (DV) (E ∞ C) (n=11) 
Record Study N % of 
females in 
sample 








1777* Krebs.,(1975) 60 0 14 indices of empathy were measured; 
3 subjective reports;  
11 psychophysiological measures  
A chance to win money or receive a shock on the 
bonus trial  
+ C1M 3 Cooperation 
1797 * Marks, Penner, & Stoner 
(1982) Study 1 
159 0 STAI-State Anxiety Scale (A-State) 
(Spielberger et al., 1970) 
A list of 21 possible outcomes and an envelope 
containing $2; The choices varied along a 
continuum of selfishness-helpfulness; 
0 C1M 7 Cooperation 
798 * Eisenberg et al., (1989) 69 53 Facial indexes; Facial and self-report 
indexes; Heart rate; 2 sympathy scales  
Hours offered to help + C1 8 Helping 
797 * Eisenberg et al., (1989) 78 48 Four adjectives from the emotional 
response questionnaire 
The number of hours that could be donated to help 
X around the house 
+  C1 8 Helping 
IRI The same as above + C1 8 Helping 
1788 * Maner & Gailliot (2007) 154  68 Rates of emotions; 
General-Specific (GS) assessment based 
on items that include sad, low-spirited, 
heavy-hearted. 
Willingness to help +/0 C1M 8 Helping 
441 * Paal & Bereczkei (2007) 127  60 Mindreading ability test  TCL +  C1 1 Cooperation 
769 * Irwin et al, (2008)  
Study 1 
61 66 Emotion IFQ presented after vignettes PDG +  C1M 8 Cooperation 
 Study 2 88 54 The same as above PDG +  C1M 8 Cooperation 
1798 * McGinley et al., (2009) 148 67 Empathic concern subscale from IRI PTM (for men) +  C1M 8 Pro-social 
PTM (for women) 0  C1M 8 Pro-social 
1790 * Greitemeyer, (2009)  
Study 4 
50 62 Self-ratings of sympathetic concern, 
compassion, soft-heartedness, tenderness 
DG +  C1M 5 Sharing 
772 * Koschate et al., (2012)  
Study 2 
185 NG IFQ OCB (for individual-directed pro-social behaviour) +  C1M 8 Helping 
Four items (group-directed helping behaviour) 0 C1M 8 Helping 
757 * Edele et al., (2013) 35 46 IRI DG +  C1 1 Sharing 
MET-CORE +/0 
MASC 0  
Note. All references referred to in Table 1 are organized by publication year. In addition, IRI: Interpersonal Reactivity Index (Davis, 1983); TCL: Social Cooperation 
Scale of Cloninger’s Temperament and Character Inventory test (Cloninger et al., 1994); IFQ: Impression and Feelings Questionnaire (Batson, 1991); PDG: prisoner’s 
dilemma game; DG: dictator game; PTM: The Pro-social Tendencies Measure (Carols & Randall, 2002); OCB: organizational citizenship behaviour (Smith, Organ, & Near, 
1983); MET-CORE: the Multifaceted Empathy Test (photo-test) (Dziobek et al., 2008); MASC: Movie for the Assessment of Social Cognition (movie-test) (Dziobek, et al., 
2006); NG: not given. The findings reported are scored simply according to the following: +: positive effect; 0: null effect; -: negative effect. In column 8, it refers to the 
CHAPTER 1 A SYSTEMATIC REVIEW 
 
29 
relationship between empathy and cooperation, here C1 refers to correlation between two dependent variables (empathy and cooperation), as depicted in Graph A of Figure 2; 
C1M refers to the indirect effect of the independent variable on the dependent variable (cooperation) through the mediator variable (empathy), as depicted in Graph B of 
Figure 2.  
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1.3.2. Category 2: Effect of Empathy (IV) on Cooperation (DV) (EC)  
In this research approach, empathy was introduced as an independent variable 
to examine the effects of empathy on cooperation in laboratory settings, as 
demonstrated in Figure 2C. Table 2 presents the studies included under this category. 
Overall, most research studies (11 out of 13) found that empathy induction promoted 
or at least maintained cooperative behaviour (Allsop, Fifield, & Seiter, 2002; Batson 
& Moran, 1999; Cialdini et al., 1987; Eimontaite, Nicolle, Schindler, & Goel, 2013; 
Fultz, Batson, Fortenbach, McCarthy, & Varney, 1986; Oswald, 1996, 2002; Pavey, 
Greitemeyer, & Sparks, 2012; Rumble, Van Lange, & Parks, 2010; Stürmer, Snyder, 
Kropp, & Siem, 2006; Xu, Kou, & Zhong, 2012); however, two studies, and half of 
another (Oswald, 1996; Warren & Walker, 1991; Xu, et al., 2012, Study 2) reported a 
null effect of empathy induction on cooperation.  
For studies which found a positive empathy-cooperation link, the method of 
empathy induction involved: 1) creating a needy situation and perspective taking 
instructions (cognitive & affective) (Batson & Moran, 1999; Oswald, 2000); 2) a 
description of suffering transmitted either vocally (Cialdini, et al., 1987), via a story 
(Allsop, et al., 2002; Pavey, et al., 2012; Stürmer, et al., 2006), or an essay 
(Eimontaite, et al., 2013). As indicated in Table 2, the majority of those studies, 
which found a positive link between empathy and cooperation, adopted the first 
method of empathy induction, that is, presenting participants with a sad story of 
suffering to induce sorrow or pity towards another. This was a means to encourage 
participants to behave more cooperatively in the prisoner’s dilemma task – a social 
dilemma task often employed to examine the extent to which people either cooperate 
or defect (Batson & Ahmad, 2001; Batson et al., 1995; Batson & Moran, 1999; 
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Rumble, et al., 2010; Xu, et al., 2012). The idea here is that presenting stories of this 
kind will in turn prime people to have empathic experiences, which in turn are 
designed to promote cooperation.  
For example, Batson and Moran (1999) examined whether empathy induced 
altruism by providing a negative profile and a perspective taking inducing instruction, 
with the idea that it would motivate participants to cooperate in the prisoner’s 
dilemma. They found that cooperation was significantly higher in the empathy-
inducing condition compared with the non-inducing condition. Moreover, the authors 
argued that altruism is not simply a type of moral motivation, but actually a distinct 
form of pro-social motivation. The goal of moral motivation is to uphold a moral 
principle, but the goal of pro-social motivation is to increase others’ welfare (Batson, 
Klein, Highberger, & Shaw, 1995). This study concluded that empathy-induced 
altruism leads to cooperative behaviour, which confirmed the empathy-altruism 
hypothesis that when one has empathy for another in need, the former is altruistically 
motivated to increase the latter’s welfare. Unlike Batson and Moran (1999), Batson 
and Ahmad (2001) used a sequential (one individual would act first, then the other 
would act), rather than simultaneous, prisoner’s dilemma to address a similar question. 
Instead of assessing the participants’ decisions under the uncertainty of what the other 
participant would do in the task, the sequential method allowed them to assess 
whether empathy-induced altruism motivates a person to cooperate in the prisoner’s 
dilemma task, even if participants knew that the target of empathy has defected. The 
results of this study found that even though people knew their partner in the game 
defected, empathy was still maintained, and in some cases even increased cooperation. 
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Likewise, another study (Xu, et al., 2012, Study 1) using the same paradigm 
examined whether or not empathy promoted cooperation when people explicitly knew 
the other player would defect, which replicated Batson and Moran (1999)’s results. 
The study reported that inducing empathy towards a partner maintained cooperation. 
More to the point, their manipulation of empathy fostered forgiveness towards 
another that would be likely to defect. Thus, empathy induction towards one 
individual clearly helped to promote cooperation in the prisoner’s dilemma task.  
In a similar vein, Rumble, et al. (2010) used an iterated social dilemma task 
while also inducing empathy, and concluded that empathy has broad benefits for 
social interaction. “Noise” was introduced in this study; a “noisy” situation in social 
dilemma was referred to as one in which the intentions or actions of others were 
uncertain. They believed that empathy could be an effective tool for coping with 
ambiguous and potentially easy to misinterpret behaviours in others, which plays a 
key role in the relationship between people, thereby maintaining and enhancing 
cooperation. As high levels of empathy help individuals to reduce or eliminate the 
detrimental effects of noise their findings provide good support for this hypothesis. 
They suggested that empathy increases the positive weight associated with the 
interaction partner’s outcomes, which in turn would likely bring about relatively high 
levels of cooperation, even when repeated incidents of “noise” challenge the 
cooperative interaction. Therefore, the empirical evidence supported the claim that 
empathy maintained cooperation regardless of “noise” situations (Van Lange, 1999; 
Van Lange & Kuhlman, 1994; Van Lange & Visser, 1999). 
In contrast, a number of research studies (Oswald, 1996; Warren & Walker, 
1991; Xu, et al., 2012, Study 2) found the ineffectiveness of empathy on cooperation. 
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For instance, Warren and Walker (1991) manipulated empathy and perceived 
effectiveness of helping to examine whether this was an efficient way to raise money 
for charity organizations. The experiment found that the effectiveness manipulations 
produced significant main effects, whereas the empathy manipulation itself was 
ineffective. Moreover, Oswald (1996) induced cognitive and affective perspective 
taking by instructing participants to pay attention to the target thought (cognitive) or 
feelings (affective), and found that participants in the affective perspective taking 
condition offered more help than those in the cognitive perspective taking condition 
and the control condition (i.e. attend to the technical aspects of the videotape, e.g., 
lighting and sound quality). This study, however, failed to find that the cognitive 
perspective taking condition offered more help than the control condition. 
Furthermore, despite the identical experimental methods and procedure, Xu, et al. 
(2012)’s Study 2 failed to replicate Batson and Ahmad (2001) results.  
In summary, several methods of empathy induction were adopted in the 
research studies in the Category 2. The suffering stories of others plus perspective 
taking instructions was proved to be the most effective way of promoting cooperation 
in social dilemma games. It provides evidence that the methodology of inducing 
empathy is effective in enhancing cooperative decision making in laboratory 
experimental settings. However, alternative empathy induction methods that required 
participants to empathize with an agent in a story (story-driven empathy induction) 
were found to induce unstable effects regarding an empathy-cooperation link. Even 
when adopting the same empathy induction method by the same research group (e.g., 
Oswald), one study was found to lead to a positive effect (Oswald, 1996, 2000), but 
another was not (Oswald, 2002). 
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Table 2 Studies included in Category 2: Effect of Empathy (IV) on Cooperation (DV) (EC) (n=13) 
Record  Study N  % of 
females 
in sample 













720 * Fultz et al., (1986)  
Study 1 
22 100 Need situation + perspective taking 
instructions 
Self-reported situational 
empathy (6 empathy adjectives 
and 8 distress adjectives) 
Indicate a willingness to 
spend time with X 
+  8 Helping 
Study 2 32 100 The same as above Self-reported emotion  Help offered + 8 Helping 
1779 * Cialdini et al., (1987) 
Study 1 
87 100 “Elaine”- the other participant, who 
reported problems with electronic 
shock, would be performing a series 
of learning trials while receiving 
electronic shocks 
Self-reported focus on how X 
in the story felt; self-reported 
focus on objective information 
from the vignette (indicated on 
a 7-point scale) 
Help offered  + 8 Helping 
Study 2 35 100 Listen to a 5-min “News from the 
personal slide” tape, which described 
the plight of Carol Marcy, who broke 
her legs in an automobile accident 
The same as above Help offered  + 8 Helping 
1781 * Warren & Walker 
(1991) 
2648  NG Perspective taking manipulation 
(imagine-self; picture-a-person) 
A 5-point scale of empathy Value of a donation 
made/ whether 
participants returned a 
form expressing their 
support 
0 6 Charity 
donation (S) 
1782 * Oswald (1996) 65 85 Affective perspective taking (attend to 
Ron’s feelings); 
Cognitive perspective taking (attend 
to Ron’s thought) 
A 5-points scale of affect, 
cognition, technical aspects of 
the videotape 
Hours offered to help + Affective empathy 
 
0 cognitive empathy 
8 Helping 
496 * Batson& Moran(1999) 60 100 The same way as Batson (1991) IFQ A simultaneous PDG + 8 Cooperation 
1783 * Oswald (2000) 162 70 Cognitive perspective taking; 
Affective perspective taking; 
IFQ Hours offered to Help  +/0  8 Helping 
1784 * Allsop et al., (2002) 97  64 Imagine being asked for money by a 
person who had locked keys in a car 
Self-report of empathizing with 
X from the vignette 
Likelihood of complying 
with a request to help 
+ 6 Helping 
1785 * Oswald (2002) 109 71 Affective perspective taking; 
Cognitive perspective taking 
Self-report of empathy (7-
points scale) 
Minutes taken to 
volunteer to help 
+ Affective  8 Helping 
1787 * Sturmer et al., (2006) 
Study 1  
94 0 Story about feeling down about life Impression Check 
Questionnaire indexing feelings 
of compassion, sympathy, and 
empathic understanding (1-7) 
Helping intentions + 8 Helping 
Study 2 40  58 Story about a lost backpack The same as above Help offered with + 8 Helping 




possibility of losing their 
own money if they don’t 
comply)  
494 * Rumble et al., (2010) 180  NG Perspective taking + break up story 
(Batson, 1991) 
IFQ A PDG variant + 8 Cooperation 
747 * Xu et al., (2012)  
Study 1 
60 50 Perspective taking + break up story 
(Batson, 1991) 
IFQ A simultaneous PDG + 8 Cooperation 
Study 2 60 50 The same as above IFQ A simultaneous PDG 0 8 Cooperation 
1187 * Pavey et al., (2012)  
Study 1 
70 42 A short passage of information about 
a person who had been in a car 
accident and who consequently could 
not go to work (adapted from Batson 
et al., 1997) 
IFQ (presented online) Willingness to help (two 
questions using 5-point 
scale) 
+ 8 Helping 
Study 2 166 82 The same as above IRI Pro-social intentions, 
self-reported pro-social 
behaviors carried out 






Study 3 59  33 A short passage about a woman who 
was suffering from depression. 
IFQ Willingness to help  ＋ 8 Helping 
1795 * Eimontaite et al., 
(2013) 
38 37 Sympathy-inducing essay (modified 
from Harmon-Jones et al., 2003) 
Self-emotion questionnaire (a 
list of 36 emotion words and 
for each work, indicated which 
“other participant” they had felt 
it towards) 
PDG; TG +  8 Cooperation  
Note. All references referred to in Table 2 are organized by publication year. In addition, PGG: public goods game; PDG: prisoner’s dilemma game; TG: trust game; 
NG: not given; IFQ: Impression and Feeling Questionnaires (Batson, 1991): IRI: Interpersonal Reactivity Index (Davis, 1983). The findings reported are scored simply 
according to the following: +: positive effect; 0: null effect; -: negative effect. Here, as depicted in Graph C of Figure 2; C3 refers to the total effect of the independent 
variable (empathy) on the dependent variable (cooperation).  
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1.3.3. Category 3: Effect of Cooperation (IV) on Empathy (DV) (CE)  
As shown in Table 3, the third approach of exploring the association between 
empathy and cooperation is to examine the impact of cooperation on empathic 
reaction, demonstrated in Figure 2D. It is apparent that cooperation here (in Category 
3) is referred to as the cooperative contexts, rather than cooperative intention or 
behaviour, as is the case in Categories 1 and 2. The cooperative contexts here refer to 
situations in which cooperation is experienced in synchrony (Valdesolo & DeSteno, 
2011), such as carrying out tasks together between two people (Greitemeyer, 2013), 
or imagining a positive interaction or personal contact with another individual 
(Kuchenbrandt, Eyssel, & Seidel, 2013). 
Most of the research studies in Category 3 report that in the cooperative 
situations or imagining cooperative contact situations, people revealed stronger 
empathic reactions (Lanzetta & Englis, 1989), which was indexed via autonomic 
responses or self-reported (Balconi & Bortolotti, 2012a, 2012b; Balconi, Bortolotti, & 
Crivelli, 2013). Studies measuring self-reported empathy found that empathic 
reactions were higher in cooperative contexts rather than neutral or non-cooperative 
contexts (Behrends, Müller, & Dziobek, 2012). Balconi and Bortolotti (2012a) and 
Balconi, et al. (2013) measured four autonomic responses: facial expression via the 
both the corrugator supercilious and zygomaticus major muscle, skin conductance 
response, and heart rate. In these two studies, cooperation was manipulated by 
different emotional reactions to video clips in which two actors (one male and one 
female university student) were seated next to each other in a laboratory room. In the 
cooperative condition, the actors were smiling and happy, while in the neutral 
emotional condition, the actors maintained neutral expressions throughout their 
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interactions. Both studies found that a cooperative situation induced a higher 
empathic response than the neutral condition, such as increased activity of facial 
muscle movements, specifically zygomaticus major muscle movements. The activity 
of zygomaticus major muscle movement was found to be a valid measure of empathy 
in response to external stimuli such as viewing the cooperative interactions of others 
(Brown, Bradley, & Lang, 2006). In addition, Kuchenbrandt, et al. (2013) carried out 
a study with three types of conditions, neutral, positive imagined and cooperative 
imagined. This was designed to provide evidence that responses found were due to 
positive emotion rather than sense of cooperation. In the neutral condition participants 
were given a short description of a scenario in which they had contact with a stranger 
who was looking for a seat in a classroom; in the positive imagined condition, they 
used the identical description with more information about the terms pleasant and 
interesting to specify the tone of the conversation; in the cooperative imagined 
condition, the description was that both the participant and stranger decided together 
to get seats from the classroom in the same scenario. The study found that the 
cooperative imagined condition induced empathy more than the positive imagined 
and neutral conditions; this was indexed by presenting 15 emotive words from the 
Impressions and Feelings Questionnaires (Batson, 1991, 1999). These findings 
suggest that in general, individuals show more empathic reactions, including non-
verbal automatic response, self-reported empathic impressions and feelings in 
cooperative situations, when a smiling interaction scenario or a joint goal scene is 
taking place.  
However, one important point to make is that when individual differences for 
empathizing ability is taken into account, a more detailed understanding of the impact 
of observed cooperative interactions is provided. For example, Balconi and Bortolotti 
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(2012b) found that only high behavioural activation system subjects, measured by the 
Balanced Emotional Empathy Scale (Mehrabian & Epstein, 1972), were more 
responsive and empathic when viewing positive cooperative situations. 
In summary, research studies in Category 3 investigated the effect of 
cooperation (cooperative contexts) on empathic reactions, measured by either 
physical response (e.g., heart rate, skin conductance response and muscle movements), 
and/or self-report. Overall, such manipulation found that in most cases the more 
cooperative or positive interacting contexts are, the more likely they are to lead to a 
stronger empathic response, but that this was influenced by the personality trait of 
empathy.  
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Table 3 Studies included in Category 3: The Effect of Cooperation (IV) on Empathy (DV) (CE) (n=10) 
Record  Study N % of females 
in sample  
Manipulations of cooperation 
(IV) 
Measures of empathy (DV) Effect on cooperation 
and on empathy 
1778 * Barnett, et al., (1985) 72 50 Excellent interpersonal problem solving 
and helping skill V.S. excellent figure-
perception skills  
6-min videotapes of a female undergraduate describing a serious personal 
problem to an unseen therapist 
An emotional-response questionnaire adopted from Batson et al., (1983),  
(a list of 14 adjectives, 6 reflecting feelings of empathy and 8 reflecting 
feelings of distress) 
+  
1780 * Lanzetta & Englis (1989) 40 30 Expectation of cooperation (the cofactor 
smiling) matched outcome of cofactor 
expression and observer outcome 
SCR and HR measures of autonomic arousal; 
EMG data from 4 facial muscle regions 
+  
1162 * Likowski, et al., (2011) 77 100 Manipulation situation (cooperation 
situation): it was said that both players 
would win if the sum of their scores after a 
certain number of rounds exceed a certain 
value; if the sum of both players’ scores 
did not exceed this value both would lose 
Cognitive empathy: “Reading the mind in the Eye test” (Baron-Cohen, 
Wheel-wright, Hill, Raste, Plumb, 2001) 
+  
Emotional empathy: questionnaire which consisted of 24 items measuring 
distress, sadness and emotional empathy  
0  
766 * Valdesolo & DeSteno (2011) 69 NG Green and red task (synchrony) A three-item measure using 7-point response scales: a) sympathy for victim, 
(b) pity for victim, and c) compassion for victim 
+  
1793 * Balconi & Bortolotti (2012) 35 49 Present interpersonal scene types; smiling 
and happy expressions by two actors for 
cooperative scenes  
Autonomic behaviour (SCR, HR); 
Personal response to empathic scale (BEES), approach-withdrawal attitudes 
(BIS/BAS); verbal self-report measures 
+  
1128 * Balconi & Bortolotti (2012) 35 52 Create a cooperative setting via smiling 
and happy expressions for cooperative 
scenes 
Verbal self-report measures (empathic response, emotional involvement 
and emotional significance and valence); 
Autonomic responses (facial expression-corrugator supercilii and 
zygomaticus major muscle, SCR and HR) 
+  
777 * Balconi, Bortolotti, & Crivelli. 
(2013) 
35 52 Create a cooperative setting via smiling 
and happy expressions for cooperative 
scenes 
BEES  +  
750 * Kuchenbrandt, Eyssel & Seidel 
(2013) 
87 52 Manipulating cooperative imagined 
contact 
A list of 15 emotion words (Batson, 1991) +  
1794 * Greitemeyer (2013)  
Study1 
109 68 Playing video game cooperatively: two 
participants 
The extent to which they felt sympathetic, warm, compassionate, soft-
hearted and tender (Batson et al.,) 
+  
Study2 85 77 Worked together as teammates A story about a woman and her four children who live in Bangladesh. The 
father of the children had died in a work-related accident a year ago. The 
oldest children (8 years old) had to leave school because the family could 
not afford the tuition fee 
+  
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1796 * Stellar et al., (2014)  
Study 1 
90  55 Either an egoistic, cooperative, or control 
target who disclosed a time of suffering, 
the death of grandparent  
Watching the video about the grandfather’s death. 12 other emotions (a 10-
piont Likert scale 1 I do not feel this at all; 10 I feel this as much as I’ve 
ever felt). 
+ 
Study2 136  49 The same as above Face-to-face interaction;  
Telling story about family dog had passed away 
+  
Note. All references referred to in Table 3 are organized by publication year. In addition, IRI: Interpersonal Reactivity Index (Davis, 1983); MET-CORE: the 
Multifaceted Empathy Test (Dziobek et al., 2008); MASC: Movie for the Assessment of Social Cognition (Dziobek, et al., 2006); BEES: Balanced Emotional Empathy 
Scale; Mehrabian & Epstein, 1972): SCR: skin conductance: HR: heart rate; zygomatic response: the reactions of zygomaticus major muscle as a valid measure of empathy 
via a happy expression in response to external stimuli; NG: not given. The findings reported are scored simply according to the following: +: positive effect; 0: null effect; -: 
negative effect. Here C3 refers to the total effect of the independent variable (cooperation) on the dependent variable (empathy), as depicted in Graph D of Figure 2.  




A comprehensive systematic review of the methodologies was conducted, 
developed to examine the association between empathy and cooperation, and the 
nature of this relationship based on the different approaches taken. Overall, there were 
three categories of studies. The first category explored the correlation with results 
mixed regarding reliability. The second category examined the role of empathy 
induction on cooperation with evidence showing that inducing other-oriented 
emotions and feelings including sympathy, compassion or pity, lead to a relatively 
high stable positive effect on cooperative behaviour in the prisoner’s dilemma task. 
The third category of studies showed that manipulating an observed cooperative 
situation, or taking part in one, can influence empathic responses. More specifically, 
this was specific to individuals exhibiting greater empathic responses (e.g., increased 
facial muscles movement) in response to external stimuli. 
While the evidence shows some positive association between empathy and 
cooperation, this systematic review has also revealed that regardless of which 
category of study there is, the findings are mixed with regards to the reliability of the 
association between empathy and cooperation. The reasons for this require further 
discussion. An explanation for the mixed and unstable association between the two 
might be based on the types of definitions proposed for each phenomenon. With 
regards to the definition of empathy, in some articles, empathy is referred to as theory 
of mind (Paal & Bereczkei, 2007), or perspective taking (Oswald, 2000); whereas in 
some other articles, empathy is referred to as sympathy (Eimontaite, et al., 2013) or 
empathic concern (McGinley, et al., 2009). Without a clear psychological 
understanding of the concept being investigated, it is unlikely that researchers can 
CHAPTER 1 A SYSTEMATIC REVIEW 
 
42 
gain a good understanding of the association between empathy and cooperation. In 
addition, there are also problems regarding the definition of cooperation, which is 
considered as synonymous with pro-sociality. When the initial search was conducted 
in the databases, only studies that self-declared they were studying cooperation were 
included. However, one concern was that many of the studies treated cooperation as 
pro-sociality. From a behavioural point of view it may well be the case that 
cooperation and pro-sociality appear to be one and the same, because both involve 
doing good things to others. However, if one considers the motivations behind 
cooperation, and many forms of pro-sociality (i.e. helping, sharing) then these 
concepts are not exactly the same and should be distinguished conceptually and 
operationalized differently. Without clearly specifying what constitutes cooperation 
and how it is distinct from other forms of pro-sociality confusion will remain, and so 
inferring the precise connection between empathy and cooperation becomes evermore 
unclear.  
1.4.1. Definitions of Empathy 
Most of the studies in Category 2 considered empathy as “other-oriented” 
emotional and feelings’ reactions, including compassion, sympathy, pity and sorrow. 
This is because participants were observing another in need and imagining the 
person’s situation and having concerns over their welfare. Eisenberg (2000) suggested 
that the content of empathy above, as defined by Batson, should be considered as 
sympathy. She distinguished between empathy and sympathy, and proposed that 
empathy should be defined as “an affective response that stems from the apprehension 
or comprehension of another’s emotional state or condition and is similar to what the 
other person is feeling or would be expected to feel, e.g., a girl sees a sad peer and 
consequently feels sad, that the girl is experiencing empathy; sympathy, on the other 
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hand, is an emotion response stemming from the apprehension or comprehension of 
another’s emotional state or condition, which is not the same as what the other person 
is feeling (or is expected to feel) but consists of feelings of sorrow or concern for the 
other, e.g., a girl sees a sad peer and feels concerns for the peer, she is experiencing 
sympathy” (pp. 671-672). Therefore to avoid misunderstanding, due to the 
definitional confusion of empathy with other constructs such as sympathy, all eight 
psychological states which have been referred to as empathy in Batson’s work 
(Batson, 2011) are presented. To gain a better understanding of the link between 
cooperation and empathy, it is important here, to clarify exactly what the studies in 
the systematic review mean by the term empathy. As mentioned before, 
inconsistencies revealed in the systematic review may be accounted for based on the 
lack of precision defining which phenomena are actually being studied.  
“1) Knowing another person’s internal state, including his or her thoughts 
and feelings; 2) adopting the posture or matching the neural response of an observed 
other; 3) coming to feel as another person feels; 4) intuiting or projecting oneself into 
another’s situation; 5) imagining how another is thinking and feeling; 6) imagining 
how one would think and feel in the other’s place; 7) feeling distress at witnessing 
another person’s suffering; 8) feeling for another person who is suffering, which is 
other-oriented emotion elicited by and congruent with the perceived welfare of 
someone in need.” (Batson, 2011, pp. 12-19) 
Thus, an additional column “concept of empathy” is added in Tables 1 and 2 
to examine the corresponding psychological state investigated in each study, and then 
going back to examine the concept of empathy in those references included in the 
systematic review. The concepts of empathy were categorized either as explicitly 
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defined in the references or inferred based on the descriptions of empathy. Thus, as 
seen from Table 1, most Category 1 studies investigated the 8th concept of empathy 
with the remaining studies examining the 1st, 3rd, 5th and 7th concepts. Studies falling 
under Category 2 investigated the 6th and 8th concepts of empathy. It is apparent that 
there are substantial differences between the studies regarding the concept of empathy, 
however, even when taking the different conceptions into consideration, this does not 
account for the discrepancies. Of the other factors which might contribute to the 
mixed findings; the precise meaning of cooperation seems the highest possibility and 
will be presented in the following section. 
1.4.2. Definitions of Cooperation  
Although the key word search for “cooperation” was limited in the selective 
criteria in the systematic review, careful reading of the studies (see Table 2), suggests 
some were investigating other types of pro-social behaviour which may not 
specifically be considered as cooperation per se; for instance, helping (Allsop, et al., 
2002; Cialdini, et al., 1987; Fultz, et al., 1986; Oswald, 1996, 2002; Pavey, et al., 
2012; Stürmer, et al., 2006) and altruistic sharing (Warren & Walker, 1991) are 
similar to but not identical to cooperation (Batson & Moran, 1999; Eimontaite, et al., 
2013; Rumble, et al., 2010; Xu, et al., 2012). The same issue applies to studies 
classified under Category 1. The evidence from Category 1 and Category 2 deal with 
cooperation as either cooperative intention or behaviour, whereas the studies under 
Category 3 considered cooperation in the cooperative context itself. The findings in 
Category 3 were not generally considered to make a big contribution to the 
association between empathy and cooperation, because the cooperative context is 
simply manipulated by imagining positive-person contact or experiencing synchrony. 
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This is rather different from common definitions of cooperation, which will be 
defined later. However, the studies under Category 3 are still an essential and critical 
part of the conceptual understanding of the association between empathy and 
cooperation. Despite the importance of Category 3 studies, studies under Categories 1 
and 2 studies are also of central interest for researchers because the cooperative tasks 
studied are treated as more typical of cooperative behaviours.  
As mentioned, the second issue revealed in the systematic review is that 
cooperation (in Categories 1 and 2) is considered as synonymous with pro-sociality, 
and other types of pro-social behaviour. So what exactly does cooperation mean here? 
Is cooperation the same as helping, or charity donations? Generally cooperation, 
helping and sharing are all referred to as examples of pro-social behaviours (Marcus, 
1991). Pro-social behaviour refers to voluntary actions that are intended to benefit 
another individual or group of individuals (Eisenberg & Mussen, 1989). Altruistic 
behaviours are those pro-social behaviours motivated by other–oriented intentions or 
moral concerns and empathy (Eisenberg, 1986), sometimes at a cost to oneself; 
though not all pro-social behaviours are altruistic behaviours. Altruism is a 
motivational state with the ultimate goal of increasing another’s welfare, though from 
Batson’s perspective, altruism does not necessarily require self-sacrifice. Egoism is a 
motivational state with the ultimate goal of increasing one’s own welfare (Batson, 
1991). Therefore, pro-social behaviours may result in the same outcome but crucially 
the underlying motivations for the behaviours can either be altruistic or egotistical.  
In general, cooperation tends to be defined according to the relationships 
between members of a group. One approach is to focus on the individual’s role within 
a group. If cooperation is considered from the perspective of an individual within a 
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group, the definition of cooperation is behaviour that benefits the group or collective, 
often at the cost of individual benefits (Irwin, et al., 2008). For example, Hinde and 
Groebel (1991, p. 27) refer to cooperation as “behaviour intended to benefit a group at 
a cost to an individual”. Another way to define cooperation is to focus on the 
relationship between the relevant parties (i.e. individuals, groups, institutions), such as 
joint behaviour that is directed toward a goal in which the participants gain equal 
rewards (Marwell & Schmitt, 1975). If one considers cooperation from the 
perspective of the relationship between individuals, then cooperation should be 
referred to as behaviour that involves a shared goal. Ideally, two persons perform 
interdependent roles (the actions of each influence the other’s gains or losses) directed 
by a shared goal. In addition they possess the motivation to mutually support each 
other’s action to reach that goal; this always involves activities with shared goals and 
shared intentions (Derlega & Grzelak, 1982; Liebal, Colombi, Rogers, Warneken, & 
Tomasello, 2008; Warneken & Tomasello, 2007). However, there is a possibility for 
joint action based on motivations that are egotistical; because it is not necessary for 
there to be a shared underlying intention, even though the goal is shared. For this 
definition, the key feature for cooperation is that the relationship between individuals 
is interdependent.  
Based on the distinctions drawn from the relationship between individual to 
group and the relative gains, how helping differs from cooperation on the basis of the 
relationship between two parties should be considered (Derlega & Grzelak, 1982; 
Marwell & Schmitt, 1975). Helping is considered as behaviour in which the helper 
must understand the other’s unachieved goal and other’s intention. If motivated by 
altruism, this would be when one is directed to perform a voluntary action in a 
situation in which the helpee is dependent on the helper. Derlega and Grzelak (1982) 
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argued that what distinguished helping from cooperation are the nature of the jointly 
determined costs and benefits rather than the nature of the dependence relation. 
Cooperation involves mutual rewards (material/external rewards to distinguish 
helping from cooperation) and mutual costs. In contrast, in helping situations the 
reward is experienced by the helpee alone, and the costs (and decision control) by the 
helper alone. In addition to helping, cooperation is also confused with sharing, but 
this too is distinct from cooperation. Based on the definitions of cooperation and 
helping, sharing is referred to as a voluntary action motivated by altruism; however, 
the sharer does not need to understand the other’s goal and intention, whereas they 
should do in cooperative situations. Table 4 presents the distinctions between 
cooperation, helping and sharing. From behavioural perspectives, sharing, helping and 
cooperation are all “give-some” behaviours (Komorita & Parks, 1994). 
Table 4 The Distinctions among Sharing, Helping and Cooperation 
 Behaviour Cognitive Process Motivation Relation of parties 
Cooperation Giving and 
Gaining  
1. Both know the other’s 
intention and goal   
2. Both know they will 








1. The helper 
understand the helpee 
unachieved goal  
2. The helper knows the 
helpee need  
Other-concerns The helpee is 
dependent on 
helper 
Sharing Giving  No necessary 
understanding of the 





1.4.3. Measures of Cooperation 
Along with providing conceptual clarification of cooperation, cooperation was 
considered as a dependent variable, and so the measure of cooperation discussed, with 
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many studies using classic social dilemmas tasks (R. M. Dawes, 1980), and others 
involving the use of self-report questionnaires (see Table 5). 




1 (within a 
group) 
Public Goods Game (Batson, Batson, et al., 1995);  Cooperative 
Behaviour 
2 (two parties) Prisoner’s Dilemma (Van Lange, Ouwerkerk, & 




1&2 (within a 
group & two 
parties)  
social cooperation scale of Cloninger’s 
Temperament and Character Inventory test 
(Cloninger, Przybeck, & Svrakic, 1994; Paal & 
Bereczkei, 2007);  organizational citizenship 




The most widely used behavioural paradigms are in the domain of social 
dilemmas, including the prisoner’s dilemma and variations of it (Batson & Ahmad, 
2001; Batson & Moran, 1999; Rumble, et al., 2010; Xu, et al., 2012), and the public 
goods game (PGG) (Batson, Batson, et al., 1995). The classic paradigm of the 
prisoner’s dilemma is derived from prisoner confession stories. To detect the relation 
between empathy and cooperation, there are several variants of the prisoner’s 
dilemma game which measures cooperation, and a simultaneous variant of prisoner’s 
dilemma (card given) (Batson & Moran, 1999) is one of them. In their variant, each 
participant received three cards (two +5 and one -5 cards). There were four outcomes 
(+5/+5; +5/-5; -5/+5; -5/-5), which the payoffs of outcome match the payoff matrix of 
the classic prisoner’s dilemma task. In this card game variant of prisoner’s dilemma 
the operational definition of cooperation is giving a +5 card in each experimental 
condition. It is worthwhile mentioning that the interactive paradigm of Van Lange and 
Visser (1999), another variant of prisoner’s dilemma, allows participants to decide 
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how many coins to give away to the partner, which could also be construed as a 
method of examining degrees of cooperation. 
There are also several variants of the PGG; one example of it (Batson, Batson, 
et al., 1995) is as follows. Initially, each participant would receive 16 raffle tickets in 
two 8-ticket blocks; each ticket was good for one chance of winning a $30 gift 
certificate at the store of the winner’s choice. For each block, the participant could 
keep the 8 tickets (all or none) for him- or herself, give them to another participant, or 
give to the group as a whole. In addition, they were told that the more raffle tickets 
they ended up with; the more chance they have of winning a gift certificate. The 
participant would play the game and then simply be informed of the final number of 
tickets he or she received, but without knowing other participant’s individual 
allocation decision. If the tickets were given to the group as a whole, those tickets 
were given 50% extra, and then divided equally to each of the participants. In this 
experimental setting, participants were placed with the conflict of self-interest, other-
interest and collective interest. According to the first definition of cooperation, it 
refers to the conflict between self-interest and collective interest. Thus, the 
operational definition of cooperation is to give the raffle tickets to the group.  
Cooperation is therefore defined as behaviour that benefits the group or the 
collective, often at the cost of benefit to the individual (Irwin, et al., 2008). This 
perspective is to measure the intragroup cooperation, for which the common measures 
are PGG and the common resource paradigm. Alternatively, there is another 
perspective in considering cooperation as joint behaviour that is directed toward a 
goal in which the participants gain equal rewards (Marwell & Schmitt, 1975). This 
definition of cooperation is more likely to measure dyadic cooperation, with the most 
common measures being the prisoner’s dilemma and ultimatum game. The prisoner’s 
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dilemma game studies dyadic cooperation and the PGG examines multi-person 
cooperation. In summary, social dilemma tasks are the primary measure of adults’ 
cooperative behaviour. Social dilemma tasks generally require participants to make 
decisions in a scenario, sometimes decisions are associated with the payoff; while 
self-report questionnaires (e.g., The social cooperation scale of Cloninger’s 
Temperament and Character Inventory Test and organizational citizenship behaviour 
questionnaires) are based on participants’ self-report which can lack real costs. In this 
case the measure of cooperation are intentions to cooperate, as indicated in Table 5. 
The main focus of the discussion here has been on studies that fall under 
Category 1 and 2, for which there is some overlap regarding methods for studying 
cooperation and the definitions of cooperation. Studies falling under Category 3 are 
rather different from the other two categories because they concern manipulations of 
cooperation rather than measures of cooperative behaviour per se. For this reason the 
measures of cooperation are not discussed further for Category 3, though the research 
approach taken for studies under this category provide a novel way of examining the 
association between empathy and cooperation.  
Considering the different conceptual issues regarding empathy and 
cooperation, along with the measures of cooperation, as highlighted, it is worth now 
considering this as a possible explanation of the mixed findings in the studies 
included in the systematic review, Therefore, distinguishing cooperation from other 
types of pro-social behaviours and understanding the psychological concepts of 
empathy (eight concepts in total), the evidence suggests that for those studies that fall 
under Category 1, the empathy-cooperation link (Paal & Bereczkei, 2007) (1-C) and 
the empathy-helping (8-H) (Eisenberg, Fabes, et al., 1989; Eisenberg, Miller, et al., 
1989) are positive, but the empathy-sharing (1-S) (Edele, et al., 2013) is mixed. For 
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those studies in the Category 2, empathy-cooperation link (8-C) (Batson & Moran, 
1999; Rumble, et al., 2010) and empathy-helping link (8-H & 6-H) (Fultz, et al., 1986; 
Oswald, 2000) were found positive, but the empathy-sharing link (6-S) (Warren & 
Walker, 1991) was not. In short, Category 1 explores the correlation between empathy 
and cooperation, with a stable and positive correlation found regarding real 
cooperation, instead of other types of pro-social behaviours, and empathy as in 
“knowing another person’s internal state, including his or her thoughts and feelings”. 
Moreover, another stable empathy-cooperation link was found when empathy refers 
to “feeling for another person who is suffering. This is other oriented emotion elicited 
by and congruent with the perceived welfare of someone in need” and is manipulated 
as an independent variable.  
The limitations of the present systematic review are that it only includes 
English language publications, and does not include unpublished empirical data 
(Rothstein, Sutton, & Borenstein, 2006). In addition, only “empathy” and 
“cooperation” were used as the key words when searching through the databases. A 
broader search including terms such as “sympathy”, “compassion”, and “perspective 
taking” might help to obtain thoughtful and complete studies; however, such a broad 
search would add to the conceptual problems that already exist regarding the terms 
empathy and cooperation. Despite these limitations, this systematic review still 
provides an evaluation of the evidence that seeks to explore the association between 
empathy and cooperation, and highlights that more work needs to be done to establish 
the reliability of the precise relation between empathy and cooperation. Specifically, 
the systematic review helps to distinguish amongst those forms of pro-social 
behaviours and point out the current mixed use of relevant concepts (e.g., pro-
sociality, cooperation and helping). This should highlight to researchers that they need 
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to be more careful with regards to what conceptions of empathy and cooperation they 
are investigating in future studies. What is more, through experimental design these 
concepts need to be carefully distinguished in order to lead to successful theory 
development. For example, measuring cooperation and helping separately, and by 
manipulating information (i.e. what is revealed) for both players, as well as 
considering the structure in the prisoner’s dilemma from the 
interdependence/dependence relationship will make it possible to improve on the 
current state of empirical work. Furthermore, using a variety of measures of both 
empathy and cooperation in a single study would help to measure not only the effects 
on cooperation in a PGG, but also the reliance on other measures of cooperative 
intention (e.g., the social cooperation scale of Cloninger’s Temperament and 
Character Inventory Test (Cloninger, et al., 1994)). 
As mentioned thus far no previous review has been conducted that examines 
the different research approaches designed to investigate the relationship between 
empathy and cooperation. The aim here has been to highlight key findings, and to 
show further fruitful areas of inquiry, and to present conceptual controversies.  
1.5. Conclusion and Implication for Future Studies 
Empathy and cooperation constitute two of the most researched topics in the 
social and behavioural sciences, spanning more than five decades of theorizing and 
research. Despite these longstanding efforts, one key question that is essential to 
theories of empathy and cooperation has not been fully answered, namely: what is the 
relationship between empathy and cooperation? To date, with the exception of the 
presented review, there has been no systematic review (or meta-analysis) that has 
consolidated research insights in order to answer this key question. The systematic 
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review shows that evidence across three methodological approaches implies an 
association between empathy and cooperation. More to the point, if studies show that 
the manipulation of cooperation can in turn impact on empathy, and vice versa, that 
inducing empathy can increase cooperation, then it may be the case that there is a bi-
directional relationship between empathy and cooperation. Another critical problem 
addressed by this systematic review is that there is a need for conceptual clarification 
regarding what cooperation is, and how it is distinct from other types of pro-social 
behaviours (helping, sharing). Most researchers readily agree that the role of empathy 
is crucial to well-functioning relationships, organizations, and even societies, but the 
extant literature is far from providing definitive support for this assumption. The 
endeavour here has been that this systematic review provides a valuable insight for 
those researchers who show a keen interest in researching the association between 
empathy and cooperation.  
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Chapter 2  Theoretical Motivation 
The last chapter used a systematic review to present empirical evidence on the 
association between empathy and cooperation. The aim of this project is to explore 
the effects of empathy on cooperation, in which empathy is the independent variable 
and cooperation the dependent variable, as in section 1.3.2 Category 2. Prior to 
describing a series of empirical studies I conducted to explore this issue, the 
theoretical backgrounds will firstly be introduced. This chapter presents the 
theoretical motivations behind the experiments conducted in this thesis and also the 
way in which the research question of the whole thesis is addressed. The first section 
introduces the Public Goods Game (PGG) experimental paradigm and its rationale; 
the second section presents the theories and models that explain why people cooperate 
within groups; the third section discusses the motivations of cooperation in social 
dilemma; the fourth section contains a discussion on the theories concerning empathy-
cooperation link; and the final section outlines the four studies conducted in the 
empirical section of this thesis and their theoretical connections with relevant theories 
introduced in the second and fourth sections. 
2.1. PGG and its Rationale 
In Chapter 1, the systematic review provided an evidence-based analysis on 
the clarification of definitions. The conclusions suggested that the experimental 
paradigm used in research plays a critical role in determining the addressed research 
problem and operational definition. As discussed in Chapter 1 and according to other 
review work (Eisenberg & Miller, 1987), the mixed findings in previous studies are 
due to the diversity of experimental tools, as well as the various different and 
misaligned conceptions of empathy and cooperation. Therefore, to enable a better and 
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clearer comparison with previous studies, the series of studies within this thesis 
consistently adopted a typical experimental paradigm, a linear public goods game 
(PGG). Given its roots in game theory, the PGG was selected because it not only 
meets all the requirements of social dilemmas, but also provides a precise way of 
examining cooperative behaviour in a group setting. Social dilemma games consist of 
two key characteristics: a) at any given decision point individuals receive higher 
payoffs for making selfish choices than they do for making cooperative choices 
(regardless of the choices made by those with whom they interact); and b) everyone 
involved in the game receives lower payoffs if everyone makes selfish choices than if 
everyone makes cooperative choices (R. M. Dawes, 1980). Unlike another widely 
studied economic game, the prisoner’s dilemma, PGG enables researchers to explore 
cooperative behaviour within small groups and provides a continuous response 
instead of a binary choice. Although these two experimental paradigms are 
distinctive, researchers have argued that they are connected to a certain degree. The 
prisoner’s dilemma is considered as a special case of the PGG in which two players 
make a binary choice: contributing nothing (i.e. defect) or contributing everything 
(i.e. cooperate) (Fehr & Fischbacher, 2004). Each player in the prisoner’s dilemma is 
better off if he defects regardless of what the opponent does. However, Fehr and 
Fischbacher (2004) highlighted that in the PGG, the collective rational choice is to 
contribute everything on each round (i.e. full cooperation). This is because if all 
players defect (keep their all tokens in each round), they only keep what they started 
with. If, however, all players cooperate on each round (contribute their full 
endowments), their overall income is significantly greater than their endowment on 
each round. The connection of these two types of social dilemma provides a valid 
reason for selecting the PGG as the experimental paradigm of choice in this thesis. 
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The final reason for selecting the PGG is due to the broad range of investigations it 
enables. Due to such practical applications, the PGG is not only used in psychology, 
but also in other disciplines such as sociology, biology and economics (Komorita & 
Parks, 1995). Thus, consistently adopting the PGG across the studies in this thesis 
provides an opportunity for multidisciplinary applications. In summary, strong 
mathematical roots, a typical representative social dilemma paradigm, a continuous 
response, and a cross-disciplinary application lead to the selection of the PGG as the 
experimental paradigm for use in the thesis.  
In the public goods problem an individual’s incentive is at odds with the group 
interest. While this conflict has received attention, over several decades, from a 
number of aforementioned disciplines (Fehr & Gächter, 2000; Fischbacher & 
Gächter, 2010; Kroll, Cherry, & Shogren, 2007b; Ledyard, 1994; Rapoport & 
Suleiman, 1993), it was first investigated by economists (Lindahl, 1919) in 1919. 
Economist Samuelson (1954) conjectured the problem, and later Ledyard and Roberts 
(1974) discussed the PGG in detail, including describing a typical experiment, 
exploring the fundamental question of the PGG and identifying factors increasing 
cooperation. The initial discussion on the issue by economists inspired political 
scientists to pay attention to the problem of collective action (Olson, 1965) followed 
by  Sociologists (Marwell & Schmitt, 1975). After publication of an annual review 
concerning social dilemma by the social psychologist Dawes (R. M. Dawes, 1980) 
psychologists joined the discussion. The public goods problem drew the attention of 
these researchers due to its direct real life application to help solve social problems 
and guide policy making. There are many example of use of the PGG paradigm in 
‘everyday’ settings, ranging from paying taxes (Uler, 2011), voting (Kroll, et al., 
2007b), to contributing to keep the National Public Radio on the air (Attari, Krantz, & 
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Weber, 2014). The greatest challenge to the PGG is free riding. Free riding refers to 
individuals who always pay out none or less than the average contribution of others 
(Andreoni, 1988), which leads to the non-production or underproduction of a public 
good.  
Many variants of the PGG were generated and adopted in order to meet a 
variety of researchers’ needs. So far, studies of cooperative behaviours typically use 
either the linear (continuous) (Fehr & Gächter, 2000; Ledyard, 1994; Zelmer, 2003) 
or discrete (step-level) (De Cremer, 2007; Rapoport & Suleiman, 1993) version of the 
PGG. For the linear PGG, the value of the public good varies directly with the total 
amount contributed by the group members; whereas in the step-level PGG, there is a 
provision point such that the public good provided is all-or-none if the total amount 
contributed exceeds the provision point (Komorita & Parks, 1995). The present thesis 
uses the linear PGG rather than the step-level PGG because the step-level PGG 
measures coordination and the linear PGG measures cooperation, as noted by Abele, 
Stasser, and Chartier (2010).  
In typical linear PGG games players are endowed with 20 tokens in each of 10 
rounds, and they must choose to contribute anything from 0-20 tokens per round. 
After each player makes a decision, the group pot will be multiplied by a certain 
number and then all tokens in the common pot divided evenly irrespective of the 
player’s initial contributions. The mathematical equation shown as Equation 1 is 
adopted from (Fehr & Gächter, 2000).  




     0 < 𝑎 < 1 < 𝑛𝑎                                              (1) 
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Here 𝜋𝑖  is the monetary payoff for the participant i is one round, 𝑎  is the 
marginal per capita return from a contribution to the public good, 𝑔𝑖  refers to the 
contribution to the group pot. In each round each of the n participants in a group 
receives an endowment of 𝑦 tokens. A participant can either keep these tokens for 
him- or herself or invest 𝑔𝑖 tokens (0 ≤ 𝑔𝑖 ≤ 𝑦) into a project. The decisions about 
𝑔𝑖 are made simultaneously. In the present thesis, there are 10 rounds, 4-player or 2-
player groups (n = 4 or 2); with 𝑎 being equal to the factor by which the pot is 
multiplied divided by the number of players. 
The rationality for the one-shot game and iterated game of the linear PGG are 
different. The operational definition of cooperation in the PGG is the amount of 
contributions in the common pot (𝑔𝑖). There is only one Nash equilibrium for the one-
shot PGG, which is to contribute zero (𝑔𝑖 = 0), a self-defeating dominant strategy 
(Abele, et al., 2010). According to empirical studies (Ledyard, 1994), most people 
typically contribute 40% ~ 60% of their endowments in the one-shot linear PGG, or 
the first round in the iterated game. However, the optimal strategy for the iterated 
linear PGG is still unclear and controversial. For the iterated version, the behaviour of 
some people may approximate the tit-for-tat strategy for repeated interaction with the 
same individual (Nowak, 2006), which is a matching strategy that involves mimicking 
what opponents do in the previous round. The standard tit-for-tat strategy is usually 
defined and interpreted for repeated two-player games with binary pure responses 
(cooperate or defect). Throughout the whole thesis, the matching strategy in the PGG 
is a generalized tit-for-tat strategy, that is, the main observed pattern is that people 
adopt a simple strategy that tracks the behaviour of others. In other words, they adopt 
the so-called “Golden Rule” - “Do unto others as they have done unto you”. However, 
is this the whole story? The answer is, not quite. On iterated versions some 
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individuals, characterized as unconditional free riders, start by contributing nothing, 
regardless of how the other opponents behave, and maintain this strategy throughout 
all the PGG rounds (Fischbacher, Gächter, & Fehr, 2001). However there are some 
individuals, referred to as unconditional co-operators, who contribute everything 
regardless of their opponents’ responses (Nowak & Sigmund, 1993).  
2.2. Theories concerning Human Cooperation 
Theoretical work (H. H. Kelley & Thibaut, 1978; Tyler, 2010; Weber, 
Kopelman, & Messick, 2004) in the area of human cooperation appears to be focused 
on the question, why do people cooperate? The question concerns fundamental issues 
regarding what the appropriate strategy is in repeated social dilemma games, and as 
discussed in the previous section, are there different ways of conceptualizing what the 
optimal strategy is with regards to maximizing personal gain, and maximizing the 
overall gain of the group? The discussion that follows considers the different 
theoretical approaches to address this question. Four different disciplines have 
developed theories to address these questions, namely evolutionary biologists, 
economists, sociologists and psychologists, and these will be discussed in turn, with a 
particular focus on the psychological work in the domain of cooperative behaviours.  
Evolutionary biologists suggest that cooperative behaviours have evolved 
through natural selection by kin selection, direct reciprocity, indirect reciprocity, 
network reciprocity and group selection (Deng & Chu, 2011; Hauert, Holmes, & 
Doebeli, 2006; Nowak, 2006; Sachs, et al., 2004; Sigmund, 2009; Tomasello & 
Carpenter, 2007). Kin selection, also called inclusive fitness, suggests that genetic 
relatedness will favour cooperation (Dawkins, 1976) and this claim was developed to 
explain why relatives cooperate with each other more than with strangers. Direct 
reciprocity refers to cooperation occurring due to repeated encounters between the 
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same individuals, even strangers, as they too cooperate in some circumstances. 
Indirect reciprocity occurs when the relationship between the actor and the recipients 
is asymmetric and therefore direct reciprocity is impossible. This indirect reciprocity 
is a means of establishing a good reputation within a new social group. Network 
reciprocity refers to cooperation within one’s own spatial network (e.g. neighbours) 
with clusters of co-operators outcompeting defectors. Group selection is the idea that 
competition is not only between individuals but also between groups, for example, 
pure cooperator groups might grow faster than pure defector groups. The five 
mechanisms from an evolutionary perspective to explain why people cooperate in five 
different possible types of situations (genetic relatives, two repeated interacting 
individuals, social acquaintances, co-operators networks and group relations), which 
helps us to clearly understand the evolution of cooperation. In summary, evolutionary 
biologists focus on the ultimate distal mechanisms that support fitness or reproductive 
success outcomes, which is informed by an evolutionary mechanism based on 
repeated interactions with strangers. This in turn provides a guide for analysing the 
generalized tit-for-tat strategy.  
Economists claim that expected utility/rational choice models (Elster, 1986; 
Pruitt & Kimmel, 1977) are concerned with maximizing personal utility, while the 
inequality aversion model (Fehr & Schmidt, 2000) involves other-regarding 
preference concerns for fairness and reciprocity. The expected utility/rational choice 
model presumes vigilant, calculating decision makers who assess choice 
environments with care, determine the probable utility (e.g., payoff) associated with 
each possible choice, and then choose to maximize their expected utility. One issue 
with this is that many rational choice models struggle to account for actual evidence 
of cooperative behaviour because they tend to predict that people will maximize their 
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own utility at the expense of the group (Colman, 1995; Ch 9). Thus, one way in which 
rational choice theory is problematic is the default expectation that all other players 
will behave rationally, that is, all members will maximize personal wealth, and does 
not necessarily show cooperative behaviours. What the evidence suggests, however, is 
that people make decisions in social dilemma games that are based on incomplete 
information, errors, and more importantly, on concerns for the welfare of others. 
Therefore, where empirical data cannot be fully explained and predicted by the 
rational choice model, the inequality aversion model (Fehr & Schmidt, 1999) is 
proposed as an alternative model which makes reference to other-regarding 
preferences. The inequality aversion model, motivated by psychological evidence on 
social comparison and loss aversion (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979), suggests that 
people resist inequitable outcomes between their opponents’ payoffs and their own 
payoffs (Fehr & Schmidt, 1999). In most cases, the standard self-interest model 
(expected utility/rational choice model) is unambiguously refuted; however, in other 
situations (e.g., ultimatum game, PGG with punishments), the predictions of the 
inequality aversion model seem to be more accurate. 
While economists were dealing with a variety of experimental economic 
games investigating cooperation and models predicting cooperative behaviour, 
sociologists sought to explain why people show cooperative behaviours at a societal 
level (Simpson, 2004, 2006; Simpson, Willer, & Ridgeway, 2012; Willer, 2009b). For 
instance, the status theory of collective action, proposed by Willer (2009b), 
emphasizes the role of status in motivating group members to overcome the 
temptation to free ride, as well as promoting a fear of inefficacy. This theory claimed 
that cooperation with public goods (collective action) earns an individual improved 
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status and this standing in turn motivates individuals further to show cooperative 
behaviours (Willer, 2009b). 
Within social psychology, there are several theories that have attempted to 
explain the social-cognitive mechanisms that underpin cooperative decision-making. 
Unlike evolutionary biologists, economists and sociologists, social psychologists are 
interested in identifying the motivations that are the antecedents of cooperation, 
exploring the motivations that shape the degree to which people cooperate with others 
and the personal and situational factors that impact cooperation choice (Van Lange, 
Joireman, Parks, & Van Dijk, 2013). Two main approaches will be considered in 
depth: resource-exchange based theories and identity-based theories. With regards to 
resource-exchange based theories, the fundamental idea is based on the fact that 
people exchange their resources to maximize their own materialistic benefit and to 
minimize cost (economic motivations). Two theories that fall under this category are 
the interdependence theory (H. H. Kelley & Thibaut, 1978) and the social-value 
emotion framework of pro-sociality (Keltner, Kogan, Piff, & Saturn, 2014). With 
regards to identity-based theories, the fundamental idea is that people behave 
cooperatively in order to obtain group identity within their community. Thus the 
incentives of individuals to cooperate are social motivations rather than economic 
motivations. The theories that fall under this category are the group engagement 
model (Tyler & Blader, 2003) and the appropriateness framework (Weber, et al., 
2004). Each of these theories will be described in the following section.  
2.2.1. The Interdependence Theory and associated theories 
The interdependence theory, derived from game theory, provides a 
comprehensive account for interaction and relationships by delineating the ways in 
which social situations shape both intrapersonal and interpersonal processes. It 
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presents a logical analysis of the structure of interpersonal situations, advances a 
taxonomic model of situation, that is, a functional analysis of the structure of the 
social situations interacting people encounter. It connects types of situations to the 
particular types of goals and motives that are relevant to dealing with situations. 
(Rusbult & Van Lange, 2003) The interdependence theory, proposed by H. H. Kelley 
and Thibaut (1978) assumes that the structure (e.g., the payoff structure), partners (A 
and B), and dynamics (e.g., the strategy) of interaction jointly determine the 
interdependent interaction. The interdependence theory is derived from game theory, 
and it assumes that decision makers transform the given matrix to the effective matrix, 
with the effective matrix closely linked to their behaviour. The transformation process 
may involve a redefinition of the choices and/or a shifting of evaluative criteria (H. H. 
Kelley & Thibaut, 1978, p. 17). Each person’s matrix, (given matrix and effective 
matrix) is determined by the relative magnitudes of: the direct control over their own 
outcomes (reflexive control), the direct control over their outcome by their partner 
(fate control), and the two person’s joint control over their outcomes (behaviour 
control). This theory was suggested as a broad theoretical framework that helps 
understand the interdependence structure (what a situation is about) and 
transformations (what people might make of a situation). 
The interdependence theory was later developed by Van Lange (1999) into the 
integrative model of social value orientation, and further developed by Parks to form 
Parks’ Integrated Model (C. D. Parks, Joireman, & Van Lange, 2013). As shown in 
Figure 3, the central part of the Parks’ Integrated Model is the given matrix (features 
of the decision self), effective matrix (personal histories, culture, evolutionary 
motives, and immediate social situation), and the transformation process, which are 
the basic ideas of the interdependence theory. The integrated model combines the 
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basic tenets of Kelley and Thibaut’s (1978) interdependence theory, and develops it 
by taking into account individual differences (e.g., social value orientations), and 
cultural influences and factors moderating response to outcomes. Social value 
orientation describes a person’s preferred pattern of outcomes for participants in a 
mixed-motivation situation, and how she/he tends to characterize (or transform) the 
interpersonal situation (Van Lange, Agnew, Harinck, & Steemers, 1997). The model 
assumes that the effective matrix can affect a decision maker’s intention to cooperate 
via perceived consequences or decision rules. 




Figure 3. The integrative model of decision making in social dilemma adopted from (C. D. 
Parks, et al., 2013) 
2.2.2. The Sociocultural Appraisals, Values and Emotions (SAVE) Framework of 
Pro-sociality 
Unlike the interdependence theory and its follow-up theories, an alternative 
focus has been to consider cognitive processes in social dilemma decision making. 
The social appraisals, values and emotions theory is a comprehensive framework that 
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explores the psychological mechanism of pro-sociality, including but not limited to 
cooperation, as noted in section 1.4.2 Definitions of Cooperation. The central ideas of 
both theories are resource exchange. Keltner, et al. (2014) focused primarily on the 
factors that affect people acting in a positive manner towards others even, in some 
cases, at the expense to themselves. As shown in Figure 4, under this framework, the 
focus is to explain the balance of cost and benefits when acting pro-socially. If the 
cost of action is larger than the benefits, and the cost of inaction, then the pro-social 
behaviour (such as acting cooperatively) is likely to occur. M in Figure 4 refers to 
social momentum for acting pro-socially. This represents the degree to which the 
individual’s sociocultural milieu encourages or discourages pro-social behaviour and 
is largely affected by cultural factors, e.g., social norms and cultural value. D is the 
default, which captures individual differences in pro-sociality and situational factors 
that characterize the immediate social context and make pro-social behaviour more or 
less likely. K is the modifying factor, which captures the giver’s biases and 
perceptions of the specific recipient (negative or positive biases). Bself is the perceived 
benefit to the self of acting pro-socially; Brecipient is the perceived benefit to the 
recipient of a particular pro-social act; Cinaction refers to the cost to self for not acting 
pro-socially; Caction refers to the cost to self for acting pro-socially. This framework 
focuses on individual-level appraisal processes that give rise to pro-social action, but 
it also models how dyadic, group and cultural factors further shape this cost-benefit 
analysis.  
 
Figure 4. The sociocultural appraisals, values and emotions (SAVE) framework of pro-
sociality adopted from (Keltner, et al., 2014)  
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In summary, what is clear from the models that fall under the category of 
resource exchange approach theories is that materialistic or economic cost-benefit 
analysis is the core factor that motivates people to behave pro-socially, including, 
specifically, cooperative behaviours.  
2.2.3. The Group Engagement Model 
The two theories mentioned above stress the economic motivations of acting 
cooperatively from the resources exchange perspective. The following models argue 
that there are social motivations that can supplement economic motivations in 
securing intragroup cooperation. The group engagement model focuses on addressing 
why people cooperate in groups, such as companies and institutions. Therefore, unlike 
the interdependence theory focusing on the decision-making in social dilemma, the 
group engagement theory not only provides theoretical accounts on the social 
dilemma problem, but also stresses the group identification process and the sense of 
collective/group identity. The group engagement model highlights the coexistence 
between individual and group, while interdependence theory and the SAVE 
framework emphasizes the individual level, specifically at the level of the individual 
cognitive processes involved in cooperative behaviour. 
The group engagement model (Tyler & Blader, 2003) assumes justice 
motivates pro-social behaviours. Specifically it explains why procedural justice 
shapes cooperation in groups, organizations and societies, and implies that procedural 
justice influences cooperation through social identity. Procedural justice, one of the 
three primary arenas of justice research (distributive justice, procedural justice and 
retributive justice), is the study of people’s subjective evaluations of the justice of 
procedures (whether they are fair or unfair, ethical or unethical), and otherwise accord 
with people’s standards for fair processes in social interaction and decision making 
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(Schroeder & Graziano, 2015, p. 551). This model draws together the insight of the 
group-value model of procedural justice (Lind & Tyler, 1988) and the relational 
model of authority (Lind & Tyler, 1992) and extends them to explain the antecedents 
of cooperation in groups (Tyler & Blader, 2001). Social identity theory argues that to 
the degree that people think of themselves in terms of group membership, they are 
drawing their identity from the group; and also argues that when people identify more 
strongly with a group, they will be more willing to act cooperatively in that group—
investing their time and energy in working to see the group succeed. The group 
engagement model extends the social identity theory, and develops the contents of 
identity (identification, status judgment) into three aspects: identification, pride, and 
respect (Tyler, 2010, p. 39), as shown in Figure 5. Identification refers to the degree 
to which people merge their sense of self with the group; pride refers to judgments 
about the status of the group, expresses people’s view about the status of the group in 
a large context, and is indexed by measures of group prestige (Mael & Ashforth, 
1992); respect reflects judgments about one’s status within the group and expresses 
people’s views about their status in the eyes of other group members (Tyler, 2010). 
Why does identity encourage cooperation? From an identity perspective, people act 
cooperatively, at the expense of their self-interest, because they have merged with 
others, so that self-interest and the interest of others are intertwined. Hence they think 
of the group interest as their own interest (De Cremer & Tyler, 2005). Procedural 
justice within groups influences the identification judgement and this in turn 
influences cooperation. The model makes the key claim that people focus on 
procedural justice and it is this that sheds light on their motivations for engaging in 
groups. This model explicitly posits what these motivations are, that is, the argument 
underlying the group engagement model. This model is more focused on cooperative 
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behaviour in groups rather than specifically addressing social dilemma problems, 
although the same logic, in theory, can be extended to be able to explain behaviour in 
social dilemma problems.  
 
Figure 5. The group engagement model adopted from (Tyler & Blader, 2003) 
2.2.4. The Appropriateness Framework 
The group engagement model stresses the role of identity on intragroup 
cooperation. Likewise, the appropriateness framework considers identity as one of 
three key concepts determining choices in group contexts. Similar to the 
interdependence theory, the appropriateness framework is particularly interested in 
decision making in social dilemmas. The “identity” in the group engagement model is 
more like group identification (group membership) - “How strongly do I belong to 
this group”; whereas the “identity” in the appropriateness framework is the perception 
of self, and does not necessarily link to a group per se but other individuals in the 
group - “What does a person like me?” Despite this gap regarding the definition of 
identity, the perception of self in most cases contributes to group identification, 
especially when the individual and group share similar values (Van Zomeren, 
Postmes, & Spears, 2008).  
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Unlike the interdependence theory and the SAVE framework, based on the 
logic of consequence, the appropriateness framework (Weber, et al., 2004) is based on 
the logic of appropriateness (March, 1994). Weber and colleague’s (2004) framework 
aims to answer the fundamental question; “what does a person like me (identity) do 
(rule) when they are in the situation like this (recognition)?” (p. 282). As shown in 
Figure 6, identity (e.g., what does a person like me), recognition of the situation (e.g., 
in the situation like this) and rule (e.g., how they do) are the three basic factors of 
determining the decision. The decision maker views the situation through a lens 
constituted by the interaction between identity and situational cues. Identity in the 
appropriateness framework is “an umbrella concept that includes all the idiosyncratic 
factors that individuals bring with them into a social situation”, including personality 
factors, such as self-monitoring (Snyder & Gangestad, 1985), social value orientations 
(Messick & McClintock, 1968), personal history and personal experiences. It is also 
suggested that the normative constellations of qualities, status, behaviours and values 
may act as pivotal identity factors in social dilemmas. The recognition of the situation 
involves matching features of the situations encountered to features of other situations 
that are already (at least partly) understood or previously experienced; i.e. unexpected 
strange behaviours, uncertainty, attributional ambiguity, or novel contextual 
information which leads to greater difficulty in recognizing the situation based on 
prior experiences. Rules include explicit and codified guidelines for behaviour (e.g., 
codes of ethics or laws), less visible and/or potentially explicit influences of social 
heuristics (e.g., women and children first) and habitual rituals (e.g., the equal division 
of resources). Economic utility maximization is only one of the possible decision 
rules that may apply in a social dilemma situation.  
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In summary, the psychological theories mentioned above focus, on the one 
hand, on the cost-benefit analysis (the interdependence theory and the SAVE 
framework), while on the other hand, they stress the importance of identity and rules 
(e.g., justice in the group engagement model, economic utility maximization in the 
appropriateness framework). All these four theories or frameworks cover both social 
motivations and economic motivations, but place different weight on these two 
aspects.  
 
Figure 6. The appropriateness framework adopted from (Weber, et al., 2004) 
2.3. Motivations for Cooperation in PGG  
Why do people act cooperatively in repeated public goods games? As noted in 
section 2.1 PGG and its Rationale, some theories (e.g., Expected utility model) 
emphasize self-interested motives in human behaviour. Nonetheless, millions of 
people give to public goods like the Red Cross and Public Broadcasting, and 
generally contribute sizable sums indicating that people do act for the public good in 
some situations. In such mixed-motivations social dilemmas, the motivations for 
humans to cooperate are at least threefold: 1) egoism, to maximize their own benefits 
in the long run; 2) fairness, to minimize the gap between their own and their 
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opponents’ benefits; 3) altruism, to maximize their opponents’ benefits. This idea was 
partially supported by (Batson, 1994), who conceptually analysed and claimed that 
the reasons for people acting for the public good are egoism, altruism, collectivism 
and principlism, though there is limited empirical evidence for these claims. 
Specifically, the ultimate goal of egoism is self-benefit; the ultimate goal of altruism 
is to increase one or more other individuals’ welfare; the ultimate goal of collectivism 
is to increase group welfare; and the ultimate goal of principlism is to uphold one or 
more moral principles (justice or the utilitarian principle). However, the latter two 
motivations (collectivism and principlism) have little evidence to support them. In 
this thesis, these three motivations (egoism, fairness, altruism) will be presented and 
discussed in detail in the following sections (see the graphic as shown in Figure 7). 
Two of the three motivations, map onto Batson’s (1994) claims, namely egoism and 
altruism. Egoism is serving the public good to benefit oneself whereas altruism refers 
to serving the public good to benefit one or more others. The idea of fairness 
motivation is similar to and potentially categorized as principlism, on the condition 
that the upholded principle is egalitarianism. 
2.3.1. Egoism: Self-interested Motives 
So why do people act cooperatively in repeated public goods games? The first 
and most obvious answer is egoism. Serving the public goods to benefit oneself is 
consistent with the pervasive assumption that all human action is motivated by self-
interest, supported by expected utility/rational choice theory. When one considers the 
conflict of self-interest and collective interest this transforms into a “short-term loss 
but long-term gain” issue, and therefore when translated in this way illuminates the 
motives for self-interest. Thus, the individual may decide to act for the public good as 
a means of reaching long-term self-benefit at the expense of short-term loss, 
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consistent with resource-exchange based theories, which consider economic 
maximizations as a motivator of cooperative behaviours (predictions of the 
interdependence theory or the cost-benefits analysis of the SAVE framework).  
Another explanation of acting for the collective good in social dilemmas 
redraws the boundaries of self-interest in a different way, that is, group identity 
(Batson & Ahmad, 2009). When the self can be defined at not only the personal level 
but also at the group level (collective interest), then this can cause overlap with the 
individual’s personal self-interest, according to self-categorization theory (Turner, 
Hogg, Oakes, Reicher, & Wetherell, 1987), and group engagement model (Tyler & 
Blader, 2003). Through the transformation of collective interest into self-interest, the 
conflict in the public goods no longer exists. Thus, in turn, heightened group identity 
increases the contribution to the public goods.  
Undoubtedly, viewed in this way, the self-interested motive (egoism) is the 
major incentive that drives people to act cooperatively either via enlightened self-
interest or via the self-collective interest overlap through group identity. However, a 
number of behavioural and social scientists have found that all action for the public 
good does not seem to be fully explained by egoism alone. As suggested by theories 
discussed earlier, for example the group engagement model, the importance of justice 
in cooperative decision-making becomes an important determinant of behaviour.  
2.3.2. Fairness: Maintaining the Social Norms 
Another motive for people acting cooperatively in public goods is to maintain 
social norms within the community; after all, self-interest is not the only motivation 
for acting cooperatively in public goods, as some theories argue. Norms here 
comprise of social norms, such as equality/fairness (Ainsworth & Baumeister, 2013; 
Yamamoto & Takimoto, 2012), justice (Schroeder, Steel, Woodell, & Bembenek, 
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2003), egalitarianism (C. T. Dawes, Fowler, Johnson, McElreath, & Smirnov, 2007), 
inequality aversion (Camerer & Fehr, 2001), and reciprocity (Falk & Fischbacher, 
2006). Social norms are standards of behaviour that are based on widely shared 
beliefs on how individual group members ought to behave in a given situation 
(Hechter & Opp, 2001). These social norms, to some extent, are similar to each other, 
such as egalitarian motivation/justice (Van Lange, 2008). “Fairness” is the central key 
word for the social norm, as indicated by the group engagement model which focuses 
on procedural justice, and will be fully discussed in this thesis. “Fairness, defined in 
terms of mutual advantage or impartiality, may, in appropriate conditions, directly 
favour equalitarianism” (Ainsworth & Baumeister, 2013, p. 75). It regulates social 
exchanges between members of groups and is designed to promote group harmony to 
ensure that everyone gets what they deserve, in this case, the promotion of 
cooperation and deterring free riding (Van Vugt & Van Lange, 2006).  
2.3.3. Altruism: Concern for Others’ Welfare 
The third motivation for people acting for the public good is altruism (Alger, 
2010; Kurzban, Burton-Chellew, & West, 2015), or so called “kindness” (Andreconi, 
1995) or “warm-glow” (Andreoni, 1990). Altruism is defined as the ultimate goal to 
increase other individuals’ welfare (Batson, 2011). There is a growing body of 
empirical studies that show that this motivation is critical to generating cooperative 
behaviours in public goods experiments.  




Figure 7. The motivations of acting cooperatively in PGG 
2.4. Theories concerning the Empathy-cooperation Link 
Four theories (the independence theory, the SAVE framework, the group 
engagement model and the appropriateness framework) are presented to explain why 
people cooperate and also the three potential motivations for acting cooperatively in 
the PGG. As discussed earlier, some theories explicitly focus on explaining how it is 
that people cooperate and the underlying mechanisms that guide this behaviour. This 
thesis is particularly interested in the empathy-cooperation link. Psychological 
theories have debated, for several decades, the empathy-cooperation link, with a focus 
on whether empathy induces altruism or egoism. The representative theories are the 
empathy-altruism hypothesis and the negative-state relief hypothesis.  
2.4.1. The Empathy-altruism Hypothesis 
As shown in Figure 8, the empathy-altruism hypothesis theory (Batson, 1991) 
assumes that empathy will produce altruism towards the person one is empathizing 
with, and one will show concern about the person’s welfare, resulting in behaviour 
that will likely help that person. Figure 8 provides an overview of the theory by 
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putting the antecedents of empathy, the empathy-altruism hypothesis, and the 
behavioural consequences of empathy together. Empathy, namely empathic concern 
in Figure 8, is defined as an other-oriented emotion elicited by, and congruent with, 
the perceived welfare of someone in need. The empathy-altruism hypothesis claims 
that empathy (empathic concern) only produces altruistic motivation. The overview 
indicates that the observed behaviour is a product not only of altruistic motivation but 
also of the cost-benefit analysis prompted by altruistic motivations; and that this 
analysis involves weighing the costs and benefits associated with each possible 
behaviour. 
 
Figure 8. Overview of the theory of empathy-altruism hypothesis adopted from (Batson, 2011, 
p. 80) 
2.4.2. The Negative-state Relief Hypothesis 
The contrasting negative-state relief hypothesis (Cialdini, Kenrick, & 
Baumann, 1982) argues that empathy induction triggers egoistic motivations. These 
theorists suggest that individuals who experience empathy when witnessing another 
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person’s suffering are in a negative affective state of temporary sadness or sorrow- 
and that this in turn prompts them to act pro-socially (particularly refers to helping) in 
order to relieve their own negative state.  
Both theories accept that the empathic emotion is one of the key motivations 
to act pro-socially (help), and empathy leads to increased helping. They also both 
agree a person feeling empathy for another in distress is likely to feel sadness and 
temporary depression, and that helping is likely to dispel the sadness and temporary 
depression. Where they disagree is over the nature of the motivation that is evoked by 
feeling empathy for another in distress. The negative-state relief hypothesis claims 
that the motivation is directed toward the egoistic goal of the helper by providing 
mood-enhancing self-rewards. The empathy-altruism hypothesis claims that the 
motivation is directed at least in part toward the altruistic goal of relieving the other’s 
distress (Batson et al., 1989). However, both theories mainly focus on the explanation 
of the empathy-helping association. As stated in section 1.4.2 Definitions of 
Cooperation, the difference between cooperation and helping is the interdependent 
relation between the two parties. In the PGG, cooperation is obviously investigated as 
the outcome is interdependent (cooperation) rather than dependent (helping), and the 
interdependent relation is more likely to influence the behavioural response.  
Moreover, a large number of empirical studies (Van Lange, 2008; Van Vugt & 
Van Lange, 2006) have already shown that empathy does indeed produce altruism 
rather than egoism. This thesis considers the point of view of the empathy-induced 
altruism hypothesis. One remaining issue is that the theory does not discuss whether 
such a motivation is strong enough to lead to increases in acting cooperatively when 
confronted with the public goods problem. Thus the question remains: To what extent 
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is empathy-induced altruism effective in producing behaviour change (i.e. increased 
cooperative behaviours)?  
2.5. Link between Theories and the Present Empirical Studies in this thesis 
A series of four empirical studies were designed in this thesis to address the 
empathy-cooperation link. Each, in effect, addressed the general question “What is 
the effect of empathy on cooperation?” Study 1 was designed to examine the 
empathy-cooperation link in the PGG. According to the empathy-altruism hypothesis, 
Parks’ Integrated Model explicitly demonstrated (see Figure 3) that empathy is 
conceptualised as an individual difference (i.e. dispositional), further influencing the 
secure attachment system and subsequently affecting the predisposition to cooperate. 
The predisposition to cooperate plays a critical role in the transformation of the given 
matrix to effective matrix, and consequently affects cooperative decision-making. The 
SAVE framework (see Figure 4) does not explicitly mention the role of empathy in 
pro-sociality, however it implies that individual differences will affect D (default) and 
K if empathy does indeed play a role in cooperative decision-making. The group 
engagement theory does not explicitly point out the role of empathy on intragroup 
cooperation. The appropriateness framework can be applied here, since it assumes 
that empathy induction will affect the recognition of a situation, and in turn individual 
differences regarding dispositions of empathy affecting identity in a way that 
influences the decision to cooperate (i.e. the greater the disposition of empathy, the 
more likely the individual will cooperate in a situation identified).  
Study 2, described in Chapter 4, was designed to explore the role of personal 
values, considered as a potential social cue affecting the empathy-cooperation link. 
According to identity-based theories (the group engagement model and the 
appropriateness framework) identity plays a critical role in determining cooperative 
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decision within a group. Shared values are essential parts of self-identification and 
recognition (Van Zomeren, et al., 2008), and these should in turn potentially promote 
cooperative behaviours. Therefore, Study 2 was designed and conducted in such a 
way as to examine this idea.  
Studies 3A and 3B (Chapter 5) aimed to explore the impact of empathy on 
cooperation in the PGG when the endowment is heterogeneous, and the origin of 
endowment (endowed vs. earned) is also manipulated. Through the creation of 
heterogeneous endowments, the status concept is involved, and as such status within 
the group is considered another important psychological concept for Study 3. 
According to identity-based theories, especially the group engagement model, status 
is identical to the respect concept, which is the status within a group. The claim is that 
the concept of status affects individuals’ identity judgments as a result of behavioural 
engagement within a group, which should in turn affect cooperative behaviours. To 
explore the concept of status in the empathy-cooperation link, Study 4 is designed to 
replicate Study 3. However, unlike studies 1, 2 and 3 which explore intragroup 
cooperation, Study 4 is examines the empathy-cooperation link under dyadic 
interaction. This will be discussed in the Chapter 6.  
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Chapter 3  Study 1: The Role of Empathy on 
Cooperation in PGG with Homogenous Group Setting  
Summary of Chapter 3: The previous chapters have reviewed work that 
considered the theories and methodologies that examine the link between empathy 
and cooperation. The next four chapters present four laboratory studies that were 
designed to address the main research question for this project, “What is the effect of 
empathy on cooperation?” This first study specifically addresses the following 
research hypotheses. Hypothesis 1: There will be a main effect of empathy, such that 
the rates of contribution will increase in the Public Good Game (PGG); Hypothesis 2: 
Conditions in which empathy is induced (high-empathy condition, low-empathy 
condition) should decrease generalized tit-for-tat strategy use compared to the no-
empathy condition; Hypothesis 3: Individuals’ higher dispositional empathy ability 
should contribute more in the PGG than those with low dispositional empathy. Also, 
those with higher dispositional narcissism should show a negative association with 
contributions in the PGG. 
The first study uses a typical linear PGG to examine whether inducing 
empathy increases cooperation, and whether individual differences, including 
dispositional empathy and narcissism, predict cooperative behaviour in a PGG with a 
homogenous group setting. Sixty-nine participants were randomly allocated to one of 
the following conditions: high-empathy, low-empathy and no-empathy. After 
administering an empathy induction manipulation, all participants completed 10-
rounds of the PGG, followed by the Interpersonal Reactivity Index (IRI) 
questionnaire, and Narcissistic Personality Inventory (NPI). The results from Study 1 
showed that the induction of empathy did not increase contributions in the first round 
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of the PGG, and moreover, it did not impact on contributions on all other rounds. In 
addition, dispositional empathy ability and narcissism personality did not correlate 
with behaviour in the PGG. However, age (age range from 18 to 56 years old) 
appeared to be a predictor of cooperation in the PGG; in the direction that older 
people were more likely to contribute more in the PGG overall as compared to 
younger people. A detailed account of the study itself, including the rationale, 
methodologies and findings, are presented in the rest of this chapter.  
3.1. Introduction 
Cooperation is widely investigated and examined using experimental 
economic games. As the most frequent pro-social behaviour (Iannotti, 1985), 
cooperation is one of the most investigated in social psychology; this is mainly 
because cooperation is critical in many social exchanges, from small-scale 
interactions between individuals up to macro-scale levels of interaction between 
whole societies. As stated in section 1.4.3 Measures of Cooperation, most 
psychologists (Batson & Ahmad, 2001; Haselhuhn & Mellers, 2005; Rumble, et al., 
2010; Sanfey, Rilling, Aronson, Nystrom, & Cohen, 2003) investigate cooperation (in 
terms of two players’ cooperation) using social dilemmas, specifically the prisoner’s 
dilemma game and the ultimatum game. In some cases the public goods game (PGG) 
is used as well as the common resource dilemma, both of which involve more than 
two-players. As mentioned in section 2.1 PGG and its Rationale, PGG is the 
experimental paradigm used throughout the whole project. It is speculated that 
cooperative behaviour in social dilemmas is affected not only by contextual factors 
(e.g., the introduction of changes in payoffs, increasing communication, promoting 
trust), but also by dispositional factors. In order to situate the work of the present 
study in relation to other related work, the introduction begins with some general 
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details regarding contextual (e.g., the introduction of changes in payoffs, increasing 
communication, promoting trust) and dispositional factors (e.g., trust, social value 
orientation) associated with promoting cooperation. This section will firstly detail 
various other factors that have been the focus of researchers attention in promoting 
cooperation in social dilemma games. The subsequent section presents details behind 
the contextual and dispositional factors that are specifically explored in the present 
study (i.e. inducing empathy to promote cooperation, examining personality traits that 
in turn are thought to be associated with cooperation).  
3.1.1. Contextual Factors thought to Promote Cooperation 
As mentioned in section 2.1 PGG and its Rationale, one of the greatest 
challenges to cooperation is free riding. Free riding generally refers to individuals 
who always pay out less than the average contribution of others (Kurzban & Houser, 
2005). It is a tempting strategy to adopt given that paying out the least while at the 
same time enjoying access to a public resource means that one can maximize one’s 
own gain by exploiting the contributions of others. However, if everyone free rides, 
the public good will no longer exists. So, many researchers have been interested in 
answering the following: “What can one do to promote and maintain cooperation?” 
which in turn also means limiting free riding. According to the existing literature, 
some general answers to this question have been found in manipulations of the payoff 
structure of the social dilemma, as well as the introduction of a sanction system. The 
motivation for this is to change the cost-benefit ratios in order to make cooperation 
more salient. In addition manipulations have also focused on facilitating 
communication, trust and empathy as ways to enhance cooperation, all of which are 
treated as contextual manipulation regarding the game itself. These factors will be 
discussed below. 
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3.1.1.1. Sanction System 
Implementing a sanction system (reward for cooperation & punishment for 
defection - or alternatively - free riding) has proved to be an effective method of 
promoting cooperation and reducing the free riding problem. For example, one of the 
most cited studies using this approach is by Fehr and Gächter (2000). They found that 
punishment constituted a credible threat for potential free riders and caused a large 
increase in cooperation levels (82.5% per cent full cooperation in punishment 
condition vs. 53% per cent in no-punishment condition). Sefton, Shupp, and Walker 
(2007) introduced reward by using tokens (representing money, in their case 10 cents) 
into the experiment, and the reward treatment was found to successfully facilitate 
contribution. A meta-analysis (Balliet, Mulder, & Van Lange, 2011) examining 187 
studies, that have used sanctioning systems in social dilemma games, reported the 
effectiveness of rewarding cooperation, and punishing free riding as d = 0.51 and d =  
0.70, respectively.  
There are, however, negative consequences regarding the implementation of 
sanction systems. Some have argued that the constant threat of punishment leads to 
decreases in intrinsic motivation to cooperate consistently highly (Yamagishi, 1988). 
More to the point, the cost of actually administering sanctions is also seen as less 
attractive manipulation in social dilemma games (Edney & Harper, 1978; Jensen, 
2010). Mulder, van Dijk, De Cremer, and Wilke (2006) found that such sanctioning 
systems in social dilemma games undermine the trust-belief that other members in the 
game are motivated to cooperate. Overall, it appears that the introduction of sanctions 
is an effective way to maintain cooperative levels in social dilemma games, but at the 
expense of reducing other qualities that are important in social exchanges, such as 
trust and motivation to help others. Therefore, while this is a reliable technique, it 
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does interfere with core attributes that are thought to be integral in social exchanges, 
and one may wonder how long sanctions can be implemented in a social dilemma 
game (beyond the typical 10 rounds) before more severe detrimental effects emerge.  
3.1.1.2. Communication 
Enabling communication in social dilemma games has been found to be an 
effective means of promoting cooperation (Bixenstine & Douglas, 1967; Rapoport & 
Suleiman, 1993). Typically, communication in social dilemma games involves 
players discussing their potential choices in a social interaction task (task-related 
communication), answering questions concerning the best gifts they ever received (T. 
R. Cohen, Wildschut, & Insko, 2010), or estimating the percentage of people at 
certain income levels in a certain town in the United States (R. M. Dawes, McTavish, 
& Shaklee, 1977) (task-unrelated communication). Communication was not only 
found to promote cooperation directly, but also to solve the uncertainty that “noise” 
brings, that is, to be more willingness to forgive an incident of “noise” in social 
dilemma (Tazelaar, Van Lange, & Ouwerkerk, 2004). “Noise” refers to the 
phenomenon in which people show discrepancies between their intended and actual 
behaviours as a result of errors; for example, imagine you are late to meet up with a 
friend because there is a delay in the public transport you are using, this means that 
while you intended to be there on time, you were prevented from doing so; 
communication here can help to limit any negative consequences that might follow 
from a misinterpretation of an outcome as intended, rather than by accident/error. 
However, not all types of communication have been shown to enhance rates of 
cooperation in social dilemmas (R. M. Dawes, et al., 1977). What seems to be critical 
is that the communication between players in such games needs to be focused around 
promoting cooperation by activating interpersonal norms related to fairness and trust 
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(T. R. Cohen, et al., 2010). This has been shown in social dilemma games presented 
as a single-trial interaction (Insko et al., 1993) or iterated over rounds (Wichman, 
1970). Furthermore, a meta-analysis (Balliet, 2010) systematically analysed the 
positive communication-cooperation association (d = 1.01) from 45 empirical studies 
while taking into account several moderator factors (e.g., types of communication, 
discussion before versus during the dilemma and group size). The meta-analysis 
revealed that communication via speech was more effective in promoting cooperation 
than in written form. Interestingly there was no difference in rates of cooperation if 
communication has been established before the social dilemma game, or during the 
game, but what did matter was that there was a stronger communication-cooperation 
association in larger groups (n > 2) than in smaller groups (n = 2). 
Overall, it appears that communication, in and of itself, is not key to 
promoting cooperation. Instead it appears that only when the content of 
communication is focused specifically on social dilemma games, and is presented in a 
specific medium, does the degree of cooperation seem to be associated with 
communication. To ensure the highest levels of cooperation, the most effective 
manipulations require communication to be via speech, and designed to signal 
information regarding intentions. This may also relate to the effectiveness of 
sanctioning, which is also a means of signalling what is deemed to be the most 
relevant behaviour in the social exchange of the dilemma task. 
3.1.1.3. Trust 
Apart from using a sanction system, or introducing the opportunity to 
communicate with other players, trust building (Balliet & Van Lange, 2013a; De 
Cremer, 1999; C. D. Parks, et al., 2013) is another key factor that has been used to 
increase cooperation, particularly in mixed-motive situations. Social dilemma games 
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are an example of this, because people can either be motivated to cooperate or defect 
(i.e. free ride). According to Mayer, Davis, and Schoorman (1995, p. 712), trust is 
“the willingness of a party to be vulnerable to the actions of another party based on 
the expectations that the other will perform a particular action important to the trustor, 
irrespective of the ability to monitor or control that other party”.  
Research on social dilemmas has shown that trust influences expectations 
regarding another’s motives (De Cremer, 1999), and again has some connections with  
communication - given that signals to motivations and intent are critical for others to 
determine the extent to which they will reciprocate. More to the point, trust is thought 
to affect cooperative decision-making in two ways: 1) contextual cues (i.e. through 
inducement), 2) individual differences (i.e. dispositional) - the details are discussed in 
the next section 3.1.2.1 Dispositional trust. 
Though difficult to induce (typically in establishing reciprocity, and initial 
willingness to cooperate - which in turn signals to others good intent), it seems clear 
that trust is a powerful tool in promoting cooperation, because it reduces the fear of 
being exploited by others (Komorita & Parks, 1994). De Cremer (1999) presented 
empirical evidence showing that when players trusted other players, fear of free riding 
decreased, and reciprocity was strengthened in the PGG game. In effect what 
establishing trust in the game did was to strongly reinforce perceptions of fairness in 
the group of players (Buchan et al., 2011; T. R. Cohen & Insko, 2008).  
3.1.2. Dispositional Factors thought to Affect Cooperation 
3.1.2.1. Dispositional Trust  
Outside of building trust by making it salient in social dilemma games, 
researchers have examined the extent to which people showing high levels of 
personality traits such as trust (dispositional trust) are associated with cooperative 
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decision making (Deutsch, 1973). Several studies show that in social dilemma games 
high trusters (who expect reciprocity) cooperated irrespective of whether others 
cooperated, and tended to cooperate more overall than low trusters. With regards to 
the PGG, studies show that people scoring high on measures of dispositional trust 
contributed more in a PGG than those scoring lower in dispositional trust measured 
by Yamagishi’s Trust Scale (C. D. Parks & Hulbert, 1995; Yamagishi, 1988; 
Yamagishi & Sato, 1986). Nonetheless, De Cremer, Snyder, and Dewitte (2001) 
pointed out that the positive relationship between dispositional trust and cooperation 
should take situation cues and individual predispositions, specifically accountability 
and self-monitoring, into account. In other words, people who display high levels of 
self-monitoring, may be low trusters, but they are in turn concerned with the 
accountability of their own actions, and so their concern for how they are perceived 
means that they show high levels of cooperation, even though they score low on 
dispositional trust. Balliet and Van Lange (2013a) conduced a meta-analysis on the 
relation between trust (both contextual and dispositional) and cooperation. Results 
showed there was only a small to moderate positive association between dispositional 
trust and cooperation (r = .26) based on a total of 60 effect sizes. However, their 
analysis has been criticized, and the positive link reported by the meta-analysis has 
been argued to be the result of publication bias. All in all, this evidence does support 
the view that dispositional trust is positively associated with cooperation, but there are 
also limitations attached to this work.  
3.1.2.2. Dispositional Social Value Orientation 
To date, the most investigated personality trait in connection to cooperation is 
social value orientation, which measures what are thought to be stable preferences for 
outcomes that impact others, and oneself (Bogaert, Boone, & Declerck, 2008, p.453). 
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Unlike many other personality traits, social value orientations are primarily rooted in 
social relations rather than specific characteristics of an individual (Dovidio, 2006). 
As indexed by the social value orientation, those preferring outcomes that benefit 
others (pro-socials) contributed more in a PGG than those that showing individualist 
and competitive traits (pro-selfs) (De Cremer & Van Dijk, 2002). This suggests that 
those with a tendency to be pro-social demonstrate pro-social behaviours even in 
laboratory based social dilemma tasks. However, in terms of social value orientation, 
the measures used are in fact similar to the social dilemma games in which 
cooperation is also measured (Messick & McClintock, 1968). On the other hand, 
social value orientation measures have been found to quite accurately predict 
personality descriptions given by friends and roommates (Bem & Lord, 1979) and 
everyday activities, including volunteering for charitable causes (McClintock & 
Allison, 1989; Van Lange, Bekkers, Schuyt, & Van Vugt, 2007). Therefore, one may 
question the extent to which this is a valid measure (see critical comments in Chapters 
1 and 2) on which to base any assessments between dispositions and behaviour in 
social contexts, if the items in both cases overlap. Further discussions on this issue 
can be found in section 4.1 Introduction. 
3.1.3. Contextual and Dispositional Factors that are Specific to the Present Study: 
Empathy 
A variety of contextual factors (sanction system, communication, trust) and 
personality traits (trust, social value orientation) that researchers have speculated to be 
relevant in promoting cooperation, have been discussed above. Nevertheless, few of 
these factors appear to be free from problems and challenges. The remaining section 
outlines the details regarding the specific contextual factors that have a bearing on the 
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present study – and their connection to the theoretical proposal outlined in Chapter 2 
on which the empirical work is based. 
3.1.3.1. Empathy and General Cooperative Behaviours 
Empathy, as discussed at length in Chapters 1 and 2, broadly refers to an 
“other-oriented” emotional response congruent with the perceived welfare of another 
(Batson & Moran, 1999). Therefore, the discussion here will be brief, and the focus 
will be on contextual factors that have a bearing on the kind of manipulations 
explored in Study 1. While there is evidence to suggest that inducing empathy will 
increase cooperative behaviour, there are only a handful of studies (Batson, Klein, et 
al., 1995) that have examined this positive empathy-cooperation link, as discussed in 
the section 1.3.2 Category 2. Previous studies (Batson & Ahmad, 2001; Batson & 
Moran, 1999; Rumble, et al., 2010) have consistently found that empathizing with 
others in a prisoner’s dilemma is associated with more cooperation than defection 
decisions. Moreover, the empathy-cooperation link has been examined in common 
resource dilemma games (1999) and the PGG (1995). Batson, Batson, et al. (1995) 
found that inducing empathy towards one of the other group members did indeed 
increase allocation of resources to that person, but as a result this diminished 
resources to the common good. In their version of PGG, participants were required to 
decide whom they were going to devote their tokens to, i.e. 1) the group pot, or 2) one 
of the other group members, or 3) keep them all for themselves. Batson et al (1995) 
came to the conclusion that directed induced empathy could be effective, but it came 
at the cost of promoting cooperation generally. However, in their experimental 
paradigm, empathy induction was not designed to observe behaviour change under 
conflict between self-interest and collective-interest, but rather to observe behaviour 
change under the conflicts between self-interest, other-interest and collective-interest 
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via empathy. Given the paucity of studies those have successfully induced 
cooperation via empathy at a group level rather than towards another member, Study 
1 is designed to build on the techniques developed by Batson et al (1995) in order to 
promote cooperation under conditions in which conflicts only exist between the 
group’s interest and self-interest. Does empathy induction modulate people’s 
behaviours under this type of conflict?  
3.1.3.2. Empathy Induction Modulating Strategy Use 
Empathy induction (different contextual information) may not only influence 
cooperative behaviour (i.e. choosing to cooperate or defect), but also the kinds of 
strategies used. As discussed in section 2.1 PGG and its Rationale, unconditional 
cooperating, unconditional free riding and generalized tit-for-tat strategy are three 
strategies frequently found when dealing with iterated social dilemma games. One of 
the most effective strategies is generalized tit-for-tat strategy. This strategy is an 
efficient way to play multi-player iterative games (prisoner’s dilemma, PGG),because 
simply matching the behaviour of the other player(s) does not involve developing an 
independent strategy of one’s own (Axelrod, 1984). Generalized tit-for-tat strategy is 
a strategy based on reciprocity (Axelrod & Hamilton, 1981). It has been speculated 
that empathy can reduce generalized tit-for-tat in social dilemma games via an 
empathy induction method (Batson & Ahmad, 2001; Batson & Moran, 1999; Rumble, 
et al., 2010). The idea here being that information that signals the needs of others, - 
i.e. empathy induction, is designed to prioritize the focus on the needs of others, 
rather than developing a selfish strategy that only benefits the other player(s) if they 
show initial or sustained willingness to cooperate.  
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3.1.3.3. Dispositional Empathy 
Several reviews (Eisenberg & Miller, 1987; Underwood & Moore, 1982) have 
argued that dispositional empathy is predictive of pro-social behaviours in a variety of 
contexts. However, empirical work examining a direct link between dispositional 
empathy and cooperative behaviours in social dilemma games is scant. For this reason 
dispositional empathy will be examined in the present study, with an expectation, 
based on the reviewed work, that there should be a positive correlation with 
cooperative behaviours in the PGG.  
There are several items used to make assessments of dispositional empathy. In 
Study 1 and all others in the present thesis, dispositional empathy was measured using 
Davis’s (1983) Interpersonal Reactivity Index (IRI), which consists of four subscales: 
perspective taking (PT), empathic concern (EC), personal distress (PD) and fantasy 
(FT). The PT scale assesses the tendency to spontaneously adopt the psychological 
point of view of others; FS scale taps respondents’ tendencies to transpose themselves 
imaginatively into the feelings and actions of fictitious characters; EC scale assesses 
“other-oriented” feelings of sympathy and concerns for unfortunate others, and the 
PD subscale measures “self-oriented” feelings of personal anxiety and unease in tense 
interpersonal settings (Davis, 1983). Because this particular measure is the most 
comprehensive method of assessing dispositional empathy it was favoured over the 
many other methods of determining dispositional empathy. For this reason, the IRI 
was the questionnaire of choice used for the all the studies in this thesis.  
3.1.3.4. Dispositional Narcissism 
Another personality trait that has a bearing on pro-sociality, though for 
antithetical reasons to dispositional empathy, is narcissism. Narcissism is the opposite 
trait to empathy. As one of the dark triad personalities (i.e. Sociopathy, Machiavelism, 
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Narcissism), narcissism was first reported in the psychological literature in 1898 and 
referred to as “a tendency for the sexual emotions to be lost and almost entirely 
absorbed in self-admiration” (Ellis, 1898, p. 280). According to the American 
Psychiatric Association’s Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, 
narcissistic personality is a disorder in which the following clinical criteria apply: a 
grandiose sense of self-importance or uniqueness; a preoccupation with fantasies of 
unlimited success, power, brilliance, beauty, or ideal love; exhibitionism; an inability 
to tolerate criticism, the indifference of others, or defeat; entitlement or the 
expectation of special favours without assuming reciprocal responsibilities; 
interpersonal exploitativeness, relationships that alternate between extremes of 
overidealization and devaluation; and a lack of empathy. Therefore, based on these 
characteristics, in the present project, one avenue by which to examine the link 
between empathy and cooperation was to examine whether the absence of empathy 
(as observed in those who have narcissist tendencies) would also be associated with a 
lack of cooperation (i.e. more free riding). 
Of the various measures of narcissism that have been developed, the 
Narcissistic Personality Inventory (NPI) by Raskin and Hall (1979) measures 
individual differences in narcissism in nonclinical populations. This is the measure 
adopted in the present study. In Study 1 the full-scale 40-item NPI (Raskin & Terry, 
1988) was used to measure the participants’ individual differences in narcissism. The 
seven NPI component scales are Authority, Exhibitionism, Superiority, Entitlement, 
Exploitativeness, Self-Sufficiency and Vanity. As some studies (Ehrenberg, Hunter, 
& Elterman, 1996) have shown that the self-centered personality trait narcissism 
seems to have a negative impact on maintaining cooperation, this negative association 
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was also expected to be observed between narcissism personality and lack of 
cooperative behaviours in the PGG used in Study 1.  
3.1.4. Present Study 
The present study focused on the empathy-cooperation link. The motivation 
was simply to assess the extent to which inducing empathy based on prior established 
methods would promote cooperation, and also to measure the extent to which 
dispositions (i.e. empathy, lack of empathy [narcissism]) predicted cooperation in the 
PGG.  
The first main Hypothesis 1 that was tested was the following: There will be a 
main effect of empathy such that, according to previous work that has developed 
empathy induction techniques, rates of contributions will increase in the PGG. To test 
this, Study 1 included two different levels of empathy induction (high-empathy 
condition, low-empathy condition), and a baseline (no-empathy induction). In the 
empathy induction conditions, the aim was to induce empathy towards all three other 
group members, as opposed to the technique adopted by Batson et al (1995) in which 
empathy induction was towards only one other player.  
In the case of the Batson et al., (1995) study, participants had three choices, 
keeping the tokens, giving the tokens to the group pot, or giving the tokens to one of 
the three other players. In Study 1 of this thesis, participants only need to decide how 
many tokens they are willing to contribute to the group pot, which is deemed as 
benefiting the collective. Regardless of the amount of tokens the other players 
contribute, the more the participants contribute, the more cooperative they are. For 
such purposes, the study is deliberately designed in this way to examine whether 
empathy induction promotes cooperation if participants are confronted with only self-
interest and collective interest conflict.  
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Hypothesis 2: Conditions in which empathy is induced (high-empathy 
condition, low-empathy condition) should decrease generalized tit-for-tat strategies as 
compared to the no-empathy condition; The generalized tit-for-tat strategy is an 
efficient way to play multi-player iterative games (prisoner’s dilemma, PGG); this is 
because simply matching behaviour of the other players is a cognitively efficient 
method of deciding what to do (Axelrod, 1984).  
Hypothesis 3: Hypothesis 3a, individuals’ dispositional empathy ability should 
predict their contribution in the first round of PGG, in that those with higher 
dispositional empathy ability should contribute more than those with low 
dispositional empathy. Hypothesis 3b those scoring high on dispositional narcissism 
should show a negative association with cooperative behaviours in the PGG. 
3.2. Method 
3.2.1. Participants 
Sixty-nine volunteers (47 female and 22 male) were recruited from Queen 
Mary University of London via emails and fliers. The mean age of the participants 
was 22.68 years (range from 18 to 56; SD = 5.65). All participants gave written 
informed consent prior to participation. After the experiment, they were paid an 
amount for their participation on the basis of the tokens gained in the PGG. In each 
PGG 25 tokens were equal to £1, which all participants were made aware of at the 
start of the experiment. The actual payment ranged from £6 to £12. The Ethics 
Committee of Queen Mary University of London approved the study (QMREC1190). 
Participants were randomly allocated to one of three conditions (high-empathy 
condition, low-empathy condition, no-empathy condition). 
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3.2.2. Design and Materials  
Study 1 was a between-subject design with 3 levels (empathy [high-empathy, 
low-empathy, no-empathy]), and the critical dependent variable was participants’ 
proportion of contribution (PoC) per round in the main PGG, of which there were 10 
rounds in total. A prior power analysis was conducted using G*power 
(http://www.gpower.hhu.de/en.html) to infer the required sample sizes for this study 
(Faul, Erdfelder, Lang, & Buchner, 2007). Assuming the effect size of empathy is the 
medium effect (ƒ = 0.25) suggested by Cohen, defined for between subject repeated-
measures ANOVA (J. Cohen, 1988), Study 1 required 90 participants in order to be 
sufficiently statistically powerful (1-β = .8). The rationale of using the medium effect 
size to conduct power analysis will be discussed in details in section 7.3.3 Sample 
Size, Effect Size and Statistical Power. In addition, the study included several items, 
both prior to and following the main task. There were five pre-task questions 
concerning participant’s experiences (i.e. positive, negative and their hobbies), for 
example, “Describe an event that has happened to you that has made you sad in the 
last year” and “What hobbies do you have”. Then participants were presented with the 
PGG task, and then they were presented with several post-task questions and 
questionnaires.  
The PGG task was presented in E-prime 2.0. The way the game was set up 
was that each participant played with three other virtual players that they could see on 
screen- (actual photos and profiles were from past Dynamic learning and decision-
making lab members - therefore participants would not have been seen them before). 
In the high-empathy condition, the three other people’s profiles referred to a serious 
event that had happened to each of them (Player 1= a break up with a partner, Player 
2 = a car accident, Player 3 = a stolen mobile phone). In addition, participants were 
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also instructed, “While you are reading this, try to imagine how the person felt about 
what they have just described. Try to imagine how it has affected them and how they 
feel as a result”. This was based on Batson & Moran’s (1999) empathy induction 
method. In the low-empathy condition participants read the same profiles as those in 
the high-empathy condition, but they were instructed, “While you are reading this, try 
to take an objective perspective towards what has just been described. Try to remain 
as objective and detached as possible.” This served as an intermediate level of 
empathy induction based on previous empathy induction techniques. In the no-
empathy conditions, participants were not given any instructions as to how to read the 
profiles. In addition, the profiles referred to neutral events (Player 1 = enjoy 
swimming, Player 2 = ride bicycle, Player 3 = run most mornings). 
In the PGG, the amounts the three virtual players contributed were fixed 
across the participants and based on average contributions (taking into account the 
standard deviation) in the partner-treatment without punishment condition in Fehr and 
Gächter (2000) study. The combined total contribution of the three other players on 
each of the 10 rounds respectively was as follows: 27, 34, 31, 24, 22, 23, 24, 18, 12, 
and 10.  
The post-task questions consisted of nine-rating scores on similarity and 
empathizing with the three other players’ profiles. To examine similarity, participants 
were asked to consider how similar they judged themselves to be relative to each of 
the other three players. To measure the degree of empathizing in the game, 
participants were asked to rate “to what extent, did you empathize with each person in 
the game” on a 9-point scale, ranging from 1 (not at all) to 9 (very much). Apart from 
these two dimensions, participants were asked to judge the facial emotions of the 
other players based on the following available options: happy, neutral, sad, and angry.  
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The questionnaires presented at the end of the study included a questionnaire 
to measure empathy and a questionnaire to measure narcissism. The empathy 
questionnaire in Study 1 was the Interpersonal Reactivity Index (IRI) (Davis, 1983) 
which examines participants’ dispositional empathy. The narcissism questionnaire 
was the 40 items Narcissistic Personality Inventory (NPI) (Raskin & Terry, 1988). 
Finally, there was a debriefing session at the end of the experiment. Here participants 
were asked by the experimenter to report the strategies they used in the PGG, and the 
extent to which they were aware of any interactive deception – i.e. that they were not 
interacting with three real other players.  
3.2.3. Procedure  
Figure 9 shows the procedure for the experiment. Participants took part in the 
experiment individually and they were led to believe that three other players were 
taking part online simultaneously with them.  
 
Figure 9. The procedure of experiment 
After arriving at the lab, participants were escorted to the experimental 
cubicle. The experimenter briefly explained the requirements of the experiment. After 
giving informed consent, a passport photo of the participants was taken by the 
experimenter to use in the profiles for the experiment. In addition, they were also 
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required to answer the pre-task questions (5 questions) in as much detail as possible. 
These questions involved their positive, negative experience and hobby. Once they 
completed the pre-task questions, they were informed that they would be required to 
wait for approximately 5 to 10 minutes, while the profiles were made exchanged by 
the experimenter. During this time, participants read the instructions for the PGG. 
After uploading all four pictures to the participants’ computer, the experimenter came 
back to the lab, showed them the three virtual players’ pictures, explained the 
instruction and informed them a time to start the PGG. This was designed to give the 
impression that participants were interacting with three other players simultaneously 
online. 
Next, the participant was presented with the profiles of three other players, 
and then completed the 10 rounds PGG. In each round, a fixation was presented. The 
number of the round was presented. Then a screen consisting of the three other 
profiles showed, and the instruction requesting participants to enter the amount of 
tokens they were willing to contribute. Once participants entered their decision, the 
screen jumped to the next screen showing the message “Please wait, the three other 
players are deciding…”. The timing of this screen jump was randomly presented from 
5s to 10 s. Feedback was presented indicating the three other players’ total 
contributions on that round; the contribution of the actual participant on that round, 
the share of group pot that round, and the cumulative tokens as points across rounds. 
To ensure more engagement with the task, participants were required to copy down 
the feedback information into the token form provided, and they recorded the details 
on paper. Once they completed this, they were required to press the space key to 
move on to the next round. It took approximately 12 to 20 minutes to complete the 
PGG. 
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3.3. Scoring   
With regards to scoring for the IRI empathy questionnaire, four subscales (PT, 
PD, FS and EC) were scored individually. Each subscale consisted of 7 items, with 
some items reverse scored (items 3, 4, 7, 12, 13, 14, 15 and 19). Specifically, PT 
comprised of items 3, 8, 11, 15, 21, 25 and 28; PD comprised of items 6, 10, 13, 17, 
19, 24, and 27; FS comprised of items 1, 5, 7, 12, 16, 23 and 26; EC comprised of 
items 2, 4, 9, 14, 18, 20 and 22. Similarity and Empathizing were scored according to 
the ratings on the post-task questions (from 1 not at all to 9 very much). The scoring 
of the implementation of the generalized tit-for-tat strategy was based on recording 
the correlation between the contribution of rounds 1 to 9 for the three other players 
and each participant’s corresponding contributions in rounds 2 to 10.  
In terms of the Narcissistic Personality Index, participants were assigned one 
point for each response that matched the scoring key. The seven component trait keys 
by question were as follows: Authority: 1, 8, 10, 11, 12, 32, 33, 36; Self-sufficiency: 
17, 21, 22, 31, 34, 39; Superiority: 4, 9, 26, 37, 40; Exhibitionism: 2, 3, 7, 20, 28, 30, 
38; Exploitativeness: 6, 13, 16, 23, 35; Vanity: 15, 19, 29; Entitlement: 5, 14, 18, 24, 
25, 27.  
3.4. Results 
3.4.1. Empathy Manipulation Effectiveness Check 
A one-way ANOVA was conducted using mean estimates of empathizing 
concerning the three virtual players’ profiles. The analysis revealed a main effect of 
empathy, F(2, 65) = 5.95, p = .004. Post hoc testing showed empathizing was 
significantly greater in high-empathy and low-empathy compared to the no-empathy 
condition, high-empathy: 5.40 (1.41), low-empathy: 5.93 (1.77), no-empathy: 4.04 
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(2.37), p = .017 (high-empathy & no-empathy); p = .001 (low-empathy & no-
empathy). There was no significant difference between high-empathy and low-
empathy conditions, p = .337. 
3.4.2. Empathy Manipulation 
First round data were used for a one-way ANOVA to explore the main effect 
of empathy, which was not found to be significant, F(2, 66) = 0.416, p = .661. Next a 
3 x 10 (Round ([1:10], within-subject variable × Empathy [high-empathy, low-
empathy, no-empathy] between subjects variable) repeated-measures ANOVA was 
conducted. While the main effect of round was significant, F(5.79, 37.15) = 10.29, p 
< .001, ηp
2 = .135; the main effect of empathy was not significant, F(2, 66) = 0.133, p 
= .876, ηp
2 = .004 (see Figure 10). 
 
Figure 10. Mean of proportion of contribution (PoC) across 10 rounds in the three empathy 
conditions. Error bars represent ± 95% CI.  
There was no significant interaction between round and empathy, F(12.61, 
415.99) = 0.454, p = .945, ηp
2  = .014 (see Table 6). Greenhouse-Geisser correction 
was used.  




Figure 11. The average proportion of contribution (PoC) in 3 empathy conditions 
 
Table 6 The Mean Proportion of Contributions (PoC) in Three Conditions in Study 1 
Note. CI = confidence interval 
3.4.3. Generalized Tit-for-tat Strategy 
The number and proportion of people using generalized tit-for-tat strategy in 
each condition is shown in Table 6. A loglinear analysis revealed that there was no 
significant difference in the number of participants using generalized tit-for-tat 
strategy for the main effect of empathy, Z = -.004, p = .997, 95% CI [-.986, .982], 
Empathy n M (SD) 95%CI Generalized tit-for-tat 
strategy n (proportion)  
 
No-empathy 22 .472 (.220) [.378, .566] 7/22 (31.81%) 
Low-empathy 23 .440 (.221) [.347, .532] 8/23 (34.78 %) 
High-empathy 24 .447 (.220) [.357, .537] 7/24 (29.17%) 
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which indicates that the empathy manipulation did not modulate the tendency to use 
the generalized tit-for-tat strategy in Study 1. 
3.4.4. Regression between PGG and Empathic Disposition, Narcissistic 
Disposition  
To explore whether dispositional empathy ability (PT, EC, PD and FS) 
predicted contributions in the PGG, the scores of the four IRI sub-scales and overall 
IRI mean scores were entered into a regression analysis along with first round 
contribution, and age (see Table 7). Analyses failed to show that dispositional 
empathy ability predicted contributions. Beyond the hypothesis, age significantly 
predicted contribution in the first round contribution, β = .32, t(46) =2.29, p = .027, 
indicating that the older participants (age range from 40- 56 years old in the sample) 
were the more likely to contribute. 
Table 7 Summary of Hierarchical Regression Analysis for Variables Prediction Contribution in First 
Round of PGG (N=69) 
Note. R2 = .081 for step 1; ΔR2 = .044 for step 2. * p< .05; 
Variables B SEB   95% CI
Step 1     
Age .015 .007 .284* [.002, .029] 
Step 2     
Age .017 .007 .322* [.004, .031] 
PT .004 .061 .008 [-.118, .126] 
PD .049 .053 .116 [-.057, .155] 
FS .077 .058 .174 [-.039, .192] 
EC -.018 .078 -.031 [-.174, .138] 
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In addition, a similar analysis as above was conducted on narcissistic 
personality scores. As shown in Table 8, seven component traits of NPI (Authority, 
Self-sufficiency, Superiority, Exhibitionism, Exploitativeness, Vanity and 
Entitlement) were calculated with none found to predict cooperative behaviour in the 
first round of the PGG.  
Table 8 Summary of Linear Regression Analysis for Narcissistic Personality Prediction Contribution in 
First Round of PGG (N=69) 
Note. R2 = .075 
3.4.5. Deception Check 
In the debriefing stage participants were presented with several questions, 
which were designed as a check as to whether they believed that they were actually 
taking part in the study with three other players simultaneously online. Thirty-eight 
participants reported that they believed (or at least had limited doubt) that they were 
genuinely interacting with the other players (deception success group) (high-empathy: 
n=12; low-empathy: n=11; no-empathy: n=15); whereas twenty-nine participants 
indicated they had doubts (Deception Failure Group) in the debriefing session (high-
empathy: n=11; low-empathy: n=11; no-empathy: n=7); two participants reported that 
Variables B SEB   95% CI
Authority .010 .015 .109 [-.020, .041] 
Self-sufficiency .002 .024 .014 [-.046,.051] 
Superiority .000 .023 -.001 [-.047, .047] 
Exhibitionism -.010 .022 -.074 [-.054, .033] 
Exploitativeness -.024 .026 -.147 [-.076, .028] 
Vanity .021 .031 .099 [-.040, .083] 
Entitlement -.033 .024 -.198 [-.081, .014] 
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they were not sure about their views and were not included in the analysis. An 
Independent Samples t-test was conducted to check whether interactive deception 
affected cooperative decisions. The analysis was not significant for the mean PoC for 
the 10-rounds PGG, by; deception success group (M = .425, SD = .21); deception 
failure group (M = .481, SD = .22), t(65) = -1.04, p = .30, 95%CI [-.16, .05]. 
However, there was a statistically significant difference for the first round of the 
PGG, deception success group (M = .45, SD = .29); deception failure group (M = .61, 
SD = .33), t(65) = -2.10, p = .039 < .05, 95%CI [-.319, -.008]. 
3.5. Discussion 
Study 1 failed to show an association between empathy and cooperation. This 
is inconsistent with many studies that have reported the important role empathy plays 
in increasing cooperative behaviour (Batson & Moran, 1999; Rumble, et al., 2010). In 
addition, the evidence here failed to find any association between empathy and 
cooperation, regardless of the tendency of using generalized tit-for-tat strategy or the 
amount of contributions made in the PGG. What is more, the regression analysis 
showed that rather than dispositional empathy or narcissism predicting behaviour in 
the PGG, only age was a significant predictor of contributions in the first round of the 
PGG; this is at least consistent with work showing that pro-social orientations 
increase with age (Van Lange, et al., 1997), however this was not a finding that had 
been predicted, or central to the issues explored in Study 1.  
With regards to Hypothesis 1, according to the empathy-induced altruism 
theory (Batson, 1991), the induction of empathy towards three other virtual players 
should motivate participants to contribute more than a no-empathy condition, at least 
in the first round of the PGG. The results indicate that there was no significant main 
effect of inducing empathy, which is inconsistent with previous studies (Batson & 
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Ahmad, 2001; Batson & Moran, 1999; Rumble, et al., 2010). There is evidence that 
empathy-induced altruistic motivation can increase cooperation and care in conflict 
situations (Stephan & Finlay, 1999). In contrast to this, the present study failed to find 
the predicted increase in cooperation via the empathy induction. The main reason 
might be that empathy may operate similarly to attentional processes, in that they 
operate most effectively when a target is located and is easy to specify. When the 
target is ambiguous, the effect of empathy appears to lose its effect, and it may in fact 
be the result of the “diffusion of responsibility” effect. In other words, the empathy 
induction may have indeed led to more empathy, but participants may have felt that 
the burden of responsibility to help was on others in the group. Moreover, according 
to the empathy manipulation effectiveness check, the empathizing rating in the high-
empathy condition and low-empathy condition showed no significant difference. 
Therefore, in the studies in the following chapters (Studies 2, 3 and 4), only high-
empathy and no-empathy contrasts were conducted, because high-empathy induction 
is enough to represent the empathy manipulation effect.  
Although the results in Study 1 suggested that the most frequent solution in 
human interaction games (e.g., prisoner’s dilemma) is tit-for-tat strategy (Nowak & 
Sigmund, 1993), the study also indicated that the empathy manipulations do not 
influence changes in strategic behaviours (i.e. a reduction in the implementation of 
the generalized tit-for-tat strategy). For those repeated interactions with the same 
individuals, direct reciprocity is the explanation for why people cooperate according 
to an evolutionary perspective (Axelrod, 1984). Under direct reciprocity, the 
expectation that the partner will cooperate as a return, “shadow of the future” 
motivates people to cooperate in order to receive the benefits of cooperation 
tomorrow. Direct reciprocity provides the basis for many long-term relationships in 
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humans, such as friendships and business partnerships. Generalized tit-for-tat strategy 
is a simple strategy that captures the essence of direct reciprocity. It might be the case 
that this type of situation, i.e. dealing with multi-interactions with multiple players, 
may have muted any possible effects that empathy would have on strategic behaviour 
such as generalized tit-for-tat.  
The scenario setting check in this study showed that regardless of whether or 
not participants believed they were interacting with three other players, this did not 
affect their decision to contribute tokens across 10 rounds of PGG, but it did affect 
their first round contributions. The former result is curious given that participants still 
contributed to the group pot even though they did not believe they were interacting 
with real participants. More to the point this seems like irrational behaviour, 
especially given that in the experimental setting contributing to the common cause 
cost them real money. Such irrationality is difficult to explain here, and there may be 
other factors that account for the contributions from those that failed to believe the 
experimental set up, such as social desirability effects. In short, the behavioural gaps 
between those who believed and those who did not believe the scenario setting 
methods used in Study 1, highlight the importance of including scenario setting 
checks for laboratory experiments in which similar designs to those used here are 
adopted; this issue will be discussed in further detail in Chapter 4. 
The findings from Study 1 were inconsistent with the positive empathy-
cooperation link which were found in previous studies using other social dilemma 
games such as the prisoner’s dilemma (Batson & Ahmad, 2001; Batson & Moran, 
1999; Rumble, et al., 2010) and the ultimatum game (Barraza & Zak, 2009). Both 
Van Lange (2008) and Barraza & Zak’s (2009) investigations demonstrated that 
feelings of empathy, some called them “empathic concern” -- even when not caused 
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by or directed toward the interaction partner -- nevertheless tended to produce more 
pro-social behaviour toward that partner in a social dilemma game. Explanations for 
the differences in the findings of the present study contrasted to the previous literature 
may be due the levels of ambiguity of the target of empathy, with this being 
ambiguous in this study but unambiguous in the aforementioned studies.  
Hypothesis 3 explored the link between individual difference in dispositional 
traits and cooperation. However, previous work is rather mixed with regards to the 
stability of the association between dispositional empathy and other-regarding 
behaviours. Cohen (2010) used samples of undergraduates and MBA students and 
found that dispositional empathic concern was consistently related to disapproval of 
unethical practices but not related to dispositional perspective taking. In contrast, 
dispositional perspective taking was associated with negotiation performance but 
dispositional empathic concern was not (Galinsky, Maddux, Gilin, & White, 2008). 
Therefore, whether dispositional empathic concern, “empathy” here, tends to produce 
more cooperation is still unknown or at least in the present study, there is insufficient 
basis on which to conclude anything definitively. Similarly, the same argument 
extends to failing to uncover an association between narcissistic personality and 
cooperative behaviour in the PGG. The inconclusiveness of the results here suggests 
utilizing these tools in further studies. 
3.6. Conclusion 
In conclusion, the design of Study 1 failed to support the empathy-cooperation 
link, which has been demonstrated in previous studies. There are several reasons why 
this may have been the case. The most obvious of which is that the target of 
empathetic concern, which in previous studies has been easy to identify during the 
PGG, was not obvious in the present version of the PGG. Participants could have 
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directed their empathetic concern to all three other players - by increasing their 
contributions to the group pot, though they may not have intended to, because they 
may have had a preference to direct their empathetic concern to only one other 
member of the group. Moreover, there was no evidence that there was an association 
between dispositions (empathy, lack of empathy [narcissism]) and cooperative 
behaviours in the PGG.  
The gap between Study 1 and previous studies sets forth a strong incentive to 
conduct further studies, and raises a critical issue of whether or not the empathy-
cooperation link is in fact a reliable link. Therefore, Study 2 is designed to further 
explore the empathy-cooperation link, but extending the paradigm to explore the role 
of values, such as the social cues discussed in this chapter, are thought to play in 
motivating cooperation. 
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Chapter 4  Study 2: The Role of Empathy on 
Cooperation when Personal Values are Introduced 
Summary of Chapter 4: The previous chapter presented work regarding the 
first of four studies within this thesis. Study 1 was designed to examine the role of 
empathy (high-empathy, low-empathy and no-empathy) on cooperative decision-
making in a linear public good game (PGG). Because the findings were inconsistent 
with previous work that have established this link, follow up work is needed to 
examine the extent to which other factors may affect the empathy-cooperation link. 
Therefore, Study 2 is designed to explore how empathy and personal values jointly 
influence cooperation using a similar paradigm to the one used in Study 1. The 
research hypotheses in Study 2 are presented as follows: Hypothesis 1): there should 
be a main effect of empathy induction on cooperative behaviour in the PGG; 
Hypothesis 2): personal values affect cooperation; Hypothesis 3): There should be a 
main effect of “interactive deception” on cooperative behaviours in a social dilemma 
game. 
The main questions Study 2 addresses are: Are the personal values of others a 
relevant cue when thinking about cooperating, and to what extent do values and 
empathizing with others support cooperative behaviours? To address these issues 
Study 2 presented participants (N = 120) with details of the personal values 
(predominately social values [e.g., family, friends] or predominately economic values 
[e.g., phone, bike]) that three other players of a linear PGG purportedly had. In 
addition, half those tested were induced to empathize with the other players; they 
were presented with perspective-taking instructions (high-empathy condition) just as 
in Study 1, while the other half were not given any empathy induction instructions 
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(no-empathy condition). For those that believed they were interacting with real 
players in a cooperative game (n=70) values did indeed seem to matter. Participants 
acted more cooperatively in the social value condition as compared to the economic 
value condition when the empathy induction method was implemented. However, 
empathy induction (perspective-taking instructions) in and of itself made little 
difference to levels of cooperation, and in fact only made a difference by minimally 
reducing the use of the generalized tit-for-tat strategy in the game.  
4.1. Introduction 
The aim of Study 2 was to further explore the empathy-cooperation link, while 
also exploring the role of a factor that has been identified as important in supporting 
pro-social behaviours, that is, the value that people signal as important in social 
exchanges. As mentioned in the previous chapter, dispositional social values 
orientation refers to those values that are critical to social interactions, and for which 
there are individual differences, i.e. some prioritize other-regarding qualities more 
than others (Bogaert, et al., 2008, p.453). This in turn has been shown to be associated 
with cooperation, and may be a mediating factor in the empathy-cooperation link. 
Therefore the main aim of Study 2 was to examine the extent to which the values 
signalled by members of the group (either predominately socially oriented or 
economically oriented) would lead to increases in cooperative behaviour in a PGG in 
the presence as well as the absence of empathy induction. Study 2 examined three 
hypotheses. 
Hypothesis 1 was essentially designed to further explore the findings from 
Study 1. Given that Study 1 failed to reveal a strong empathy-cooperation link, the 
aim of Study 2 was to streamline the design of the experiment, in order to provide a 
better opportunity to expose the empathy-cooperation link. This was achieved by 
CHAPTER 4 STUDY 2 EMPATHY, PERSONAL VALUES AND COOPERATION 
 
111 
simply focusing the comparison between high empathy induction instructions and the 
effects on cooperation against a condition in which no empathy induction instructions 
were provided. 
Hypothesis 2 examined the impact of other cues on cooperation, in particular 
the role of personal values in cooperative behaviour. Values are commonly 
considered as “relatively stable individual preferences about desirable states and 
behaviour that reflects socialization” (Bilsky & Schwartz, 1994, p. 164). In addition, 
personal values consist of social, economic, theoretical, aesthetic, political and 
religious values (Vernon & Allport, 1931). A large body of research has demonstrated 
that there is a strong relationship between people’s personal values and their 
personality type, as well as the decision making strategies they implement (Bilsky & 
Schwartz, 1994; Olver & Mooradian, 2003; L. Parks & Guay, 2009). Bardi and 
Schwartz (2003) speculate that identifying personal values could be used as a way to 
gauge the extent to which people will behave well socially. For example, providing 
information about one content domain of values (e.g., religiosity) influenced 
corresponding relevant behaviour in another domain (Schwartz & Huismans, 1995). 
Moreover, in reference to the connection between values and cooperation, some 
researchers have focused on the role of cultural values on cooperative behaviours 
(Probst, Carnevale, & Triandis, 1999). What is more, legitimacy values and moral 
values were considered to motivate cooperation (Tyler, 2010, pp. 34-38). 
A highly influential body of research has shown an association between 
individual difference, based on personal values (specifically social value orientation 
(Van Lange, 1999) involved “individualists” or “pro-socials” (Simpson, 2004)), and 
levels of cooperation (Balliet, Parks, & Joireman, 2009; Bogaert, et al., 2008).  The 
majority of these studies suggested that pro-socials behaved more cooperatively than 
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pro-selfs. Pro-socials and pro-selfs are distinguished on the basis of the measurements 
of peoples’ social value orientation. 
In contrast, relatively few studies have examined the extent to which value 
information could affect individuals’ cooperative decision-making behaviour. For 
instance, Volk, Thöni, and Ruigrok (2011) measured the extent to which personal 
values were associated with levels of cooperation in a social dilemma game. They 
found that individuals who highly valued pro-social values (e.g. equality) were more 
likely to cooperate than free ride. If, as implied by Volk et al’s (2011) study, personal 
values signal pro-sociality, then this indirectly provides evidence for a potential link 
between the actual values that people hold and their cooperative behaviour. If so, then 
the prediction would be that by manipulating the types of values (economic – i.e. 
selfish, social – i.e. pro-social) shared by a group, this in turn should impact on rates 
of cooperation in a social dilemma game, such as a PGG. 
Hypothesis 3: Here the aim is to further explore the issue of introducing 
deception in a social dilemma game, and the extent to which the pattern of results 
found in Study 1 would be replicated. In the present version of the PGG, there are 
three virtual players and only one real participant involved in each experimental set 
up, just as in Study 1. The reason for using fictional players was to allow for careful 
control of the range of empathic experiences that would impact on real participants’ 
behaviour during the PGG. Nevertheless, to keep the experimental set up as close to 
real as possible, the contributions that the virtual players’ made, though pre-
programmed, were based on data obtained in a real four player PGG experiment (Fehr 
& Gächter, 2000). Experimental designs such as the one adopted in the present study 
involve a critical issue regarding “interactive deception”; this means participants are 
deceived into believing that they are interacting with genuine participants. Typically 
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what is done is that several participants are placed into the same room and play a 
game at the same time, to give the illusion they are actually interacting with the others 
in the room, but in actual fact they are not (Rand, Greene, & Nowak, 2012, study 7). 
In other cases, studies used programmed strategy or pre-design strategies to mimic 
real players while participants played a prisoner’s dilemma games (Batson & Ahmad, 
2001; Batson & Moran, 1999; Rumble, et al., 2010). Similarly, Kurzban and Houser 
(2005) used a pre-designed 10-round PGG in order to create a realistic set-up for 
participants; this also involved interactive deception. Moreover, research on tit-for-tat 
strategy and proof of its success as a strategy is often explored using computer 
tournaments (Axelrod & Hamilton, 1981). Thus, the experimental design used 
presently makes it possible to validly measure the role of empathy and cooperation. 
However, one critical difference between these past studies and the present study is 
that a measure of awareness of “interactive deception” was included, just as in Study 
1. This measure was used to gauge the extent to which it differentially impacts on 
cooperative behaviour in an iterative PGG. Recall that in Study 1 the evidence 
revealed that belief/lack of belief in interacting with other players in the game did not 
impact overall contributions in the PGG, but did impact the contributions made in the 
first round. Therefore, clearly it is important to record the extent to which participants 
detect the deception as a basis on which to analyse the data, which most studies 
employing this type of deception do not do. 
In summary, the aim of Study 2 is to examine two unexplored issues in the 
domain of cooperation. Hypothesis 1): there should be a main effect of empathy 
induction on cooperative behaviour in the PGG; Hypothesis 2): to investigate the role 
of the values on cooperative behaviours in a PGG or not were examined; Hypothesis 
3): to examine the effects of interactive deception on cooperative behaviours in a 
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social dilemma game. If personal values serve as cues to cooperation, which people 
use to inform their decisions to cooperate (Keltner, et al., 2014; C. D. Parks, et al., 
2013), then when the group shares values that are social values, this should elicit 
higher levels of cooperation than when the group shares economic values. In Study 2, 
values were signalled through stories of suffering in which the cause of suffering was 
social or material. To the best of my knowledge, Study 2 is the first ever attempt to 
explore the role of personal values, through this method, as a way to examine the 
impact of values on cooperation. Based on prior work, I predict that social value 
information will promote people to behave more cooperatively than those conveying 
economic values.  In addition, given the design used, Study 2 also aimed to explore 
the impact of interactive deception on cooperative behaviour. The objective here is to 
provide important insights regarding work that adopts similar methodologies that lead 




Study 2 included 120 participants (80 female and 40 male) in four conditions 
of 30 participants each. Participants were recruited from Queen Mary University of 
London via email announcements and posted fliers. Participants were aged between 
18 and 49 (M = 22.09, SD = 4.94). They provided informed consent prior to 
participation. On completion of the experiment, participants received between £6 and 
£15 based on their performance in the linear PGG (25 tokens = £1). When debriefed, 
all participants were asked whether they believed they were interacting with three 
other players online. Forty-nine participants reported they did not believe they were 
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interacting with three other real players, and one participant reported that he was not 
sure. The Ethics Committee of Queen Mary University of London approved this 
research study (QMREC1190). 
4.2.2. Design and Materials 
This experiment was a 2 × 2 (Value [social value, economic value] × Empathy 
[empathy, no-empathy]) between-subjects design, and participants were randomly 
allocated to one of the four experimental conditions. The critical dependent variable 
was the number of tokens participants contributed to the common pot on each of the 
10 rounds, which is also the operational definition of cooperation in such economic 
game. 
Study 2, just like Study 1, recorded other details in a set of questions given 
before and after the study. The pre-task questions included questions on personal 
information (age and gender), and questions concerning the participant’s positive and 
negative experiences over the past year. Participants were also presented with the 
Interpersonal Reactivity Index (IRI) (Davis, 1983) questionnaire which is used to 
measure their dispositional empathizing ability, and consists of four subscales: 
perspective taking (PT), empathic concern (EC), personal distress (PD) and fantasy 
(FT). Unlike Study 1, Study 2 did not examine the link between dispositional 
narcissism and cooperative levels. The reason for this was that Study 2 was focused 
on examining the empathy-cooperation link, and given that dispositional empathy did 
not yield any significant results, it was deemed even less likely that dispositional 
narcissism would, and so to streamline the study, only dispositional empathy was 
included. 
The participant’s photo was taken using a phone camera and uploaded on-
screen along with photos of the three virtual players; these steps were designed so that 
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participants believed they followed the same procedures as the other three players 
they were interacting with online. The details of the profiles were based on a 
published value survey (Osman, 2014). The most common values were predominately 
non-materialistic which formed the Social Value condition (e.g., family, friends, 
health; 86%, 45% and 30%, respectively), with the least common, predominately 
materialistic, values (e.g., mobile phone, bicycle, pet; 3%, 3%, 3%, respectively), 
forming the Economic Value condition. The profiles of the three virtual players were 
matched on the basis of number of words of the personal events. Below is the profile 
from a virtual player in the Social Value condition in which theme was “friend”: 
I speak to my best friend nearly every day. She is the closest person to 
me outside of my family. Recently we fell out. This isn’t the first time that this 
has happened, and I know that we can fix this, but it is still upsetting.  
Below is the profile from a virtual player in the Economic Value condition in 
which the theme is “phone”:   
I speak on my mobile phone nearly every day. It is the object most 
close to me other than my laptop. Recently I broke my phone. It fell out of my 
bag. This isn’t the first time that this has happened, and I know that I can fix 
this, but it is still upsetting.  
The PGG was carried out via a computer using E-prime 2.0. In the PGG 
program, the number of tokens the three players contributed on each round was fixed, 
and the same for each participant. The number and variance in the tokens contributed 
was based on Fehr and Gächter (2000) study’s using average contributions (taking 
into account the standard deviation) in their partner-treatment without punishment 
condition. The combined total contribution of the three other players on each round 
was as follows: 27, 34, 31, 24, 22, 23, 24, 18, 12 and 10; identical to Study 1.  
CHAPTER 4 STUDY 2 EMPATHY, PERSONAL VALUES AND COOPERATION 
 
117 
The post-task questions recorded participants’ impression towards the three 
other virtual players on a 9-point scale, ranging from 1 (not at all) to 9 (very much), 
based on the extent to which they empathized with each of them. In addition, 
participants were also required to rate, on the same 9-point scale, the extent to which 
their personal values related to those of each of the three other players.  
During the debriefing session participants were asked if they thought they 
were interacting with real players online or not, whether they knew the other players, 
and what strategies were used. They were then debriefed about the experimental set 
up.  
4.2.3. Procedure  
Each participant was tested individually in a soundproofed experimental 
cubicle facing a computer monitor. After signing the consent form and reading the 
information sheet, participants filled in the pre-task questions, and their photos were 
taken.  Participants were then asked to wait for approximately 5 minutes and told that 
this time was needed to coordinate the other players that were taking part in the 
experiment, where the interactive deception was involved. During this time 
participants were told to carefully read the instructions for PGG. 
Before participants took part in the PGG task, they were presented with their 
own picture, alongside the three other players’ pictures and were told that they were 
playing the game with these three people. Then the Empathy condition was presented 
with the empathy induction procedure. They were told: “Next you will see profiles of 
the three other participants who will work together with you. While you are reading 
these, try to imagine how the person felt about what they have just described. Try to 
imagine how it has affected them and how they feel as a result”. In the no-empathy 
condition, they were shown the other three profiles and simply told: “Next you will 
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see profiles of the three other participants who will work with you.”. Participants then 
started the PGG. For each round, participants were first presented with the index of 
the round number, for example, “This is Round 2”. Next, participants were required to 
decide how many of their 20 tokens to contribute to the group pot. At this time the 
three others players’ pictures were also presented. After they had made their decision, 
they entered their choice into the computer. Next, they were required to wait between 
4 to 12 seconds, as randomly determined by the program. Then feedback was 
presented in exactly the same manner as in Study 1, including “Other people 
contributed tokens: (the sum of three other players’ contribution), Your contribution 
this round is: (the number of tokens they contributed), Your share of the pot for this 
round: (the number of tokens they received from the pot), Your total number of 
tokens on this round: (the total number of tokens they will receive on that round), and 
Your cumulative total of tokens across rounds: (the total number of tokens they will 
receive across all rounds)”. Participants were required to copy down those values into 
the form using pencil and paper provided. The reason for this was to make sure that 
participants attended to all the feedback information presented on screen on each 
round. When they completed all this, they were required to press space key to 
continue to the next round. This procedure was repeated until all 10 rounds were 
complete.  
On completion of the PGG, participants were then presented with the post-task 
questions, which included self-reporting on empathizing and similarity; this was then 
followed by the IRI. Finally, participants were fully debriefed about the study and its 
purpose. 




With regards to scoring for the IRI empathy questionnaire, the four subscales 
(PT, PD, FS and EC) were scored individually. Each subscale consisted of 7 items; 
with some items reverse scored (item 3, 4, 7, 12, 13, 14, 15, and 19). Specifically, PT 
comprised of items 3, 8, 11, 15, 21, 25, 28; PD comprised of items 6, 10, 13, 17, 19, 
24 and 27; FS comprised of items 1, 5, 7, 12, 16, 23 and 26; EC comprised of items 2, 
4, 9, 14, 18, 20 and 22. Similarity and Empathizing were scored according to the 
rating in the post-task questions, and ranged from 1 (not at all) to 9 (very much).  
4.3. Results 
The results section is divided as follows: First self-reported similarity and 
empathizing scores are presented, then analyses of the rates of contribution in the 
PGG are presented, along with analyses of the frequency of generalized tit-for-tat 
strategy in each of the four conditions. Finally, a regression analysis is used to 
examine the potential association between first round’s contribution in the PGG and 
dispositional empathy ability. 
4.3.1. Self-report Empathy and Similarity 
To begin with, the analyses examined if there were group differences based on 
self-report similarity and self-report empathy of participants’ personal values, and 
those of the three other players in the social value and economic value conditions. 
There were no significant differences for self-reported similarity between the four 
conditions. In terms of self-reported empathy, based on the three profiles that 
participants read of the other group members, there was a significant interaction 
between value and empathy. This suggests that in the high-empathy condition, self-
reported empathy in the economic value condition (M = 5.09, SD = 17.63) was lower 
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than in the social value condition (M =6.33, SD = 17.63), F(1,116) =7.48, p = .007, 
ηp
2 = .061. 
4.3.2. PGG: First Round 
In the first round, the mean of contribution rate was 0.52 (SD = 0.30), 95% CI 
[0.47, 0.58], which was located at the interval of 40% ~ 60% of the overall personal 
endowments. At this stage in the PGG (N = 120) the value manipulation did not 
impact on the number of tokens contributed, F(1, 116) = .435, p = .511, ηp
2 = .004, 
and neither did the induction of empathy, F(1, 116) = 2.89, p = .09, ηp
2= .024. There 
was also no significant interaction between value and empathy on first round 
contributions, F(1, 116) = 0.001, p = .99, ηp
2 <.0001.  
4.3.3. PGG: All Rounds  
Contributions made in each round by each participant were entered in a 2 × 2 
× 2 × 10 Value [social value, economic value] × Empathy [empathy, no-empathy] × 
Deception [deception success, deception failure] as the between-subject variables × 
Round [round 1-10] as the within-subject variable) mixed ANOVA to examine the 
main manipulations of the study. The Mauchly’s test indicated that the assumption of 
sphericity had been violated, χ2 (44) = 166.63, p <.001, therefore Greenhouse-Geisser 
corrected tests were reported (ε = .71).  
Table 9A shows the mean contribution of tokens for the four conditions. The 
analyses revealed a marginally significant 10 Round × Value × Empathy × Deception 
four-way effect, F(6.42, 712.38) = 55.95, p =.059, ηp
2 = .018. Apart from this, all 
other analyses failed to reach significance. Further analyses were conducted based on 
classifying participants according to whether they believed they were interacting with 
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three other players online into deception success group (n = 70) and deception failure 
group (n = 49) for further analysis.  
In terms of the deception success group (n = 70), a 10 × 2 × 2 (Round [round 
1-10] × Value [social value, economic value] × Empathy [no-empathy, empathy]) 
repeated-measures ANOVA was conducted. As shown in Table 9B, there was a 
significant interaction between Value × Empathy, F(1, 66) = 6.782, p =.011, ηp
2 = 
.093. A post-hoc power test was calculated by G*power 
(http://www.gpower.hhu.de/en.html), (1- β = 1.00 > .80). Pairwise comparisons 
showed that in the empathy condition, there was a significant difference between the 
economic value condition and the social value condition, p = .004, ηp
2= .118; not 
found in the no-empathy condition, p = .736, ηp
2 = .002, which indicates that when 
empathy was induced, for those presented with social values stories, contributions 
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Table 9A. The Mean Contribution for the Four Conditions (N=120); B. The Mean Contribution for the 
Deception Success Group (n=70); C. The Mean Contribution for the Deception Failure Group (n=49) 
A The Mean Contribution for the Four Conditions (N=120) 
 B The Mean Contribution for those Deception Success Group (n=70) 
 C The Mean Contribution for those Deception Failure Group (n=49) 
  
The main effect of round was significant, F(6.24, 411.86) = 9.98, p <.001, ηp
2 
= .13, (1- β =1.00 > .80), suggesting that overall contributions dropped over round, 
which is a typical effect in the PGG literature. The analysis also found a marginally 
significant interaction between round × empathy, F(6.24, 411.86) = 1.92, p =.073, ηp
2 
= .028, (1- β = .976 > .80). Pairwise comparisons showed that there was only a 
significant difference between the no-empathy condition (M = 10.97, SD = 4.63, 95% 
CI [9.41, 12.54]) and high-empathy condition (M = 8.07, SD = 6.42, 95% CI [5.90, 
10.24]), for the first round contribution, p = .034, d = 0.52.  
Value No-empathy Empathy 
M (SD) n 95% CI M (SD) n 95%CI 
Economic value 9.95(4.86) 30 [8.19, 11.71] 6.47(7.61) 30 [3.73, 9.23] 
Social value 9.53(4.39) 30 [7.94,11.13] 9.82(3.93) 30 [8.40, 11.24] 
Value No-empathy  Empathy 
M (SD) n 95% CI M (SD) n 95% CI 
Economic value 9.44 (3.00) 24 [8.21,10.66] 6.73 (4.25) 22 [4.92, 8.54] 
Social value 9.14 (2.04) 11 [7.86,10.42] 10.38 (3.00) 13 [8.71,12.04] 
Value No-empathy  Empathy 
M (SD) n 95% CI M (SD) n 95% CI 
Economic value 10.47 (4.91) 6 [6.42,14.51] 9.71 (4.90) 17 [7.31, 12.11] 
Social value 9.93 (4.91) 8 [6.43,13.43] 9.37 (4.91) 18 [7.04,11.71] 




Figure 12. A. Average contributions in four conditions for all data (N=120); B. Average 
contributions in four conditions for deception success group (n=70); (the left figure is A and the right 
figure is B, the same rule applies for the following figures in this thesis.).  
Turning now to the deception failure group (n=49), while it is hard to interpret 
the behaviour of this group, their pattern of contributions does provide some 
interesting insights. In Study 2 the tokens at the end of PGG converted into real 
money. Therefore rationally, the deception failure group should consistently make 
zero contributions in every round because pro-sociality is dis-incentivized as they 
believe they are not interacting with real players. However, just as in Study 1, in 
Study 2 the social nature of the PGG set up appears to have encouraged the deception 
failure group to contribute reliably above zero (M = 9.71, SD = 4.77, t(48) = 14.25, p 
< .001), as shown in Table 9C. A repeated-measures ANOVA was performed on the 
deception failure group across 10 round PGG and first round PGG data, with no 
significant main effect or interactions.   
4.3.4. Generalized Tit-for-tat Strategy 
To test the effect of the main manipulation (empathy & values) on the 
frequency of employing the generalized tit-for-tat strategy, a loglinear analysis was 
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performed on the number of participants using the strategy in each condition. Prior 
studies suggest that the tit-for-tat strategy is a common strategy employed in social 
dilemmas such as the prisoner’s dilemma; the generalized tit-for-tat strategy is the 
matching strategy in PGG. Therefore, contributions of the participants from 2nd to the 
10th round were correlated with the mean contributions of the three other players’ 
from 1st to 9th round. If the correlation is significant, those players were classified as 
using generalized tit-for-tat strategy, and if it is non-significant, those players were 
classified as using other strategy. Table 10 shows the number and proportion of 
people using the generalized tit-for-tat strategy in each condition. A log-linear 
analysis revealed more participants were classified as using the generalized tit-for-tat 
strategy in the no-empathy condition as compared to the empathy condition, Z = 
2.815, p = .005 (N =120); Z = 2.926, p = .040 (n=70). While the empathy induction 
manipulation did not lead to increases overall in the contributions made in the PGG, it 
did affect the types of strategies that participants employed and discouraged 
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Table 10 A. The Number and Proportion using Generalized Tit-for-tat Strategy in Four Conditions 
(Value × Empathy) (N=120); B. The Number and Proportion using Generalized Tit-for-tat Strategy in 





4.3.5. Regression between PGG and Empathic Disposition 
To test for an association between dispositional empathy and contribution 
rates in the PGG, a Linear Regression analysis was carried out on the first round 
contribution, age and the score of subscales (PT, PD, FS, EC) of the IRI. As seen 
from Table 11, none of subscales of the IRI predicted first round contributions in the 











Value No-empathy Empathy 
Economic value 11/30 (36.67%) 5/30 (16.67%) 
Social value 11/30 (36.67%) 3/30 (10%) 
Value No-empathy Empathy 
Economic value 10/24 (41.67%) 2/11 (18.18%) 
Social value 10/22 (45.45%) 2/13 (15.38%) 
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Table 11A. Summary of Hierarchical Regression Analysis for Variables Prediction Contribution in 
First Round of PGG for Deception Success Group (n=70); 11B. Summary of Hierarchical Regression 
Analysis for Variables Prediction Contribution in First Round of PGG for Deception Failure Group 
(n=49). 
Note. R2 = .001 for step 1; ΔR2 = .0054 for step 2. * p < .05;  
Note. R2 = .044 for step 1; ΔR2 = .141 for step 2. * p < .05; 
Variables B SEB  95% CI
Step 1     
Age -.051 .202 -.037 [-.458, .355] 
Step 2     
Age -.131 .250 -.094 [-.636, .374] 
PT .938 .806 .186 [-.688, 2.564] 
PD -.346 .745 -.079 [-1.848,1.156] 
FS .105 .648 .026 [-1.202,1.413] 
EC -.1.342  1.471 -.197 [-4.308,1.625] 
Variables B SEB  95% CI
Step 1     
Age -.058 .190 -.044 [-.439, .323] 
Step 2     
Age -.118 .191 -.091 [-.503, .266] 
PT .384 1.425 .040 [-2.489, 3.256] 
PD 3.608 1.520 .374* [.543, 6.673] 
FS .084 1.190 .011 [-2.316, 2.484] 
EC -3.355 1.870 -.279 [-7.126, .417] 
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4.4. Discussion  
As well as replicating Study 1, Study 2 was also designed to examine potential 
relevant cues that could influence cooperation, in an online interactive social dilemma 
game (PGG). To this end, Study 2 found that, consistent with Study 1, the empathy 
induction manipulation did not, in and of itself, lead to increases in cooperation 
relative to the no-empathy condition, but it did impact on the types of strategies that 
were employed in the PGG. In addition, Study 2 found that values, for those that 
believed that they were interacting with real players online, did impact on cooperative 
behaviours in the PGG, when there is perspective taking instruction. In particular, 
when participants were interacting with players that were revealed to have 
predominately social values, contributions were higher than those interacting with 
players that had mostly economic values. This supports Hypothesis 2. Also, consistent 
with evidence from Study 1, Study 2 found that participants contributed to the pot 
even though they did not believe they were interacting with real players.  
Again, as with Study 1, Study 2 failed to find an empathy-cooperation link, 
posited to be the result of presenting a social dilemma task without face-to-face 
interactions, thought to be important for empathy to take effect (Batson & Moran, 
1999; Rumble, et al., 2010; Xu, et al., 2012). In Study 2 the empathy manipulation 
was identical to other studies that have demonstrated enhanced effects on pro-social 
behaviours, which is why it is more likely that the mixed findings are a result of 
differences concerning the PGG procedures, rather than the fact that empathy per se is 
less effective as an emotional cue when interacting online. In Studies 1 and 2 
participants were asked to decide the amount of tokens they would contribute to the 
group pot, whereas in previous studies participants could decide to contribute their 
tokens to a group pot, or an individual player. This may be a critical difference 
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because when empathy was induced in Batson, Batson, et al. (1995)’s study, 
participants increased their cooperation for the target player they most empathized 
with, which was not possible in the present study.  
In Study 2 participants were presented with details of the personal experiences 
of the other players and so could, in theory, empathize with this, and reveal their pro-
social tendencies by cooperating more overall. While empathy did not reveal itself in 
cooperative behaviours per se, those induced to empathize were less likely to use the 
generalized tit-for-tat strategy is often relied on as an efficient and defensive means 
of guarding against betrayal of pro-sociality (Komorita, Parks, & Hulbert, 1992). 
Moreover, this study explored dispositional empathy ability as a predictor of first 
round contributions in the PGG; however, only weak evidence for a connection was 
found. Again, this may be the result of the procedures adopted in the PGG, or because 
there is an unstable association between empathy and cooperation when interacting 
with others online. 
Secondly, Study 2 did find evidence to suggest that signalling pro-social 
behavioural dispositions online is a useful cue that participants use to determine the 
extent to which they cooperate, consistent with Parks’ Integrated Model (C. D. Parks, 
et al., 2013). As previous work has shown, if one is provided with information that 
reveals pro-social behaviours such as trustworthiness (Stave, 1983), cooperative 
behaviour with strangers increases. While this study is the first of its kind to provide 
evidence of the mediating role of values in a linear PGG, it lends further support to 
the work of Volk, et al. (2011) which suggested that values do play a role in 
cooperation. One question that those findings raise is what role values play for 
determining cooperative behaviours in the PGG. Given that the overall pattern of 
contributions decays over rounds, which is consistent with previous studies of PGG 
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(Ledyard, 1994), one way of conceptualising the role of values is that signalling social 
values reduces the decay, relative to signalling economic values. Thus, the findings 
from the present study limit claims that signalling materialistic values per se is a way 
of increasing cooperation overall, at least for the linear PGG. In order to support this 
claim, further studies using the PGG would have to show that participants (either 
interacting with real or virtual players) make higher contributions systematically 
across rounds when not providing any information in contrast to providing 
information signalling economic values.  
In line with standard economic versions of the linear PGG based on 
recommendations by economists and psychologists (Hertwig & Ortmann, 2001) 
Study 2, as with Study 1, used real financial incentives rather the fixed payments or 
credits. However, Studies 1 and 2 introduced a form of social-interaction-deception, 
“interactive deception”, as participants were led to believe they were interacting with 
real players. Even though this was present, Study 2 revealed that, compared with 
other studies, overall first round contributions were within the standard 40% ~ 60 % 
range of endowments (Ledyard, 1994). This suggests that the decision making 
behaviour that was observed was in line with previous economic studies that involve 
genuine (though typically not direct face-to-face) interactions with real players. 
Nevertheless, to examine the impact of interactive deception on decision-making 
behaviour participants were asked if they did indeed believe they were interacting 
with real players, and only a small proportion did not. What is curious is that these 
participants continued to make contributions knowing that they were not interacting 
with real players, when the rational strategy would be to contribute nothing on each 
round. One explanation for this is that participants were subject to social desirability 
bias, as speculated in Chapter 3, which is the tendency to present oneself in a positive 
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social manner to be accepted by others (Edwards, 1957; King & Bruner, 2000). 
Despite this, 58% of participants in Study2 who indicated that they believed they 
were genuinely interacting with real players, revealed observable patterns of 
behaviours consistent with the prediction in Study2. Future studies that include 
manipulations such as the ones used here should include checks to identify if 
participants are aware of the presence of deception, whatever kind is used. 
4.5. Conclusion 
Overall, Study 2 showed that signals of social values as compared to economic 
values maintained cooperation in a social dilemma game when there were 
perspective-taking instructions designed to induce empathy. Moreover, empathy 
reduced the likelihood of a typical reciprocal strategy (generalized tit-for-tat). Taken 
together both Studies 1 and 2 suggest that empathy is a weak method for increasing 
cooperative behaviours, but that in combination with other factors, such as signalling 
of pro-sociality through personal values, does at least maintain reasonable levels of 
cooperation in a PGG. Given this, the aim of Study 3 was to further explore other 
factors that can, in combination with induced empathy, increase cooperation in a 
PGG. 
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Chapter 5  Study 3: The Empathy-cooperation Link in 
PGG with Heterogeneous Group Setting 
Summary of Chapter 5: This chapter presents Study 3 consisting of two 
experiments (Experiments 3a, and 3b), both designed to further explore the empathy-
cooperation association, with a focus on status. Whereas Study 1 focused on purely 
establishing a link between empathy and cooperation, and Study 2 aimed to replicate 
and extend the findings from Study 1, Study 3 now builds on this work to explore the 
extent to which empathy impacts on cooperative behaviours when the status between 
individuals in a social dilemma game is manipulated. By focusing on status, the aim is 
to look at the way in which different types of social structures impact on behaviour in 
a social dilemma game, and whether in fact empathy can have a significant impact in 
supporting cooperative behaviours. 
The following hypotheses were examined in Study 3 in which social status 
was manipulated: Hypothesis 1: The low-status group is more dependent than those in 
the high-status group in the community; therefore, the low-status group will show 
greater levels of cooperation, irrespective of the inducement of empathy; Hypothesis 
2: There should be greater cooperation in groups that have achieved their status 
through chance (Experiment 3A) than through efforts (Experiment 3B); Hypothesis 3: 
According to the empathy-altruism hypothesis, empathy induction will promote 
cooperation; Hypothesis 4: Those with higher empathic disposition will make higher 
first round contributions in a linear public good game (PGG); Hypothesis 5: Empathy 
induction will reduce the likelihood of using generalized tit-for-tat strategy.  
Study 3 considered the extent to which empathy mediates cooperative 
behaviours when individuals’ status within group (i.e. having more [high-status] or 
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less [low-status] resources than their group members) is either determined by chance 
or effort. The general method employed in Study 3 was similar to both Studies 1 and 
2. Study 3 involved one real player and three virtual players taking part in a linear 
PGG. The findings from Experiment 3A and 3B showed that, regardless of whether 
individuals were endowed with their status (Experiment 3A chance-status) or earned 
their status (Experiment 3B effort-status), individuals in high-status conditions 
devoted a lower proportion of contributions (PoC) than their low-status counterparts, 
which suggests that the high status group behaved less cooperatively than the low 
status group. Empathy in and of itself did not lead to increases in PoC but did 
maintain PoC for the low-status group when status was determined by effort 
(Experiment 3B effort-status). Overall, the results from Study 3 suggest that empathy-
induced altruism is a weak motivator of cooperation in a group setting when financial 
incentives are made especially salient. 
5.1. Introduction 
Equality of opportunity can be determined by chance or determined by effort; 
that is, ceteris paribus (all else being equal) the opportunity for gaining resources is 
through chance factors, which all members of a group are exposed to, or through 
achieving more resources through effort alone. To what extent is successfully 
promoting pro-social behaviours dependent on the way in which status is achieved 
through chance or effort? This empirical question forms the basis of Study 3. As 
mentioned in Chapter 1, pro-social behaviour is a broad category of acts that are 
agreed on by a significant segment of society or one’s social group, as generally 
beneficial to others (Penner, Dovidio, Piliavin, & Schroeder, 2005) with cooperation 
the most frequent pro-social behaviour. Status is a term that includes, but is not 
limited to, constructs such as socioeconomic status (SES), social influence resource-
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holding potential, and social class (Kafashan, Sparks, Griskevicius, & Barclay, 2014), 
the latter of which has been found to affect behaviours associated with social 
engagement (Cote, 2011; Kraus & Stephens, 2012). 
Some experimental work suggests a link between how status is achieved and 
pro-sociality in terms of displays of cooperative behaviour. In equal opportunity via 
chance manipulations (Muehlbacher & Kirchler, 2009), tokens are randomly assigned 
by the experimenter to participants to mimic acquisition of wealth via inheritance 
(Komorita, et al., 1992) or via lotteries. Equal opportunity via effort is examined by 
assigning tokens based on performance on a specific task, which is designed to mimic 
situations in which access to greater wealth is achieved by meeting performance 
criteria in job settings (Kroll, Cherry, & Shogren, 2007a). Taken together, the general 
findings suggest that pro-sociality weakens when status is achieved through effort 
rather than by chance (Muehlbacher & Kirchler, 2009; Rockmann & Northcraft, 
2008). While this work suggests that generally the basis on which status is achieved 
does in turn impact displays of pro-sociality, it does not speak on issues regarding the 
link between status and pro-sociality per se, which is also an important component for 
addressing the target question motivating this study. 
One key motivation of Study 3 is to examine the link between status and pro-
sociality, which Kafashan, et al. (2014) claim is functional in one of two ways, either 
pro-social behaviour can be used to help achieve status (Willer, 2009a), or  possessing 
status can change the costs and benefits of engaging in pro-social behaviour. With 
regards to the latter, evidence suggest that low-status individuals are more likely to 
show pro-social behaviour than high status individuals when it comes to charitable 
donations (Bennett, 2012; Piff, Kraus, Côté, Cheng, & Keltner, 2010). Some work has 
looked at the extent to which this pattern of behaviour extends to other contexts such 
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as laboratory tasks, for instance, a linear public goods game (PGG) which consists of 
only one Nash equilibrium in which everyone contributes nothing and one Pareto 
efficient solution in which everyone contributes everything (Abele, et al., 2010). Here 
each of four players can choose to contribute a certain amount of their endowments to 
a common pot (i.e. an index of cooperation), which is distributed equally amongst all 
four players. In typical versions of the linear PGG each player is endowed with the 
same amount of tokens (homogenous set up). Heterogeneity, which can serve as a 
proxy for different levels of status, can be introduced via distribution of an unequal 
amount of tokens amongst players (Cherry, Kroll, & Shogren, 2005). Consistent with 
research on status and charitable donations, there is some evidence to suggest that 
low-status individuals (i.e. those endowed with less tokens than the group) contribute 
more than high status individuals (Piff, et al., 2010). Given that experimental 
manipulation of endowment heterogeneity in the PGG creates a lab-analogue of 
having low-status and high-status, a similar paradigm is used in the present study. 
Based on previous work assuming a functional relationship such that status affects the 
costs and benefits of pro-social behaviour, it is predicted that having low-status, 
regardless of the way of it was achieved (i.e. chance, effort), will lead to greater 
displays of pro-sociality through contributions to a public good. However, this 
manipulation alone does not tackle the issue of how to artificially promote pro-social 
behaviours in both low-status and high-status groups.  
According to the theories presented in Chapter 2, different social statuses 
affect one’s costs and benefits analysis with resultant changes in behaviour. 
Therefore, if changes occur to a person’s relative status within a group, the proclivity 
for cooperative behaviour will change due to either the change of exchange of 
material resources or the relative identity they could potentially obtain. However, 
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these theories do not consider whether empathy induced altruistic motivation 
increases cooperation in such contexts. The empathy-altruism hypothesis (Batson, 
2011) predicts that if people feel empathic concern for another group member, 
altruism will be motivated towards them.  
To address the main objective of Study 3, and to examine many of the 
outstanding empirical questions raised by research examining equal opportunity, 
status, cooperation and empathy, two experiments were conducted for Study 3 to 
explore the role of empathy when the endowments were heterogeneous and the origin 
of status were manipulated. Each experiment (Experiment 3A, Experiment 3B) 
assessed the extent to which empathy influenced cooperative behaviour in an iterated 
linear PGG. Cooperation was indexed by proportion of contributions (PoC) to a 
community resource in one of three modes of equality. Experiment 3A (chance-
status) assessed behaviour under conditions in which status was determined by chance 
(i.e. a draw of a ball from a box with equal distribution of red and blue balls). 
Experiment 3B (effort-status) assessed behaviours when status was determined by 
effort (i.e. performance on a cognitive test of executive functioning), again in which 
there was equal opportunity but unequal resources.  
The following five main hypotheses are made for Study 3: Hypothesis 1) 
based on the resource exchange theory (H. H. Kelley & Thibaut, 1978), the low-status 
group will be more dependent on the community than those in the high-status group; 
therefore, the low-status groups will show greater levels of cooperation, regardless of 
the inducement of empathy; Hypothesis 2) there will be greater cooperation in groups 
that have achieved their status through chance than through effort; Hypothesis 3) 
according to the empathy-altruism hypothesis (Batson, 2011), inducing empathy 
towards the suffering of others will promote cooperation in Study 3; Hypothesis 4) 
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those with higher empathic disposition will make higher first round contributions in 
the PGG (Here empathic disposition in general is measured using a subscale of the 
Interpersonal Reactivity Index (IRI), though Studies 1 and 2 have failed to show this); 
Hypothesis 5) empathy induction will reduce the likelihood of using generalized tit-
for-tat strategy (Axelrod & Hamilton, 1981), because generalized tit-for-tat strategy 
is considered as the most effective strategy for egoists (consistent with the findings 
from Study 2). This strategy tends to produce more overall personal gain than a 
strategy of relentless defection, even though defecting is optimal on each individual 
trial (Axelrod, 1984). 
5.2. General Method 
5.2.1. Overview 
Study 3 comprised of two experiments, in which real participants were 
exposed to a series of 10 rounds in a linear PGG while interacting with three fictional 
players, just as in Studies 1 and 2. The assignment of participants to the key 
experimental conditions (high-status vs. low-status) in Experiment 3A was based on a 
random draw of a coloured ball picked from an occluded black box (chance-status). In 
the black box there was one blue ball and one red ball, so the probability of their 
assignment to high-status or low-status group was 50%, respectively. Participants 
were assigned to the low-status condition if they picked the blue ball and the high-
status condition if they picked the red ball. The endowment allocation distribution in 
the high-status was as follows: real player 30 tokens, fictional players each with 20 
tokens, whereas that of low-status was: real player 10 tokens, fictional players each 
with 20 tokens. In Experiment 3B, participants were assigned to status conditions 
(high-status vs. low-status) according to their performances on a digit cancellation test 
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(effort-status). The endowment allocation distribution was the same as Experiment 
3A. A prior power analysis was conducted using G*power 
(http://www.gpower.hhu.de/en.html) to infer the required sample sizes for this study 
(Faul, et al., 2007). Assuming the effect size of empathy is the medium effect (ƒ = 
0.25) suggested by Cohen, defined for between subject repeated-measures ANOVA 
(J. Cohen, 1988), the required total sample size is 72, when the power (1-β = .8).  
These two experiments’ data analysis followed the same structure. First, the 
analyses assessed the effectiveness of the empathy manipulation using a mixed 
repeated-measures ANOVA to examine the effects of empathy and status on 
cooperation using proportion of contribution (PoC) in the PGG. Next, the number and 
proportion of participants using a generalized tit-for-tat strategy across all conditions 
were examined to check whether the tendency to use a generalized tit-for-tat strategy 
was affected by the manipulation. Finally, a regression analysis was conducted to 
assess whether dispositional empathy measured by IRI predict the first round 
contribution in the PGG.  
Experiment 3A 
In Experiment 3A the aim was to examine the effects of empathy on 
cooperation in situations in which status (high vs. low) in the PGG game was 
achieved via chance.  
5.2.2. Method (Experiment 3A) 
5.2.2.1. Participants 
Ninety-four volunteers (58 female and 36 male) were recruited from Queen 
Mary University of London via emails and fliers. The mean age of the participants 
was 20.71 years (range from 17 to 32; SD = 3.09). Based on the condition they were 
assigned to, they were given different final payments. In the high-status condition, 
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participants were paid between £10 and £15; in the low-status condition, participants 
were paid from £5 to £7.  
All participants gave written informed consent prior to participation. After the 
experiment, they were paid an amount for their participation on the basis of the tokens 
gained in the PGG. In each PGG 25 tokens was equal to £1, which all participants 
were made aware of at the start of the experiment. The Ethics Committee of Queen 
Mary University of London approved the study (QMREC1190).  
5.2.2.2. Design and Materials  
Experiment 3A was a 2 × 2 (Empathy [high-empathy, no-empathy] × Chance-
status [high-status, low-status] between-subject experimental designs. The critical 
dependent variable was participants’ proportion of contributions (PoC) in each round 
of the PGG, which comprised 10 rounds in total. Participants’ contributions from 
round to round were assessed. In addition, the experiment recorded other dependent 
measures in a set of questions given before (demographics, personal stories, hobbies) 
and after (dispositional empathy, estimates of similarity, estimates of empathy, 
believability of study, strategy development) the main task. The pre-task questions 
included questions regarding age and gender, the participants’ positive (i.e. “Describe 
an event that has happened to you that has made you happy in the last year”) and 
negative experiences (i.e. “Describe an event that has happened to you that has made 
you sad in the last year”), and their hobbies. Post-task questions consisted of rating 
scales to assess participants’ judgements of similarity to, and empathy towards each 
of the three virtual players. The post-task questions recorded participants’ impression 
(similarity, empathizing) towards the three other virtual players on a 9-point scale, 
ranging from 1 (not at all) to 9 (very much). Moreover, participants were also 
presented with IRI questionnaire, which is widely used to measure adults’ 
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dispositional empathizing ability and consists of four subscales, Perspective Taking 
(PT), Empathic Concern (EC), Personal Distress (PD) and Fantasy (FT) (Davis, 
1983). Participants’ photos taken at the start of the experiment, using a phone camera, 
were uploaded on screen along with the photos of the three virtual players; these steps 
were designed to ensure that participants felt that all of the participants in the game 
were experiencing the same procedures, and were supposedly interacting live online. 
Finally, as with Studies 1 and 2, debriefing questions were presented to participants to 
assess whether they believed that they were interacting with three other players 
online, and whether they recognized the three other players. 
The PGG was programmed and implemented via a computer using E-prime 
2.0 software. The game was arranged such that each participant was playing with 
three other players whose actual profiles, included stories (regarding either negative 
events they experience, or their chosen hobbies) and photos, were prepared in 
advance; this method is often referred to as “interactive deception”. In the high-
empathy condition, the three other players’ profiles referred to a negative event that 
had been experienced (Player 1 = a break up with a partner, Player 2 = a car accident, 
Player 3 = a stolen mobile phone), which to some extent can be categorized as social 
pain/psychological pain. In addition, participants were instructed on the empathy 
induction method, in the same way as in Studies 1 and 2. In the no-empathy 
condition, the profiles referred to neutral events (Player 1 = swimming, Player 2 = 
ride bicycle, Player 3 = running most mornings). There were no perspective-taking 
instructions as to how to read the profiles. 
The assignment of participants to each experimental condition was carried out 
prior to the main experiment. This study involved a status manipulation, in which half 
of the real participants were endowed with 30 tokens (high-status) and the other half 
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were endowed with 10 tokens (low-status) on each round. All the three other virtual 
players were set to given 20 tokens per round regardless of high-status or low-status 
group. In this PGG program, the amount contributed by the three virtual players was 
fixed for all participants, in a similar way as Studies 1 and 2. Besides, to help the 
participant better understand their payoff in the experiment, an equation explaining 
the method of calculating their tokens per round was also presented to the participants 
before starting the public goods programs, e.g., (30−? ) +  
(?+?𝑎+?𝑏+?𝑐)∗(1+40%)
4
 in the 
high-status condition and (10−? ) + 
(?+?𝑎+?𝑏+?𝑐)∗(1+40%)
4
 in the low-status condition 
(? refers to the amount of contribution to the common pot). 
5.2.2.3. Procedure  
Each participant was tested individually in a soundproofed experimental 
cubicle facing a computer monitor. After reading the information sheet and signing 
the consent form, participants were required to pick a ball from a black box without 
looking inside and were told the colour of ball determined their group for the 
experiment. If they picked the red ball, the participants were assigned to high-status 
condition; if they picked the blue ball, they were assigned to low-status condition.  
Next, the experimenter told the participant that since the experiment required 
them to work with three other players online together, they are required to do some 
preparation. “As we said in the information sheet, you are going to play this joint task 
with three other players online. Yet we cannot let you talk with each other, since we 
need to conduct this study under controlled conditions. What we do is exchange your 
profile with three other players. In order to do that, we need to collect your picture 
and some personal information.” Having been informed of the confidentiality of their 
data, participants were asked to fill in the pre-task questions, and to have their photo 
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taken, with a neutral facial emotion, in front of a white wall background. Participants 
were then asked to wait for approximately 5 minutes and told that this time was 
needed to coordinate the other players that were taking part in the experiment. During 
this time participants were told to carefully read the instructions for the PGG. They 
were given the instructions that corresponded with the colour of ball they picked. In 
the high-status condition, they were instructed that they were to be given 30 tokens 
per round, whereas in the low status condition, the instructions informed participants 
that they were to be given 10 tokens per round.  
The experimenter came back to the experimental cubicle after uploading the 
participants’ picture to the computer running the PGG program. The experimenter 
asked the participants to describe their understanding of the instructions to 
demonstrate understanding of the task. Then the experimenter showed participants the 
three other players’ pictures alongside their own picture. “These are the players you 
are going to play with. And you will see their profile in the program.” To be more 
persuasive, the real participant picture was always the first picture presented, followed 
by the three other face photos. After entering some basic information (participant 
number, gender, age), they were presented again with instructions for the PGG 
program. They were then asked to wait again while the experimenter asked the other 
players to get ready. When the experimenter returned, after between 30 to 60 seconds, 
they were instructed to press the SPACE key to start the experiment. 
In the PGG program, the high-empathy condition was presented with the 
empathy induction procedure. They were instructed: “Next you will see profiles of the 
three other participants who will work together with you. While you are reading this, 
try to imagine how the person felt about what they have just described. Try to imagine 
how it has affected them and how they feel as a result”. In the no-empathy condition, 
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participants were instructed: “Next you will see the profiles of three other participants 
who will work together with you.” Participants were then consecutively presented 
with the picture and profile of each of the three players to read after which the PGG 
was started. For each round, when participants were required to decide on how many 
of their tokens to contribute, they were presented with the pictures of the three other 
players. In the high-status condition, it was from 0 to 30 tokens; whereas in the low-
status condition, it was from 0 to 10 tokens. After they had made their decision, they 
entered their choice, and were required to wait between 4 to 12 seconds, randomly 
determined by the program. After which they were given feedback, “Other people 
contributed tokens: (the sum of three other players’ contributions); Your contribution 
this round is: (the number of tokens they contributed); Your share of the pot for this 
round: (the total number of tokens they will receive on that round); and Your 
cumulative total of tokens across rounds (the total number they will receive across all 
rounds)”. The program then moved on to the next round. This procedure was repeated 
until all 10 rounds were complete. Participants were required to copy down all the 
values presented in each round using a pen and the form provided. The reason for this 
was to make sure that participants attended to all the feedback information presented 
on the screen on each round. On completion of the PGG, participants were presented 
with the post-task questionnaires, and debriefed about the details of the study, its 
purpose and the interactive deception issue.  
5.2.3. Results (Experiment 3A) 
5.2.3.1. Empathizing Manipulation Check 
For Experiment 3A, an independent-samples t-test was conducted on 
judgments regarding the extent to which participants empathized with the experiences 
of the other players they were interacting with in the PGG, in the no-empathy (n = 49) 
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and high-empathy (n = 45) conditions. Empathizing judgments were significantly 
higher in the high-empathy conditions (M = 4.75, SD = 1.44) than no-empathy 
conditions (M = 3.71, SD = 1.96), t(92) = -2.91, p = .005, d = -.604, 95% CI [-1.75, -
0.33]. 
5.2.3.2. Empathy & Status Manipulation  
The mean and standard deviations of the PoC of all 10 rounds in the four 
conditions for are shown in Table 12A for empathy (high-empathy, no-empathy) and 
chance-status (high-status, low-status) conditions. A univariate analysis was 
conducted with the PoC in the first round as a dependent variable, and empathy and 
chance-status as fixed-factor variables. There was no Chance-status × Empathy 
interaction on first round contributions, F(1, 90) = 0.50, p = .82, ηp
2 = .001; the main 
effect of empathy was not statistically significant, F(1, 90) = 2.04, p = .16, ηp
2 = .022; 
and the main effect of chance-status was not statistically significant, F(1, 90) = 3.47, 
p = .066, ηp
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Table 12 A. The Mean Proportion of Contributions (PoC) in Four Conditions (Chance Status × 




Focusing on the PoCs across rounds, a 10 × 2 × 2 (Round [1:10]), within-
subject variable × (Empathy [high-empathy, no-empathy]) × (Chance-status [high-
status, low-status]) between-subject variables repeated-measures ANOVA was 
conducted. The interaction between chance-status and empathy was not significant, 
F(1, 90) = 0.87, p = .36, ηp
2 = .01 (see Figure 13A); the main effect of empathy was 
not significant (see Figure 14A), F(1, 90) = 0.23, p = .64, ηp
2 = .003; the main effect 
of chance-status was significant (see Figure 14B), F(1, 90) = 5.55, p = .02, ηp
2 = .058; 
the main effect of round was significant, F(9, 810) = 5.87, p < .0001, ηp
2 = .06. Thus, 
the findings here suggest that overall contributions declined over rounds, as is 
typically found in PGG studies, and overall contributions were higher in the low-
status group compared to the high-status group. All other unreported interactions were 
non-significant. The Greenhouse-Geisser correction was used in all cases. 
Chance-status No-empathy High-empathy 
n M (SD) 95%CI n M (SD) 95%CI 
Low-status 26 .565 (.183) [.494, .635] 20 .548 (.183) [.467, .628] 
High-status 23 .441 (.182) [.365, .516] 25 .494 (.180) [.421, .566] 
Effort-status No-empathy High-empathy 
n M (SD) 95%CI n M (SD) 95%CI 
Low-status 24 .472 (.205) [.389, .555] 25 .597 (.205) [.516, .678] 
High-status 28 .382 (.206) [.306, .456] 21 .306 (.206) [.217, .394] 




Figure 13.A. The mean of proportion of contribution (PoC) across 10 rounds in the chance-
status and empathy conditions; B. The mean of proportion of contribution (PoC) across 10 rounds in 
the effort-status and empathy conditions; * denotes p < .5.  
5.2.3.3. Generalized Tit-for-tat Strategy 
The same methods used in Studies 1 and 2 to calculate the use of generalized 
tit-for-tat strategy were used here. A significant correlation between participants’ 
contributions and those of the other players was classified as generalized tit-for-tat 
strategy, and anything non-significant was classified as “other strategy”. The results 
in Table 13 show the number and proportion of people using generalized tit-for-tat 
strategy in each condition. A loglinear analysis revealed that there was no significant 
difference in the number of participants using generalized tit-for-tat strategy for the 
main effect of empathy, Z = -.019, p = .985, 95% CI [-.727, .714].  
5.2.3.4. Regression between PGG and Empathic Disposition 
The analyses also explored whether dispositional empathy ability (PT, EC, PD 
and FT) predicted first round contributions in the PGG. The scores of the four IRI 
sub-scales and overall IRI mean score were entered into a regression analysis along 
with first round contribution, and age. Analyses of data from Experiment 3A (see 
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details Table 14A) failed to show that dispositional empathy ability predicted 
contributions. 
Table 13 The Number and Proportion Using Generalized Tit-for-tat Strategy in All Conditions Across 












Figure 14. A. Main effect of empathy on the proportion of contribution (PoC); B. Main effect 




Conditions Generalized tit-for-tat strategy 
Low-status  (chance-status) no-empathy 5/26 (19.23%) 
High-status (chance-status) no-empathy 5/23 (21.73%) 
Low-status  (chance-status) high-empathy 4/20 (20%) 
High-status (chance-status) high-empathy 8/25 (32%) 
Low-status  (effort-status) no-empathy 5/24 (21.73%) 
High-status (effort-status) no-empathy 5/28 (17.85 %) 
Low-status  (effort-status) high-empathy 5/25 (25%) 
High-status  (effort-status) high-empathy 4/21 (19.05%) 
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Table 14 A. Summary of Hierarchical Regression Analysis for Variables Predicting Contribution in 
First Round of PGG (N=94) (Chance Status × Empathy); B. Summary of Hierarchical Regression 
Analysis for Variables Predicting Contribution in First Round of PGG (N=98) (Effort Status × 
Empathy) 
Note. R2 = .035 for step 1; ΔR2 = .019 for step 2. * p< .05; 2 missing data 
Table 14B 
Note. R2 = .009 for step 1; ΔR2 = .107 for step 2. * p< .05; 
Variables B SEB   95% CI
Step 1     
Age .003 .009 .035 [-.014, .020] 
Step 2     
Age .003 .009 .040 [-.014, .021] 
 PT -.043 .039 .028 [-.121, .036] 
PD -.032 .040 -1.20 [-.112, .048] 
FS .003 .034 .010 [-.065, .071] 
EC -.024 .056 -.049 [-.136, .087] 
Variables B SEB  95% CI
Step 1     
Age -.001 .007 -.009 [-.014, .013] 
Step 2     
Age .005 .007 .077 [-.008, .018] 
PT .083 .046 .205 [-.008, .173] 
PD -.045 .043 -.114 [-.130, .039] 
FS -.015 .038 -.041 [-.090, .061] 
EC .113 .062 .217 [-.010, .236] 
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5.2.3.5. Deception Check  
Participants’ data was further analysed, based on their answer to the debriefing 
question on whether they believed they were playing the PGG against three other 
“real” participants. A Round (1-10) × Deception success (yes 1, no 2) repeated-
measures ANOVA was conducted (45 missing data). The results found that the 
interaction between round and deception success was not significant, F(6.95, 326.59) 
= 0.915, p = .494, ηp
2 = .019;  and the main effect of deception on contributions in the 
PGG was also not significant, F(1, 47) = 0.16, p = .691, ηp
2= .003. 
5.2.4. Discussion (Experiment 3A) 
The key significant finding in Experiment 3A supported Hypothesis 1 
regarding status. The findings revealed that the low-status group behaved more pro-
socially than those in the high-status groups. In addition to status both the empathy 
manipulation and measure of dispositional empathy (e.g. IRI) used in Studies 1 and 2, 
were used to assess a commonly documented association between empathy and 
cooperation. In contrast to previous studies (Batson & Moran, 1999; Rumble, et al., 
2010), the findings from Experiment 3A, consistent with Studies 1 and 2, failed to 
show an effect of empathy on measures of cooperation, or an association between 
dispositional empathy and cooperation. Exploratory analyses examined if there was 
an association between levels of empathy and the likelihood of using a generalized tit-
for-tat strategy. Here too there was no impact of empathy on this behavioural 
measure. In Experiment 3A status was determined by chance in order to mimic 
situations of wealth determined by lotteries. However, in real life settings status can 
also be determined by effort. Therefore, Experiment 3B was devised with two 
purposes in mind. First, to examine the extent to which the same pattern of results 
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would be found under a different system of status acquisition, and secondly to further 
examine the reliability of the association between empathy and cooperation.  
Experiment 3B 
Experiment 3B was designed to examine the role of empathy on cooperation 
when status was determined by effort (effort-status), and to replicate the basic pattern 
of results found in Experiment 3A. In all respects but one, namely the way in which 
status was achieved, the design and procedure of Experiment 3B was identical to 
Experiment 3A.   
5.2.5. Method (Experiment 3B) 
5.2.5.1. Participants 
Ninety-eight volunteers (71 female and 27 male) were recruited from Queen 
Mary University of London via emails and fliers. The mean age of the participants 
was 21.10 years (range from 17 to 44; SD = 4.06). The payments for participating 
were the same as Experiment 3B.  
5.2.5.2. Design and Materials  
Experiment 3B was a 2 × 2 (Empathy [high-empathy, no-empathy] × Effort-
status [high-status, low-status] between-subjects experimental design. The critical 
dependent variable was participants’ PoC in the 10 rounds of the PGG. The digit 
cancellation test is a 23 × 40 matrix which was generated by Matlab software 
(http://uk.mathworks.com/products/matlab/). In this there are 106 number threes 
displayed in the matrix. The participants were presented with this matrix on a printed 
A4 piece of paper and required to cross out the number three as many times as 
possible within two minutes. The cut-off point of 94 was obtained in a pilot test.  
Prior to the pilot, the number was set at 84 because this was the median of the group 
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(n = 55, Mdn = 84.00, M = 80.17, SD = 1.58) conducting the experiment. However, 
when the experiment was initially conducted, most participants (10 out of 12) 
achieved scores above the 84 threshold. Considering this, the threshold was increased 
to 94, based on the mean achieved by the piloted high-status group (n =10, Mdn = 
95.5, M= 93.60, SD = 5.13). Those achieving a score equal to or above 94 were 
allocated to the high-status condition, and those scoring less than 94 were allocated to 
the low-status condition. All participants were informed of the allocation procedure 
prior to performing the test.  
5.2.5.3. Procedure  
In Experiment 3B, the participants were required to perform a digit 
cancellation test instead of picking a colour ball in a black box to allocate them into 
high-status or low-status conditions. Apart from the allocation of participants to high-
status or low-status conditions, which was determined by their performance on the 
cancellation test, all other experimental procedures were exactly the same as the 
Experiment 3B. 
5.2.6. Results (Experiment 3B) 
5.2.6.1. Empathizing Manipulation Effectiveness Check 
To begin, the aim of this analysis was to establish whether empathy judgments 
for Experiment 3B differed between the no-empathy (n = 52) and high-empathy (n = 
46) conditions. Empathy judgments were significantly higher in the high-empathy 
condition (M = 6.20, SD = 1.73) compared to the no-empathy conditions (M = 3.97, 
SD = 1.67), t(96) = -6.483, p < .0001, d = 1.31, 95% CI [-2.92, -1.55].  
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5.2.6.2. Empathy & Status Manipulation  
Table 12B presents the means and standard deviations of the PoCs across the 
10 rounds in each of the four conditions: empathy (high-empathy, no-empathy) and 
effort-status (high-status, low-status). The same analyses were conducted as for 
Experiment 3A. Here, the interaction between effort-status and empathy was 
statistically significant for first round contributions, F(1, 94) = 21.11, p < .0001, ηp
2 = 
.183; the main effect of empathy was not significant, F(1, 94) = 0.90, p = .34, ηp
2 = 
.01; but the main effect of effort-status was significant, F(1, 94) = 15.14, p < .001, ηp
2 
= .139. A 10 × 2 × 2 (Round [1:10]), within-subject variable × (Empathy [high-
empathy, no-empathy]) × (Effort-status [high-status, low-status]) between-subject 
repeated-measures ANOVA was conducted. While the interaction between effort-
status and empathy was significant, F(1, 94) = 5.90, p = .017, ηp
2 = .059; the main 
effect of empathy was not significant (see Figure 15A), F(1, 94) = 0.34, p = .56, ηp
2 = 
.004; the main effect of effort-status was significant (see Figure 15B), F(1, 94) = 
21.11, p < .0001, ηp
2 = .183. Because the interaction was significant, post-hoc 
pairwise comparisons were conducted, which found that in the high-empathy 
condition, the low-status condition contributed significantly more than those in the 
high-status condition, F(1,94) = 23.23, p < .0001, ηp
2 = .198, 95% CI [.171, .412] but 
in the no-empathy condition, there was no significant difference on the contribution 
rate between low-status condition and high-status condition, F(1,94) = 2.498, p = 
.117, ηp
2 = .026, 95% CI [-.023, .203]. Moreover, the interaction between round and 
effort-status was significant, F(9, 846) = 2.52, p = .017, ηp
2 = .026; the main effect of 
round was that, in general,  contributions decreased over round, F(9, 846) = 4.15, p < 
.0001, ηp
2 = .042; All other unreported interactions were non-significant.  
 




Figure 15. A. Main effect of empathy on the proportion of contribution (PoC); B. Main effect 
of effort status on the proportion of contribution (PoC)  
5.2.6.3. Generalized Tit-for-tat Strategy 
The number and proportion of people using generalized tit-for-tat strategy in 
each condition are shown in Table 13. A loglinear analysis revealed that there was no 
significant difference in the number of participants using generalized tit-for-tat 
strategy suggesting that empathy did not affect the proportion of generalized tit-for-
tat strategy use, Z = .035, p = .972, 95% CI [-.721, .745]. 
5.2.6.4. Regression between PGG and Empathic Disposition 
Dispositional empathy ability (PT, EC, PD and FS) was used as a basis for 
predicting first round contributions in the PGG. The scores of the four IRI sub-scales 
and overall IRI mean score were entered into a regression analysis along with first 
round contribution, and age. Table 14B shows that none of subscales (PT, PD, FS, 
EC) of dispositional empathy ability predicted the first round of contributions in the 
PGG.  
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5.2.6.5. Deception Check 
Like Experiment 3A, Participants data were further analysed according to their 
answer to the debriefing question on interactive deception: either Yes, they believed 
that the experimental set-up was as described (i.e. that they were playing with 3 other 
real participants), or No they did not believe the experimental set-up, and were 
unconvinced that they were interacting with 3 other participants in the PGG. A Round 
(1-10) x Deception success (yes 1, no 2) repeated-measures ANOVA was conducted 
(5 reported unsure; 8 missing data). The results found that the interaction between 
round and deception success was not significant, F(6.27, 519.99) = 0.314, p = .935, 
ηp
2 = .004; and the main effect of deception on contributions in the PGG was not 
significant, F(1, 83) = 0.28, p = .598, ηp
2= .003. 
5.2.7. Discussion (Experiment 3B) 
Consistent with the results from Experiment 3A and Hypothesis 1, the low-
status group showed more cooperation than those in the high-status group. While not 
predicted, Experiment 3B revealed that for those in the low-status group high-
empathy condition there was evidence that they showed greater levels of cooperation 
than those in the low-status no-empathy group. This suggests a highly localized effect 
of empathy on cooperation. In all other respects empathy did not impact on 
cooperation. Consistent with the null effects reported in Experiment 3A, in 
Experiment 3B, there was no reliable evidence that dispositional empathy was 
associated with levels of cooperation, and also no evidence that levels of empathy 
were associated with strategic behaviour in the PGG, in particular the generalized tit-
for-tat strategy.  
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5.3. Summary and Conclusion of Study 3 
Overall, the central concern for this study was to explore the extent to which 
empathy could increase cooperation in situations where there were differences in 
status (high vs. low), and differences in the way in which status had been achieved 
(chance vs. effort). To this end, the effects of inducing empathy on cooperation were 
generally weak, and restricted to the low-status groups. More specifically, only in the 
earned status condition (Study 3B), empathy promotes cooperation for those low 
status groups. In addition, exploratory analysis suggests that dispositional empathy 
does not predict cooperative behaviour, and that there is no link between empathy 
induction and the reduction of generalized tit-for-tat strategies in the PGG (Axelrod 
& Hamilton, 1981). Taken together the findings are generally inconsistent with the 
positive empathy-cooperation link that has been explored using the prisoner’s 
dilemma (Batson, 1991; Batson & Moran, 1999; T. R. Cohen & Insko, 2008; Van 
Lange, 2008), and also inconsistent with the empathy-altruism assumption (Batson, 
2011) in which feeling sad or sorry for another person enhances altruistic motivation, 
and ultimately leads to increased cooperative behaviour.  
To begin, the results showed that low-status groups contributed more PoC 
than those high-status groups regardless of chance or effort. This is consistent with 
work showing that high-status individuals (either high income or highly socially 
privileged) are less pro-social than low-status individuals (Galinsky, et al., 2008). 
Why is it that the relative status of endowments within a group affects people’s 
cooperative levels when it comes to the public good? In the present study it may be 
the case that low-status groups behaved pro-socially to improve their standing in a 
social hierarchy (Willer, 2009b) and thus encouraged pro-sociality as a means of 
obtaining group identity (Kraus, Piff, & Keltner, 2009). In addition, the association 
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between low-status groups and greater charitable and helping behaviours (Cote, 2011; 
Cote, House, & Willer, 2015; Piff, et al., 2010) suggests that this group hold greater 
feelings of compassion and may be more sensitive to the concept of fairness; this may 
also help to account for why the effect of empathy on cooperation was localized to 
low-status groups.  
While in general, and consistent with evidence from Studies 1 and 2, empathy 
does not appear to have a strong effect on cooperation, in Study 3B empathy 
increased cooperation for the low-status group when the status was determined by 
effort. One reason for this may be that this group show greater compassion and are 
more sensitive to fairness (Kraus, et al., 2009), but this does not explain why empathy 
only impacted those in the lower effort-status and not those in the lower chance-status 
group. One possible explanation is based on the differences in control that people 
experienced (Osman, 2014). When the mechanism by which resources are allocated is 
via chance, then clearly there is no sense of control or real ownership that people can 
feel with regards to having more or less than others (unless one experiences an 
illusion of control). In contrast, when resources are achieved through effort, then 
people are likely to feel greater ownership and responsibility over the resources they 
acquired, and that the manner by which they acquired them was under their control. 
Some have argued that limited control over the attainment of resources leaves low-
status individuals, compared to high-status individuals, more dependent on others 
(Kraus, et al., 2009), which in turn encourages more pro-social behaviour. If an 
experienced lack of control amplifies pro-sociality due to a dependence on others 
showing pro-social behaviours, then it is expected that those in the low-status group 
would show greater pro-social behaviours than the high-status group in the chance-
status condition. This is also indicated by the findings of Study 3. What is hard to 
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determine is whether differences in behaviour resulting from acquiring status through 
effort or chance is a matter of degree (i.e. levels of control), or a matter of kind (i.e. 
control vs. no control).  
Overall in Experiments 3A and Experiment 3B, those that earned their status 
contributed less to public goods than those that achieved their status by chance, which 
is consistent with previous studies that found a “house money effect” (Clark, 2002; 
Dannenberg, Riechmann, Sturm, & Vogt, 2012; Reinstein & Riener, 2009). This is a 
situation in which  “people may spend or invest windfall money more recklessly than 
they would their own, even with wealth effects taken into account” (Clark, 2002, p. 
223). Also, when tokens were gained through effort, this tends to generate more self-
interested behaviour (Cherry & Shogren, 2008). By looking more closely it is possible 
to track evidence of this behaviour in the present study. Table 12 shows that, for the 
low-status group, in the no-empathy condition under effort-status, the PoC was lower 
(.472) compared to in the high-empathy condition under effort-status (.597) and both 
high-empathy (.548) and no-empathy conditions (.565) under chance-status. While 
empathy may not have promoted cooperation, these results suggest that it may have 
prevented a decline in cooperation in the effort-status, whereas in the chance-status it 
did not because of the “house money effect”. Also, for both high-status groups, the 
PoC of both no-empathy and high-empathy conditions obviously less in effort-status 
(.382 & .306) than those in chance-status (.441 & .494), which also implies evidence 
of the “house money effect”. In short, the “house money effect” led to a decrease in 
cooperation for both high-status and low-status groups; however, empathy helped 
low-status groups maintain levels of cooperation over rounds.  
Regarding the limited role of empathy in Study 3, as well as Studies 1 and 2, it 
may be the case that the use of real financial incentives weakens any impact that 
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empathy is likely to have in promoting cooperation. When developing the paradigm 
used in this project, it was important to take heed of critical comments from the 
economics literature regarding incentives schedules that are in line with the aims of 
the specific task or game (Hertwig & Ortmann, 2001). What is common to many 
previous studies discussed in this thesis that have found empathy-induced 
cooperation, is that their payment system is either in a fixed show-up fee set-up (Xu, 
et al., 2012) or course credits for participation in the experiment (Batson, Batson, et 
al., 1995; Batson & Moran, 1999; Rumble, et al., 2010). In contrast, in Studies 1, 2 
and 3 participants’ payments were directly associated with their choice-behaviour, 
ranging between £7.46 and £17.41. Even though empathy-induced altruism may 
appear to promote cooperation (Batson & Moran, 1999), it may only be the case for 
studies in which participants are not playing for real money. When they do, the cost of 
cooperative behaviour is so high that empathy is not strong enough to override a self-
maximizing strategy (Ma-Kellams & Blascovich, 2013). Therefore monetary 
incentives may mute the effect of empathy because they alter what participants regard 
as salient motivators of behaviour. 
What appears to be clear is that while people start off with good intentions in 
the first few rounds of the PGG, as they approach the end of the game greater selfish 
behaviours emerge, consistent with many previous studies using a linear iterated PGG 
(Fehr & Gächter, 2002). More to the point, it may be the case that in social exchanges 
people opt for a typical tried and tested simple strategy, such as tit-for-tat (Axelrod, 
1984; Axelrod & Hamilton, 1981; Nowak & Sigmund, 1993), which limits the extent 
to which inferences regarding others’ complex intentions are needed. Generally tit-
for-tat was the most popular strategy employed across all three experiments 
(approximately 40% on average). Because generalized tit-for-tat is so robust, and so 
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commonly employed, this too might contribute to muting the effects of empathy on 
cooperation. The insight that Study 3 has revealed also points to a need to examine 
ways of countermanding the potential muting effects of monetary incentives and 
simple behavioural strategies. It may be that promoting cooperation requires the 
induction of empathy and trust (De Cremer, et al., 2001), as well as increasing 
communication (Bixenstine & Douglas, 1967; Yamagishi & Yamagishi, 1994) and 
the range of strategies used (Axelrod, 1984; C. D. Parks, et al., 2013).  
5.4. Conclusion 
In summary, status and the way in which it is achieved (earned, inherited) 
appears to be a more salient factor in determining the level of cooperation observed in 
a multiplayer game than empathy. The findings from Study 3, taken together with the 
findings from Studies 1 and 2 bring into question the extent to which empathy can 
effectively promote cooperation when other critical factors are considered. In 
addition, Study 3 raises the questions of what the meaning of fairness is, and what 
role empathy can have when there is inequality of resources. Fairness helps people to 
manage uncertain situations by giving them “confidence that they will ultimately 
receive good outcomes and because it makes the possibility of loss less anxiety-
provoking” (Lind & van den Bos, 2002, pp. 195-196). Empathy may trigger more 
concerns and reactions towards unfairness, which in turn may motivate behaviours in 
order to reduce inequality (i.e. inequality aversion). Up until now, empirical work has 
been focused on supporting this under situations of equality of outcome (Brosnan & 
de Waal, 2014; Choshen-Hillel & Yaniv, 2011; Dannenberg, et al., 2012). Study 3 
was unable to find evidence, using the unexplored inequality of resources condition, 
to support the general intuition of the impact of empathy on cooperation, although 
recent research studies indicate that high initial levels of economic inequality alone 
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have relatively few deleterious welfare effects (Nishi, Shirado, Rand, & Christakis, 
2015). Up until now the method that has been used to explore the empathy-
cooperation link has been the online paradigm in which participants interact with 
three other fictitious players. The motivations for using this method were to carefully 
control the different factors that are thought to influence cooperation, specifically 
empathy. However, given that across three studies, there has been a consistent failure 
in finding a robust empathy-cooperation link, Study 4 was designed to replicate Study 
3, but using a dyad in which participants were interacting with real players, as well as 
with real incentives, which has been a consistent method of motivating participants to 
take part in Studies 1-3. 
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Chapter 6  Study 4: The Empathy Effect on 
Cooperation in Two-player PGG 
Summary of Chapter 6: Chapters 3, 4 and 5 used similar experimental 
paradigms to explore the role of empathy on cooperation when empathy itself, or 
empathy with personal values and status were manipulated. All three studies 
demonstrated that empathy induction had a weak effect on promoting cooperation, 
inconsistent with previous studies (Batson & Ahmad, 2001) that have used the same 
empathy induction method.  
There are two possible reasons for the differences in results between the 
present project and previous studies. Firstly, Studies 1-3 involved “interactive 
deception”. It is still unclear as to whether the introduction of “interactive deception” 
affects the empathy-cooperation link, but it is possible that this type of paradigm 
weakens the effect because participants have doubts as to whether they are interacting 
with others. Second, there may be an issue in the group size (n = 4) in the public 
goods game (PGG). As mentioned throughout the empirical chapters, what is notable 
in previous successful demonstrations of the empathy-cooperation link in social 
dilemma games is that a single target is identified and empathy can be directed 
towards them, which in turn converts to greater levels of cooperation. Therefore, as 
discussed, the weak effect observed in Studies 1-3 of empathy on cooperation may 
potentially be the result of diffusing the target of empathizing. In response, Study 4 
was designed to overcome both these potential limiting factors. Study 4 used a two-
player version of the PGG in which both players were real. The research hypotheses 
for Study 4 are as follows. Hypothesis 1: The role of empathy induction on the 
contributions in the 2-player PGG will be significant, specifically that in the high-
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empathy conditions both players will contribute a larger proportion into the common 
pot; Hypothesis 2: Heterogeneity will increase the overall contribution rate in the 
PGG; Hypothesis 3: Based on the research findings in Study 3, low status people 
(Player A) will contribute proportionally more than high status people (Player B) in 
the [10, 20] conditions; Hypothesis 4: Empathy induction will reduce players use of 
generalized tit-for-tat strategy.  
The main focus of Study 4 was to replicate the basic status effect reported in 
Study 3, but using a 2-player version of the PGG. One hundred and sixty volunteers 
were recruited and randomly assigned into one of the four conditions (high-empathy 
heterogeneous endowments [Player A = 10 tokens; Player B = 20 tokens], no-
empathy heterogeneous endowments [Player A = 10 tokens; Player B = 20 tokens], 
high-empathy homogenous endowments [Player A = 20 tokens; Player B = 20 
tokens], no-empathy homogenous endowments [Player A = 20 tokens; Player B = 20 
tokens]), and different roles (Player A or Player B). Overall, despite attempts to give 
empathy the best chance of influencing cooperation, Study 4 results found that for 
both Player A and Player B, the empathy induction technique did not lead to 
significant increases in cooperation in the PGG.  
6.1. Introduction 
As discussed throughout, previous studies have reported a positive effect of 
empathy on cooperation levels in both the prisoner’s dilemma (Rumble, et al., 2010) 
and ultimate game (Stephan & Finlay, 1999), which are paradigms for investigating 
dyadic interaction. However, in the three studies of this project thus far, the effect of 
empathy induction on cooperative behaviour in the four-player PGG has been 
relatively restricted, irrespective of whether empathy was induced in a pure set-up 
(Study 1), or with additional manipulations regarding value cues (Study 2) or status 
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(Study 3). To rule out potential confounding variables which may lead to null effects, 
a 2-player variant of the PGG was designed (Spraggon & Oxoby, 2009). As there are 
only two players involved in this 2-player PGG, the manipulation of empathy is clear, 
with no ambiguity in identifying the relevant target of empathy. Moreover, the two 
real participants meet face-to-face in the laboratory prior to entering the separate 
cubicles to reinforce the fact that each player is playing with a real player, or target of 
their empathetic experiences. Study 4 examines four hypotheses. 
Hypothesis 1: It was predicted that the role of empathy on the contributions 
made in the PGG will be significant in that in the high-empathy conditions both 
players will contribute more to the group pot than those in the no-empathy conditions. 
As speculated, it may be that one-to-one interactions help people to personalize one 
another and to see each other as unique individuals rather than relying on categorical 
identities as the basis for classifying each other (Brewer & Miller, 1984). In addition, 
studies that have found a positive empathy-cooperation link used paradigms such as 
prisoner’s dilemma and ultimate game, in which there is a dyadic interaction rather 
than multiple group members’ intragroup interaction. Moreover, based on the 
reviewed literature in this thesis, no other studies have examined status using a 2-
player PGG set up, and so this should provide new insights into the potential role of 
empathy in a specialized social set-up. 
Hypothesis 2: According to previous studies (e.g., Fung & Au, 2014), 
heterogeneity leads to an increase in cooperation overall. Therefore, in groups in 
which there were heterogeneous endowment groups [10, 20], the cooperative rate will 
be higher than in the homogeneous endowment groups [20, 20].  
Hypothesis 3: Regardless of the presence or absence of the empathy induction, 
Player A in the [10, 20] conditions (low-status groups) will devote a higher proportion 
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of contribution (PoC) than Player B in the [10, 20] conditions (high-status groups), at 
least in the first round of the PGG. Study 3 consistently revealed in both experiments 
that low-status groups behaved more cooperatively than high-status groups. 
Therefore, given the similarity between the experimental set up in Study 3 and Study 
4, it is predicted that the equivalent low status individuals (i.e. those endowed with 
less than their game partner) will contribute more in the PGG.  
Hypothesis 4: The empathy induction will modulate the use of the generalized 
tit-for-tat strategy in both players. According to the evolutionary theoretical 
explanations discussed in section 2.2 Theories about Human Cooperation, the strategy 
for strangers who interact repeatedly is direct reciprocity with Tit-for-tat strategy 
based on direct reciprocity (Axelrod & Hamilton, 1981). The last hypothesis for 
Study 4 is to explore whether the empathy induction will be more likely to reduce the 




The study recruited 160 volunteers (87 female and 73 male) from Queen Mary 
University of London via emails and fliers. The mean age of the participants was 
22.86 years (range from 18 to 50; SD = 4.97). Prior to starting the study participants 
gave informed written consent and were allocated to one of four conditions – i.e. 40 in 
each condition (20 dyads). Remuneration for participation was based on the tokens 
gained in the PGG at a rate of 25 tokens equals £1. Depending on the condition they 
were assigned to, they were given different payments. In the high-empathy 
heterogeneous condition (he10:20) and no-empathy heterogeneous condition 
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(ne10:20) participants were paid between £4 to £9.6 for Player A and £8-9 for Player 
B. In the high-empathy homogenous condition (he20:20) and in the no-empathy 
homogenous condition (ne20:20) participants were paid from £5 to £13. The Ethics 
Committee of Queen Mary University of London approved the study (QMREC1190).  
6.2.2. Design and Materials  
Study 4 was a 2 × 2 (Empathy [no-empathy, high-empathy] × Condition ([10, 
20], [20, 20]) between-subjects experimental design. The four conditions were 
referred to as he10:20, he20:20, ne10:20, ne20:20. The critical dependent variable 
was the proportion of participants’ contributions (PoC) in each of the 10 rounds of the 
PGG. A prior power analysis was conducted using G*power 
(http://www.gpower.hhu.de/en.html) to infer the required sample sizes for this study 
(Faul, et al., 2007). Assuming the effect size of empathy is the medium effect (ƒ = 
0.25) suggested by Cohen, defined for between-subjects repeated-measures ANOVA 
(J. Cohen, 1988), the required total sample size is 72 pairs, when the power (1-β = .8), 
and actual power equals .805. 
The experimental cubicle included a computer with two monitors. A folding 
screen was placed between the two computer monitors to separate the participants. 
The PGG was programmed and conducted via a computer using E-prime 2.0 
software. In the high-empathy conditions, the same empathy induction instructions 
were provided as those used in Studies 1-3. In the no-empathy conditions, no 
perspective-taking instructions were provided. 
In [10,20] conditions (he10:20 and ne10:20), Player A was assigned 10 tokens 
in each round, whereas Player B was assigned 20 tokens in each round; in [20, 20] 
conditions (he20:20 and ne20:20), both Player A and Player B were assigned 20 
tokens for each round. 
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A paper-based pre-task mathematic calculation test consisted of four 
questions. Each question is used to assess one extreme situation that might happen in 
in the PGG (20,20) (0,0) (0,20) (20,0), as a way to assess the extent to which 
participants understand the different outcomes in the rounds. A calculator was also 
prepared for participants. This pre-task mathematic calculation test is often used in 
prisoner dilemma games to assess instruction comprehension. 
A paper-based post-task questionnaire was also presented at the end of the 
study and used as a manipulation check to assess the effectiveness of the empathy 
induction manipulation, just as in Studies 1-3. In addition, as with Studies 1-3, Study 
4 included post-task questions that recorded participants’ impression towards the 
other players on a 9-point scale, ranging from 1 (not at all) to 9 (very much). This was 
based on the extent to which they feel compassion or pity towards the partner.   
6.2.3. Procedure  
Two participants were tested together in a soundproofed experimental cubicle. 
They were seated facing a computer monitor and separated using a folding screen, as 
shown in Figure 16. After reading the information sheet and signing the consent form, 
one of the two players was asked to pick a ball from a black box without looking. If 
they picked the red ball, the participant was assigned as Player A; if they picked the 
blue ball, they were assigned as Player B. They were then allowed to enter the 
experimental cubicle. In front of each computer monitor, there were labels indicating 
their corresponding roles (i.e. Player A, Player B).  




Figure 16. Laboratory setting for 2-player PGG in Study 4 
Once seated and allocated to their role, participants were required to answer a 
pre-task question in pencil and paper. For high empathy conditions the question was 
“Describe an event that has happened to you that has made you sad in the last year”.. 
In the no-empathy conditions, the pre-task question was “Describe a type of sport that 
you enjoy”. Player A and Player B were not allowed to communicate with each other 
during this part of the experiment.  
After 2 minutes the responses to the pre-task question were handed in to the 
experimenter who placed them in an envelope. Whilst this was happening the two 
players could communicate with each other.  
After this, a pre-task mathematic calculation test was presented which took up 
to 5 minutes to complete. The experimenter returned after 5 minutes and provided the 
correct maths test answer to the participants allowing the participant a minute to 
check the answer for themselves.  
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Next, they were given the relevant instructions, token form and PGG money 
allocation, based on the assigned condition. After the instructions were explained to 
the participants, a practice round of the PGG was initiated.  
In the high-empathy condition, the PGG program was presented with the 
empathy induction procedure. Participants were instructed: “Please open the envelope 
and read the note about your partner. While you are reading this, try to imagine how 
the person felt about what he/she has just described. Try to imagine how it has 
affected him/her and how he/she feels as a result”. In the no-empathy condition, 
participants were instructed: “Please open the envelope and read the note about your 
partner.”  
The experimenter then gave the participant the envelope containing the other 
players’ response note and a rating sheet. However, unbeknownst to the participants, 
the experimenter had surreptitiously switched the envelopes containing the 
participants written replies for ones with pre-prepared responses. This was done make 
sure that all participants received the same details, and so the effects of empathy could 
be carefully controlled. The pre-prepared notes for each condition were as follows. In 
the high-empathy conditions (he1020; he2020), the note concerned details regarding a 
break up with their long-term partner;  
Break up story: “Well, I don’t know if this will be interesting to anybody else, 
but the only thing I can think of is that two weeks ago my boyfriend and I broke up. 
We’ve been together since year 12 in school and had kept the relationship up since 
Uni. It has been great going out while we have been together at QMUL as well. I 
thought he felt the same, but things have changed. Now he wants to date other people. 
This has got me down and been on my mind, been a bit hard to cope.” 
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 In the no-empathy conditions (ne1020, ne2020), the note concerned a neutral 
story regarding swimming;  
Swimming story: “Well, I enjoy swimming. I go swimming about a couple of 
times a week. I always go to my local swimming pool, which is about 10-minutes’ 
walk from my house. I usually swim about 1000 meters each time I go. It takes me 
about a half hour to complete the swimming session and then I spend about a half 
hour using the sauna and steam room and then have a shower afterwards. I usually 
do this after work before going home for dinner.” 
Participants read the pre-prepared stories and were asked to rate them on the 
rating sheet prior to starting the PGG. For each round of the PGG, participants were 
first presented with the round number and the number of tokens they were endowed 
with. They were then required to decide on how many of their tokens to contribute to 
the pot. Player A (0 to 10 for he1020 and ne1020, and 0 to 20 tokens he2020 and 
ne2020) made the decision first followed by Player B (0 to 20  for all conditions),with 
this method continuing throughout the duration of the game. Both players did not 
know the other players’ decision until post-round feedback was presented. After the 
participants entered their choice, and were required to wait between 4 and 12 seconds, 
randomly determined by the program. They were then given feedback, “Player A: 
your contribution this round; your final tokens this round; your cumulative tokens; 
Player B: your contribution this round; your final tokens this round; your cumulative 
tokens:” The program then moved to the next round. This procedure was repeated 
until all 10 rounds were complete. Participants were required to copy down all the 
values presented in each round using the pencil and form provided. The reason for 
this was to make sure that participants attended to all the feedback information 
presented on the screen on each round.  
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On completion of the PGG, participants were required to answer some 
questions in the debriefing session in terms of the strategy they used, and their 
understanding of the optimal decision. Finally they were debriefed on the details 
about the study and its purpose.  
6.3. Results 
The first set of analyses discussed concerns the empathizing manipulation 
check, then the effect of empathy on cooperative behaviours in PGG is examined, and 
this is followed by the analysis of the percentage of those using the generalized tit-
for-tat strategy in each condition for both players.  
6.3.1. Empathizing Manipulation Check 
An independent-samples t-test was conducted on judgments regarding the 
extent to which participants empathized with the experiences of the other player in the 
no-empathy (n = 80, M = 4.75, SD = 2.53) and high-empathy (n = 80, M = 7.40, SD = 
1.57) conditions. Empathizing judgments were significantly higher in the high-
empathy condition (breakup story) than no-empathy condition (swimming story), 
t(158) = 7.94, p < .0001, d = -1.25, 95%CI [-3.31, -1.99]. This confirms that the 
empathy induction method was successful in promoting empathic concern towards the 
target.  
6.3.2. Empathy and Condition Manipulation 
The mean and standard deviation PoC (over 10 rounds), in each of the four 
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Table 15 The Mean Proportion of Contribution (PoC) in Four Conditions  
Note. CI = confidence interval 
For Player A, a Multivariate analysis was conducted for the first round PoC, 
no interactions or main effects found to be significant. In addition, a 10 × 2 × 2 
(Round [1:10]), within-subject variable × (Empathy [high-empathy, no-empathy]) × 
(Condition [(10, 20); (20, 20)]) between-subject repeated-measures ANOVA was 
conducted. Again none of the interactions or main effects were significant. The same 
statistics was conducted for the data for Player B. Following the same pattern as 
Player A, none of the interaction and main effects were found to be significant. The 
Greenhouse-Geisser correction was used in all cases.  
As shown in Figure 17, there were no statistically significant differences in 
first round PoC across the four conditions. To compare the first round PoC of Player 
A and Player B in the [10, 20] condition, a Univariate analysis was conducted and did 
not reveal a significant main effect of empathy, F(1, 76) = .015, p =.903, ηp
2 < .0001. 
There was also no significant main effect of player, F(1, 76) = 1.282, p =.261, ηp
2 
=.017, and no significant interactions, F(1, 76) = .094, p =.760, ηp
2 =.001. Thus, there 
was no significant difference between both players in the contributions they made in 
the first round, regardless of the empathy induction manipulation. 
Condition No-empathy High-empathy 
n M (SD) 95%CI n M (SD) 95%CI 
[10,20] Player A 20 .539 (.290) [.410, .668] 20 .704 (.290) [.574, .833] 
[20,20] Player A 20 .513 (.290) [.384, .643] 20 .567 (.290) [.437, .696] 
[10,20] Player B 20 .585 (.304) [.450, .721] 20 .622 (.304) [.486, .758] 
[20,20] Player B 20 .523 (.304) [.387, .758] 20 .555 (.304) [.419, .691] 





Figure 17. A The mean of proportion of contribution (PoC) in first round for Player A and 
Player B (80 pairs, N = 160) in four conditions; B The mean of proportion of contribution (PoC) for 
both players in four conditions; Error bars represent ± 95% CI. 
6.3.3. Generalized Tit-for-tat Strategy  
Table 16 shows that Player A’s contribution positively correlated with that of 
Player B’s in each sequential round starting at the 3rd round, and likewise, Player B’s 
contribution was positively correlated with Player A’s contribution in the subsequent 
rounds. This data indicates that, in general, both players adopted the generalized tit-
for-tat strategy after the 3rd round of the PGG.  
The number and proportion of Player A and Player B using generalized tit-for-
tat strategy in each condition are shown in Table 17. Chi-square tests were conducted 
and revealed that there was no statistically significant difference across the four 
conditions for Player A (χ2(6) = 8.00, p = .238) or for Player B (χ2(9) = 12.00, p = 
.213), indicating that the empathy induction did not reduce the likelihood of players 
using generalized tit-for-tat strategy as expected. 
 




Table 16 The Mean Contribution in Earlier Rounds for Player A and the Sequential Rounds for Player 
B’s Correlations Overall 
 
Table 17 The Number and Proportion Using Generalized Tit-for-tat Strategy in All Conditions for 






Player A correlated with Player B in the later 
round 
Player B correlated with Player A in 
the later round 
 r p  r p 
Ac1-Bc2 .181 .109 Bc1-Ac2 .096 .397 
Ac2-Bc3 .356** .001 Bc2-Ac3 .427** <.001 
Ac3-Bc4 .481** <.001 Bc3-Ac4 .548** <.001 
Ac4-Bc5 .584** <.001 Bc4-Ac5 .467** <.001 
Ac5-Bc6 .500** <.001 Bc5-Ac6 .555** <.001 
Ac6-Bc7 .512** <.001 Bc6-Ac7 .656** <.001 
Ac7-Bc8 .632** <.001 Bc7-Ac8 .596** <.001 
Ac8-Bc9 .414** <.001 Bc8-Ac9 .582** <.001 
Ac9-Bc10 .467** <.001 Bc9-Ac10 .430** <.001 
Conditions Player A  
(Player A (2-10round) & Player 
B (1-9round)) 
Player B 
(Player B (2-10round) & Player 
A (1-9round)) 
He1020 5/20 (25%) 3/20 (15%) 
He2020 3/20 (15%) 1/20 (5%) 
Ne1020 1/20 (5%) 2/20 (10%) 
Ne2020 5/20 (25%) 6/20 (30%)  
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6.4. Discussion  
The findings in Study 4 show that the empathy induction method that has been 
used in this entire project did not promote cooperation in a 2-player PGG in which 
both players were real. Therefore, Study 4 did not support the first hypothesis. In 
terms of empathy induction on cooperative behaviour, the findings are inconsistent 
with previous research studies, but consistent in general, with the findings of Studies 
1, 2 and 3. As empathy-altruism theory claims that empathy triggers altruism towards 
another I expected cooperation in high-empathy conditions to be higher than in the 
no-empathy condition. More to the point, this study was specifically designed to 
encourage this effect by using a 2-player PGG experimental setting. While the 
rationale behind including the manipulations introduced in Study 4 fit with the 
general claims regarding how empathy is likely to promote cooperation, the study was 
still unable to detect this link. One of the key remaining reasons for these mixed 
findings may be the use of real financial rewards, which may have muted any effects 
of empathy. While most social dilemma experiments conducted by social 
psychologists do not tend to use real financial incentives, there seems validity in using 
them here, as finance incentives appear the most common and direct method of 
motivating behaviours, particularly in the work place.  
Consistent with previous studies, the findings from Study 4 did support 
Hypothesis 2 in that heterogeneity did indeed result in an increase of overall 
contribution. This corroborates evidence from some previous studies (Buckley & 
Croson, 2006; Chan & Mestelman, 1999; Cherry, et al., 2005; Fung & Au, 2014; 
Kroll, et al., 2007a; Secilmis & Guran, 2012). For example, Cherry (2005) suggested 
that when groups had heterogeneous endowments in public goods problems, the 
contribution levels were significantly lower than when groups had homogeneous 
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endowments. Moreover, Karaivanov (2009) also argued that the endowments 
heterogeneity has a negative effect on the total provision of public goods, because it 
leads to non-contribution by some participants who contribute under homogeneity.  
With regards to Hypothesis 3 in Study 4, the low-status group was predicted to 
behave more cooperatively than the high-status group. Therefore, Player A should 
have contributed a higher proportion of their tokens than Player B in the [10, 20] 
groups, since only in [10, 20] conditions there was a status manipulation. That both 
players behaved similarly did not support Hypothesis 3 (nor replicate the findings of 
Study 3) in which it was predicted that Player A would behave more cooperatively 
than Player B in the [10, 20] condition. Buckley and Croson (2006) argued that the 
less wealthy subjects (less endowment participants, Player A here) would give more 
as a percentage of their income than the more wealthy subjects (more endowment 
participants, Player B here). Nevertheless, unlike the result of Secilmis (2012), they 
found that regardless of income levels, participants contribute approximately the same 
percentage of their income (their endowments) to the dynamic public good. 
Obviously, the inconsistency of research findings for previous studies is controversial. 
According to the group engagement framework (Weber, et al., 2004) and inequality 
aversion model (Fehr & Schmidt, 1999) individuals with higher incomes (high status) 
give a higher fraction of their income to the public good than individuals with lower 
income (low status). And the principle of noblesse oblige applies. This is generally 
used to imply that nobility extends beyond mere entitlements and requires the person 
who holds such status to fulfil social responsibilities. The idea emerged to guarantee 
that those in the upper echelons of society (higher status) act benevolently toward 
others who have less (lower status). In contrast, more and more empirical evidence 
(Piff, et al., 2010) has shown that lower status individuals are more dependent on 
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others to achieve their desired life outcomes and more likely to act in a pro-social 
fashion, that is, contribute more to the public goods. In Study 4, both high status and 
low status groups contributed the same proportion of their endowments, whereas in 
the Study 3 (both Experiment 3A and Experiment 3B), the lower status groups 
contributed a higher proportion than the higher status group. The difference raises the 
question as to the role of status of cooperative behaviour as collective action.  
Finally, with regards to the generalized tit-for-tat strategy, according to Cohen 
(2008), generalized tit-for-tat strategy teaches participants to realize the long-term 
cost of defect and as a result, they are more likely to adhere to mutual cooperation. 
According to evolutionally biologists, reciprocity is the norm when individuals 
repeatedly interact with the same individual (see section 2.2 Theories about Human 
Cooperation). Furthermore, as demonstrated by Axelrod (1984), the generalized tit-
for-tat strategy is the strategy of reciprocity. The overall data analysis for generalized 
tit-for-tat usage for both Player A and Player B, shown in Table 16, revealed that 
from the third round onwards, both players adopted such a strategy. Whether in fact 
empathy induction reliably modulates both players’ generalized tit-for-tat usage is an 
issue that requires further attention however. Indeed, as shown in Table 17, and 
inconsistent with the hypothesis, empathy induction did not modulate the likelihood 
of using such a strategy regardless of players’ classification.  
6.5. Conclusion 
In conclusion, the results of Study 4 fail to show that an empathy induction 
method, typically employed by several key cited studies, promotes cooperation in a 
dyadic interaction between two players. Moreover, unlike what was found in Study 3, 
status was not found to be a salient factor which raises questions regarding the 
processes involved in decision-making in a 2-player PGG, and to what extent are they 
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differ to those used in the more conventional 4-player PGG. Finally, it appears that 
one of the key issues that may explain the lack of an empathy-cooperation association 
in this project is the presence of financial incentives. When a decision has to be made 
whether to cooperate or defect in a social dilemma game, these financial incentives 
may be more salient than empathy. 
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Chapter 7  General Discussions of the Findings 
7.1. Summary of the Findings of this Dissertation 
The general research question that this thesis was concerned with was to 
explore the role of empathy on human cooperative behaviour when there is conflict 
between individual interest and collective interest. As discussed in section 2.2 
Theories about Human Cooperation, unlike evolutionary biologists or economists, 
social psychologists are much more interested in investigating the situational factors 
and individual differences that modulate human cooperative behaviour (Van Lange, 
Balliet, Parks, & Van Vugt, 2013). This thesis explored several situational and 
dispositional factors regarding the promotion of cooperation from a unique 
perspective with a focus on how empathy induction and empathy personality traits 
modulate human cooperation. The aim of this discussion is to consider the 
implications of the project in regards to research in the social psychological domain, 
which investigates the empathy-cooperation link.  
7.1.1. Situational Empathy 
According to the definition of empathy used in this thesis, empathic concern is 
an other-oriented response to the perceived suffering of others, which consequently 
produces an incentive to behave pro-socially in order to support or alleviate this 
suffering. |The manipulation of contextual signals (others’ suffering), in order to 
induce an empathic response to achieve a behavioural change (via increases in 
cooperative behaviour in a PGG), failed to result in any strong empirical support for 
the empathy-cooperation link across the 4 studies. No matter whether participants 
were assigned with equal endowments (Studies 1 and 2), unequal endowments 
(Studies 3 and 4), or even when the target of empathy was easily identifiable (Study 
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4), empathy induction treatments failed to produce reliable increases in cooperative 
behaviour in the PGG. This is in direct contrast to the most widely accepted empirical 
findings (e.g., Batson, 1999; Rumble et al., 2010) and current theories (empathy-
altruism hypothesis or negative-state relief hypothesis) in the social psychology 
literature. 
A highly localized situation in which empathy did impact on cooperative 
behaviours was revealed in Study 2 however. Personal values are considered as 
another social motivation for promoting cooperation in collective societal action. 
Study 2 found that those who believed they were interacting with real players in a 
cooperative game, acted more cooperatively in the social value condition, compared 
to the economic value condition, when there was empathy induction (in that case 
perspective taking instruction).  
Another highly specialized situation in which empathy induction was found to 
have an effective role of modulating cooperation was for those in low status groups 
when status was determined by effort (Study 3). This finding implies that both status 
and the origin of status play a relevant role in the empathy-cooperation link in 
intragroup cooperation. However, in terms of dyadic cooperation in the 2-player PGG 
(Study 4), status was not found to be effective enough to elicit this target behaviour 
change. One thing to note here is that in Study 4 status was determined by chance, 
whereas the empathy-cooperation link found in the low status group in Study 3 was 
when status was determined by effort. This suggests that while people are sensitive to 
unequal resource distribution, and empathy induction techniques can amplify this 
sensitivity, any effect empathy has in directing behavioural change is highly specific, 
and the basis on which unequal resource distribution is determined clearly matters. 
Again, this challenges the considerable body of work in the social psychology domain 
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that suggests that the empathy-cooperation link is robust, and reliable (Batson, et al, 
1995). 
Why did empathy induction not lead to significant increases in cooperation in 
the current studies (Studies 1, 2, 3 & 4)? There are some potential reasons for this null 
effect of empathy-cooperation link.  
a) Previous studies (e.g., Batson & Ahmad, 2001; Rumble, et al., 2010) which 
found reliable positive effects of empathy induction on cooperation adopted the 
prisoner’s dilemma paradigm, categorized as a two-player social dilemma. However, 
in the series of experiments in this thesis, Studies 1, 2 & 3 used a 4-player PGG. 
Therefore, I inferred that the reported null effect of empathy induction might be due 
to the dilution of empathy induction, which is found in larger groups (n > 2). Study 4 
was designed to account for this but the data failed to support the statement that 
empathy induction works solely in dyadic cooperation. The 4-player PGG and 2-
player PGG can be said to explore intragroup cooperation and dyadic cooperation 
respectively. To some extent, dyadic cooperation is a special example of intragroup 
interaction, but investigates one-to-one interaction. What is the critical difference 
between the intragroup interaction (N = 4) and dyadic interaction that leads people to 
respond differently to others’ stories of suffering? Whether group size increases or 
decreases cooperation is a running debate in the field of cooperation research. Olson 
stated that contributions usually decreased as group size increased, as they believed 
that in larger groups, non-cooperative behaviour is difficult to detect and therefore, 
self-interested people will be less willing to contribute (Ledyard, 1994, p. 45). Those 
studies suggested the larger group is, the less cooperative it is. However, it does not 
explain why group size influences the empathy-cooperation link. What is it about the 
situational cues specific to the intragroup and dyadic interactions that lead to people 
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acting differently in the two contexts? One study has suggested an explanation based 
on the “collapse of compassion”. This implies that as the number of people in need of 
help increases, the degree of compassion (empathic response in our case) people feel, 
ironically, tends to decrease. They accounted for it by suggesting that the needs of 
large groups can be potentially overwhelming, and, as a result, people engage in 
emotion regulation to prevent themselves from experiencing overwhelming levels of 
emotion. When people confront groups, they are more likely to elicit emotional 
regulation than when they confront individuals; therefore, people feel less compassion 
(empathy) for groups than for individuals (Cameron & Payne, 2011). This suggests 
that intragroup interaction is more likely to elicit emotional regulation than dyadic 
interaction, and could be a possible explanation for the null effects found in Studies 1, 
2 & 3 of this thesis. However, Study 4 also found no positive connection between 
empathy and cooperation for a dyadic interaction, in which people confront an 
individual and therefore there must be other reasons contributing to the null effect.  
b) The second and potentially most important reason is the monetary incentive 
involved. The critical decision in the PGG is the amount of money to contribute. It is 
a multi-motivation decision making task. The involvement of financial incentives 
strengthens one of the multi-motivations – egoism, which leads to not contributing to 
the public goods. The design of the game is to elicit altruism induced by empathy, 
however the nature of payoff, i.e. money, is not altruistic? In comparisons to previous 
studies (e.g., Batson & Moran, 1999), the strengthened egoism here overrides altruism 
to lead to a more cooperative behaviour. The coexistence of financial incentive-
induced egoism and empathy-induced altruism did not necessarily lead to the 
behaviour change however. Further discussion about the introduction of financial 
incentive will be presented in 7.3.2 financial incentive.  
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c) Another potential reason is the gender of participants. Previous studies 
(Batson & Ahmad, 2001), which found a positive connection between empathy 
induction and cooperative behaviour in the social dilemma games used female-only 
participants. In contrast, in the series of experiments in this thesis, both male and 
females were recruited in the studies. Whether the gender issue lead to the null effect 
of empathy-cooperation link will be an interesting topic to pursue and investigate 
more deeply.  
In summary, this thesis consistently explored the empathy-cooperation link in 
four studies in which empathy was artificially induced via instructions, and yet this 
alone was not able to reliably impact on cooperative behaviours in a social dilemma 
game. The only contextual factors, in addition to empathy, that lead to changes in 
cooperative behaviour were for those that had achieved a low status via poor 
performance in a cognitive task, and players’ belief that they were interacting with 
others who had signalled pro-social values.  
7.1.2. Dispositional Empathy (and lack there of) 
There is some research to suggest that there is a link between personality traits 
and pro-social behaviours (Eisenberg, 2002; Peterson & Seligman, 2004) and 
dispositional empathy significantly predicts an individual’s behaviour in social 
dilemma games (T. R. Cohen, 2010). What is more, there is evidence indicating that 
the empathic concern subscale measured by IRI correlates with helping behaviour in a 
variety of situations (see Davis, 1994, for a review), and further evidence suggesting 
that individuals with narcissistic personality, psychopathy, and autistic spectrum 
disorder (ASD) – all of which show characteristically a lack of empathy, in turn 
behave less cooperatively (Colombi et al., 2009; Krueger & Tackett, 2006). For 
example, Sally and Hill (2006) found that participants with autism were much more 
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likely to accept low initial offers and refuse fair proposals in the ultimatum game, and 
were more reluctant to shift between versions of the prisoner’s dilemma. In addition, 
there is work showing that specific psychopathic personality inventory subscales 
(Machiavellian egocentricity) are negatively associated with cooperation in a one-shot 
prisoner’s dilemma (Curry, Chesters, & Viding, 2011). This evidence clearly suggests 
that those with empathy deficit personality disorders act less cooperatively in 
economic games.  
Nevertheless, despite this body of work, in Studies 1, 2 and 3 of this project 
there was no positive correlation between individual differences in empathetic ability 
(and lack of empathic ability – i.e. narcissism) and cooperative behaviour in the PGG 
(the first round or the average contribution across 10 rounds). These findings raise the 
question as to whether researchers can rely on personality traits measured by 
questionnaires to predict individuals’ behaviours, such as cooperation in a social 
dilemma game. In three studies with approximately 400 participants, there was not 
sufficient evidence to support a personality-cooperation link, particularly between 
dispositional empathy and cooperation. It may be the case that this particular method 
of examining empathic disposition does not load reliably well on cooperative 
behaviours as measured in a PGG; however, it is not clear why this relationship is 
found in other social dilemma games. The PGG involves making decisions regarding 
a continuous measure (i.e. number of tokens), whereas in other social dilemma games, 
the decisions that are required are dichotomous (i.e. cooperate or defect).  
The other individual difference explored in this thesis in Study 1 was 
narcissism; likewise, the dispositional narcissistic personality failed to predict 
cooperative behaviour in the PGG. Besides dispositional empathy and narcissism, the 
most widely studied individual difference is social value orientation, with most 
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research (Balliet, et al., 2009; Bogaert, et al., 2008) showing that it is a reliable tool 
for measuring an individual’s social preference (social value orientation) to predict 
cooperative behaviour. However, as discussed in section 4.1 Introduction, the social 
value orientation measure is unlike self-report questionnaires (statements/descriptions 
of situations), as it involves decomposed games consisting of six primary items and 
nine optional secondary items which overlap with features that appear in actual social 
dilemma games. For example, one of the items of measuring social value orientation 
is “You receive and others receives 100-50; 94-56; 88-63; 81-69; 75-75; 69-81; 63-
81; 63-88; 56-94; 50-100 matched items”, the participants need to circle one of 9 
items (Murphy & Ackermann, 2014). Because of this (highly similarity in situation 
setting), social value orientation has become a more reliable tool, to predict behaviour 
in other types of social dilemma, than empathy and narcissism, as it successfully 
distinguishes individual differences. Therefore, this casts doubt about the validity of 
the existing self-report questionnaire to reflect actual individual differences.  
Certainly, complex social behaviours are almost always influenced by 
multiple components and mechanisms. “Social behaviour is the product of reciprocal 
interactions between the characteristics of the person and the characteristics of the 
situation.” (Penner & Orom, 2010, p. 60). Social-cognitive processes are important 
because motives are not directly observable. Inferences are attributed to motives that 
underlie behaviour (e.g., Carlston & Graziano, 2010) and the motivation for any 
single act is usually ambiguous (Schroeder & Graziano, 2015). In the case of pro-
social personality, it is unlikely that the social-cognitive components and emotional 
components will be activated by the same cues, or activated at the same time. In turn 
this may be the reason why it is not easy to reliably identify how these components 
combine and in turn then lead to behavioural differences (Schroeder & Graziano, 
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2015, p. 245). Therefore, for further investigations of the personality-behaviour link, 
multiple components need to be considered such that a more detailed profile of the 
individual, their own motives, their values, and their own pro-social tendencies are 
assessed, along with a variety of pro-social behaviours, and not just use a single social 
dilemma game.  
7.2. Theoretical Considerations 
As stated in Chapter 2, there were a variety of theories and models discussing 
the motivations of people acting cooperatively, essentially addressing the question: 
Why do people cooperate? The discussion here considers the implications of the work 
from this project in response to the existing models and theories exploring the basis 
behind cooperative behaviours.  
Theories in the social psychology domain tend to explain the motivations of 
human cooperation either from the view of economic motivations (resource 
exchange) or from the view of social motivations (group identity). From the view of 
economic motivations, resource exchange is the main incentive for people to act 
cooperatively, both from a traditional rational choice model (Elster, 1986) and a more 
psychologically orientated framework, such as the interdependence theory (H. H. 
Kelley & Thibaut, 1978), SAVE (Keltner, et al., 2014). In contrast, from the view of 
social motivations, the main incentive for people to act cooperatively is because they 
associate cooperation with a particular identity, which is discussed by the 
appropriateness framework (Weber, et al., 2004) as well as the group engagement 
model (Tyler & Blader, 2003).  
As indicated from Figure 3, Parks’ integrated model explicitly points out that 
dispositional empathy affects the secure attachment system. This means it has a role 
in determining the dispositions to cooperate, and can influence cooperative decisions. 
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What is claimed is that dispositional empathy operates in such a way to transform 
actual behaviour through a motivational system, and this transformative process can 
be identified using Parks’ Integrated Model of decision making in social dilemmas. 
However, the studies (Studies 1, 2 and 3) from this project failed to support the 
prediction that dispositional empathy is positively related to actual cooperative 
behaviour.  
Why is it that, rather than empathy per se, personal social values promoted 
cooperation in the PGG as found in Study 2? In the social values condition of this 
study, the profiles concerning socially oriented values, such as family and friends, led 
to higher rates of cooperation than the economic values condition. One could 
speculate that, by sharing personal information regarding the social situation, the 
social values condition helped participants develop a sense of identity. As this was a 
value that they would willingly want to identify with, this in turn may have helped 
them form an attachment to the group. In contrast, in the economic values condition, 
the information participants shared was based on communicating a materialistic loss. 
As participants would have detected that the common theme was an identity regarding 
the loss of economic goods, this may have been an identity they were less willing to 
associate with. Therefore, under such circumstances this type of information sharing 
did not play a good enough motivating role to support cooperative behaviour, though 
it did not in turn lead to increases in defective behaviours, such as increased free 
riding. Taken together, these speculations would be consistent with identity-based 
theories (e.g., the appropriateness framework (Weber, et al., 2004) as well as the 
group engagement model (Tyler & Blader, 2003)).  
Another central aim for the thesis was to explore the role of status on the 
empathy-cooperation link. The group engagement model explicitly points out the 
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importance of status. In this model, two types of status are considered, pride and 
respect. The former refers to the status of the group in large contexts, while the latter 
refers to one’s status within one group. The status involved in Study 3 and Study 4 is 
consistent with status as viewed by the model as respect. Through manipulating the 
resources participants possessed, namely the financial tokens in the studies, status was 
created. As argued by the group engagement model, higher respect (status) affects an 
individual’s identification judgment, and in turn results in acting in a more 
cooperative fashion. Moreover, the appropriateness framework also considers the 
importance of status, although not so obviously as the group engagement model. The 
appropriateness framework stresses the role of recognition of situation, identity and 
rules. Weber, et al. (2004) considered status as part of human’s social structure (p. 
294) and anticipated that the superficial features of the situation (different status 
within group) can lead to fundamentally different understandings, and therefore 
markedly different choices, whereas the rational choice model anticipates identical 
choices. Therefore, given the pattern of findings in Study 3, consistent with the 
appropriateness framework and the group engagement model, people are clearly 
sensitive to status and this informs the basis on which they make decisions that impact 
a group. 
There has already been a large body of theoretical and empirical studies 
discussing whether empathy induction triggers egoism or altruism. However, the 
behavioural consequence of empathy induction, especially under the circumstance of 
the public goods problem, is still under theoretical consideration. Behaviour change is 
the ultimate goal for enriching research studies in behavioural and social science. 
Both the empathy-altruism hypothesis and negative-state relief hypothesis were not 
supported; because in the present project the behavioural consequence of empathy 
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were that it did not necessarily lead to cooperative decisions. However, a caveat could 
be that both hypotheses could be interpreted as being specific to helping behaviours 
rather than cooperative behaviours per se. The thesis extended both hypotheses in 
order to make the prediction that empathy induction produces the motivation (altruism 
from empathy-altruism hypothesis and egoism from negative-state relief hypothesis), 
to cooperate in a mixed-motives situation. Though, as has been clearly stated, the 
evidence from this thesis simply does not support this extended prediction.  
7.3. Methodological Considerations 
In each of the four studies that comprised this thesis the method used to 
uncover cooperative behaviour was the linear PGG. One of the key reasons for 
adopting this method is that there are fewer studies examining the link between 
empathy and cooperation in this type of social dilemma game as compared to other 
typical games (prisoner’s dilemma, ultimatum game). However, having explored the 
link between empathy and cooperation across four studies, the following discussion 
now considers the potential methodological issues that may have contributed to the 
lack of evidence for the link between the two in this project. The specific focuses in 
this discussion are on: 1) the employment of an interactive deception method, 2) the 
involvement of financial incentives, and 3) the issue of effect sizes/sample sizes. 
7.3.1. Interactive Deception 
Interactive deception, to create a group interaction, was introduced in Studies 
1, 2 and 3 in order to better observe intragroup cooperative behaviour under 
controlled conditions. In Studies 1 and 3, interactive deception did not appear to have 
any significant effect on cooperative decisions, whereas in Study 2 (personal values 
involved), interactive deception significantly influenced cooperative behaviour in the 
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PGG. However, in Study 4 where there was no interactive deception, there was also 
no evidence for an empathy-cooperation link. Taken together these findings raise 
questions regarding the extent to which interactive deception did in fact significantly 
impact on the lack of empathy-cooperation link. However, it is worth also recognizing 
that the lack of empathy-cooperation link in Studies 1- 3, may be the result of 
different reasons compared to Study 4.  
In the version of the PGG used in the Studies 1, 2 and 3, three virtual players 
and only one real participant were involved. The reasons for using fictional players 
were to allow for careful manipulations of the range of empathy and the impact it 
would have on the participants’ behaviour during the PGG. The feedback response of 
the three virtual players’ contribution was pre-programmed based on real players’ 
data from a published study. This type of experimental design involved two critical 
factors that are not the concern of studies using four players: a) is it acceptable to use 
a computer program to give feedback on the behaviour of other players in a PGG; b) 
is it acceptable to deceive players into believing that they are interacting with players 
online. With regards to the first issue, research on tit-for-tat strategy and proof of its 
success has often been demonstrated using a computer tournament (Axelrod & 
Hamilton, 1981). Alongside tit-for-tat, random, downing, joss, these types of 
feedback on decision-making behaviour in multi-player games is also provided 
through computer tournaments (Axelrod, 1984, p. 31), which in turn also seems to 
suggest that, at least some of the research community, do not deem the first issue as a 
problem. The second issue concerns deception that led participants to believe that 
they were interacting with others; this was defined as “interactive deception”. The 
employment of “interactive deception” is common because it provides a practical 
solution to setting up social experiments with social dilemma games. However, what 
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it commonly done is that several participants are interacting with a social dilemma 
game in the same room, and this gives them the false sense that they are interacting 
with an anonymous partner in the room, when in fact they are interacting with a 
“fixed” virtual player (Rand, et al., 2012, Study 7). Other studies also adopt a type of 
pre-programmed strategy or pre-design strategy, similar to the one used in this project 
(Batson & Ahmad, 2001; Batson & Moran, 1999; Rumble, et al., 2010). Therefore, 
the experimental design is not at odds with prior published experimental work, and is 
an accepted method of studying group behaviour, and has been used as a method for 
measuring both empathy and cooperation.  
The point of contention with regards to the use of interactive deception really 
is from the point of view of economists and behavioural economists. Instructions were 
presented so that participants were guided towards believing that they were 
interacting with three real players. Van Lange et al., (2013) commented that most 
social dilemma researchers tend to implement this kind of deception in their 
experimental studies. The use of deception is a provocative issue. Economists are less 
trusting of the findings of experiments that involve deception, and they argue that any 
form of deception will undermine the general validity of experiments (McClelland, 
1985). Within psychology, Hertwig and Ortmann (2001) strongly advise against the 
use of deception, whereas others are more lenient in their recommendations 
(Christensen, 1988). Some suggest that, for many social psychological experiments, 
deception may seem inevitable, especially when it comes to inducing empathy and 
examining the effect on pro-social behaviours in economic games (Batson, 2011). 
Some empirical studies do not include measures to access whether participants 
believe the deception or not (Rumble, et al., 2010; Yamagishi, Mifune, Liu, & 
Pauling, 2008) while other studies that assess participants’ belief in the experimental 
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deception omit the data from participants who expresses doubt regarding the 
plausibility of the deception (Batson & Ahmad, 2001; Batson & Moran, 1999).  
The use of deception has become more and more extensive and a 
commonplace feature of social psychology experiments. Deception is employed in 
such experiments because it is important to keep the respondent unaware of the 
personality or attitude dimension that is under exploration, as thus when using 
deception it is possible to examine the participants’ responses genuinely by 
minimizing the effects of subjective desirability (Kelman, 1967). Hertwig and 
Ortmann (2001) explicitly pointed out that the two benefits of using deception are: a) 
the experimenters can help to avoid the knowledge of the true purpose of a study that 
might affect behaviour; and b) without it, it can produce situations that are unlikely to 
arise naturally. The necessity of retaining deception as a methodological tool seems to 
be generally accepted in psychology. Moreover, some research studies have revealed 
that participants enjoyed the experience more, received more educational benefit from 
it, and did not mind being deceived (Christensen, 1988).  
With the increased popularity of using deception in social psychological 
experiments, some special concerns are raised in terms of the negative consequences 
of its use. The use of deception is criticized repeatedly as ethically unacceptable and 
morally reprehensible by behaviour economists, because it involves deceit and lying. 
More importantly, the concern is more about its adequacy as a methodology for social 
psychology; namely, the extent to which the use of deception will affect the target 
behaviour that they intend to explore. This concern is also fully discussed alongside 
the present studies data. Given the mixed pattern of results revealed in the present 
thesis and subsequent complications of interpreting these findings with regards to the 
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effects of interactive deception on cooperation, the use of  real players in future work 
is strongly recommended.  
7.3.2. Financial Incentives Involved 
Because economic games were used, the aim of the project was to adhere to 
some basic principles regarding the use of these types of games, in particular the use 
of incentives that were tied to decisions in the game. Put alternatively, decisions taken 
in a social dilemma game should have real consequences just as they do in real life. 
The aim of the project was to enhance the ecological validity of the four studies, and 
so all studies used financial incentives which were directly associated with 
participant’s decision in the experiments. This is seemingly different from many other 
psychological studies using social dilemma paradigms where course credit or fixed 
amount money is the motivator to take part in the game (Batson & Ahmad, 2001; 
Batson & Moran, 1999), which in turn does not translate to real consequences for 
decisions taken in the game. Given that money is one of the most salient incentives 
that motivates human behaviour (Camera, Casari, & Bigoni, 2013), it is likely that 
this motivator may have contributed to weakening the empathy-cooperation link 
reported in prior studies (Batson & Ahmad, 2001; Batson & Moran, 1999).  
Do financial incentives matter? Hertwig and Ortmann (2001) presented a full 
discussion and reached a conclusion that financial incentives matter more in some 
areas (e.g., games and markets) than in others (e.g., judgment and decision), in both 
psychological and economic domains. Yet, in the end, they still proposed that 
psychologists studying behavioural decision should consider using financial 
incentives when possible, while at the same time recognizing that this may interfere 
with participant’s intrinsic motivation. It may well be the case that financial 
incentives that mimic real consequences for decisions taken in the real world make 
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participants more sensitive to the actual financial gains they may achieve, interfering 
with their intrinsic motivation to behave more pro-socially in social dilemma games. 
However, it is unclear how to resolve the problem of generating an analogue of social 
situations in which conflicts between personal and social gains occur, which have 
consequences that are not financially incentivised. Thus far, the literature appears to 
be split between studies that employ a flat-fee or course credit, and studies, 
particularly behavioural economic studies, in which financial incentives are critical to 
ensure both motivation, and real consequences of decisions taken. One example of a 
set of studies in the project that suggests that the use of financial incentives is 
important, are Studies 3 and 4, in which status is determined by the relative amount of 
resources. This is a reasonable analogue of real life situations in which the relative 
amount of resources can indeed influence the way in which people behave towards 
each other.  
7.3.3. Sample Size, Effect Size and Statistical Power 
Historically, researchers in psychology have relied heavily on null hypothesis 
statistical significance testing as a starting point for many of its analytic approaches 
(APA, 2010). In response, many have recommended that effect sizes be reported as a 
supplement to null hypothesis significance tests (C. O. Fritz, Morris, & Richler, 2012; 
K. Kelley & Preacher, 2012; Lakens, 2013; Peng, Chen, Chiang, & Chiang, 2013). 
This was particularly important in this project because the statistical analyses for the 
four studies resulted in null hypothesis significance tests. Therefore, in order to obtain 
a more generally interpretable, quantitative description of the size of an effect from 
the simple identification of statistical significance, the estimates of effect size were 
presented. This was deemed a useful way for determining the practical or theoretical 
importance of an effect, as well as the relative contribution of different factors or the 
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same factor in different circumstances, and the power of an analysis (C. O. Fritz, et 
al., 2012).  
To infer the required sample size in each condition, there were two ways of 
obtaining the effect size 1) based on the previous published empirical studies; 2) 
based on the presumed generalized effect size (Cumming, 2014); to reach the 
statistical power (1-β >=. 80). In the three most closely related empirical studies 
(Batson & Ahmad, 2001; Batson & Moran, 1999; Rumble, et al., 2010), none of them 
reported sufficient statistical data to calculate the effect size of empathy-cooperation 
link, although all these studies reported a positive link. In this case, the second way of 
a presumed medium effect size for social science phenomena (f = 0.25) suggested by 
(J. Cohen, 1988) are followed. In this thesis, the tool G*power was used to conduct 
relevant statistical calculation such as effect size, required sample size and statistical 
power.  
The thesis involves two types of statistical power, a prior power and a post hoc 
power (Faul, et al., 2007). In a priori power analysis (J. Cohen, 1988), sample size N 
is computed as a function of the required power level (1-β), the pre-specified 
significance level α, and the population effect size to be detected with probability (1-
β). A priori power analysis provides an efficient method of controlling statistical 
power before a study is actually conducted and could be recommended whenever 
resources such as the time and money required for data collection are not critical. 
Whereas, a post hoc power analysis often makes sense after a study has already been 
conducted. It becomes possible to assess whether or not a published statistical test has 
in fact had a fair chance of rejecting an incorrect null hypothesis. In Studies 1 and 3, 
the prior power analyses were conducted to infer the required sample size (N). In 
Study 2, a post hoc power analysis was conducted, as showed in section 4.3.3 PGG 
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All Rounds. These statistical terminologies help better understand the basis on which 
a potential empathy-cooperation link could be detected in the studies included in this 
thesis. Given the power analyses conducted across the thesis, the actual sample sizes 
are close to or exceed the required sample sizes recommended by prior power 
analysis, and are in line or exceed prior published work in this area. 
7.4. Implications and Ideas for Further Studies 
The present project includes four studies each designed to explore the 
empathy-cooperation link. They present some challenges to previous work that 
purports to have shown that this is a reliable link. As a result, the discussion has 
highlighted several factors that may have contributed to the lack of reliable evidence 
for this link; moreover, these factors also point to possible future approaches to 
exploring the link. First, a great deal more attention should be focused on the 
personality-situation-behaviour approach instead of personality-behaviour approach 
to interpret the influence of individual differences on behaviour. It is important to 
establish the reliability of the association that many researchers have claimed exists 
between traits such as dispositional empathy and cooperative behaviours. Second, 
given this thesis only investigated repeated interaction between/amongst strangers, 
different relationship contexts in dyadic interaction could better expose the empathy-
cooperation link. This is because if there is an established relationship, the inducted 
empathetic concern may have a more secure basis on which to influence behaviour – 
because the concern for the other is more likely to be genuine. Third, economic 
disparity between people is ever more salient an issue under conditions of economic 
crises in the real world, and other such unstable economic conditions that people 
experience on a day-to-day basis. Therefore, how economic disparity modulates the 
perception of status, which in turn effects the way in which people of different status 
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cooperate (or not) with each other, is an important avenue of research and clearly 
more work that builds on the impact of social status on cooperative behaviours will be 
ever more relevant, if the gap between high and low status continues to increase 
(Piketty, 2014). Moreover, if there are differences in the way that people with 
different status cooperate with each other, then it is ever more important to find ways 
in which cooperation (particularly of those with high status) can be promoted. This 
present project reveals that empathy only has a weak effect, and it targets people that 
already have an inclination to cooperate (i.e. low status group). So, the question 
would be, how can people in high status positions cooperate more with those of low 
status conditions? As yet, the empirical work that currently exists cannot provide a 
good answer to this.  
In terms of methodology, there are several approaches that were taken in this 
current project that have not commonly been adopted in social psychology studies 
examining the link between empathy and cooperation, and it may be the case that the 
evidence base needs to be improved by using key best practices. First, each research 
study should report the effect size. This enables following studies to accurately 
calculate required sample sizes for each experimental condition. Second, a prior 
statistical power test should be calculated instead of a post hoc statistical power test in 
order to avoid some of the concerns regarding the reliability of the findings reported. 
Third, experiments should introduce financial incentives especially in contexts in 
which decisions are made that carry costs – as they would in the real world, For 
example, in social exchanges in which there are differences in status (e.g., real life 
management contexts). Finally, the experimental design should avoid employing 
deception in any form, and based on the work from this project, many of the 
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problematic issues may have been avoided if an approach like this was adopted 
consistently throughout the project.  
7.5. Conclusion 
Public goods problems, as multiple-person social dilemmas, are situations in 
which a person’s individual rationality leads to collective irrationality. That is, 
behaviour that is directed towards the personal benefit of the individual in turn costs 
the rest of a group. Thus, the most challenging problem for public goods is free 
riding, that is, placing one’s own interest above the interests of others, by contributing 
next to nothing, and benefiting from the contributions of others. This project was 
designed to find possible solutions to the public goods problem, based chiefly on the 
idea that a key emotion relevant in social exchanges, namely empathy, can promote 
cooperative behaviour, which in turn could reduce free riding. Moreover, another 
underpinning assumption of this project was that, people’s motivations, when faced 
with social interactions generally, are weighted towards being socially proactive, - i.e. 
people are not completely driven to free ride in all social exchanges. Following this, 
the whole project involved manipulating empathic concern for others in a group so as 
to, in turn, trigger increases in cooperative behaviour; thus attempting to solve the 
public goods problems. However, the series of studies in this thesis only found a 
limited effect of empathy as a means of resolving the individual-collective interest 
conflict. Instead other factors were more prominent in determining the level of 
contribution in the public goods game, particularly the shared values of the group 
(more cooperative in social shared values relative to economic values), and relative 
status (particularly the basis on which status was achieved – i.e. by chance or by 
effort). Possible explanations that may have contributed to the weak empathy-
cooperation link were speculated to be the result of two core concerns. The first of 
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which was the introduction of deception, namely that participants were led to believe 
they were interacting with other players in the game, when they were in fact not 
interacting with anyone. This may have interfered with the way in which participants 
were playing the game. The second was the introduction of real financial incentives, 
which may have overridden the effects of empathy-induced altruism. One of the most 
important goals for future work is for researchers to build theories, which pay 
particular regards to the modulating effect of status on the empathy-cooperation link, 
in mixed-motive social dilemmas. Finally, based on the review of the literature, the 
current issues that still pervade are substantive, and they concern the consistency with 
which of key terms (e.g., empathy, cooperation) are used in theory and in empirical 
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Appendix 1: Interpersonal Reactivity Index (adopted from (Davis, 1983)) 
INTERPERSONAL REACTIVITY INDEX 
The following statements inquire about your thoughts and feelings in a variety 
of situations. For each item, indicate how well it describes you by choosing the 
appropriate letter on the scale at the top of the page: 1, 2, 3, 4, or 5. When you have 
decided on your answer, fill in the letter on the answer sheet next to the item number.  
READ EACH ITEM CAREFULLY BEFORE RESPONDING.  Answer as honestly 




 1               2              3               4                 5 
 DOES NOT                                                     DESCRIBES ME 
 DESCRIBE ME                                                 VERY 
 WELL                                                             WELL 
 
1.  I daydream and fantasize, with some regularity, about things that might 
happen to me. (FS) 
2.  I often have tender, concerned feelings for people less fortunate than me. 
(EC) 
3.  I sometimes find it difficult to see things from the "other guy's" point of 
view. (PT) (-) 
4.  Sometimes I don't feel very sorry for other people when they are having 
problems. (EC) (-) 
5.  I really get involved with the feelings of the characters in a novel. (FS) 
6.  In emergency situations, I feel apprehensive and ill-at-ease. (PD) 
7. I am usually objective when I watch a movie or play, and I don't often get 
completely caught up in it. (FS) (-) 
8.  I try to look at everybody's side of a disagreement before I make a decision. 
(PT) 
9.  When I see someone being taken advantage of, I feel kind of protective 
towards them. (EC) 
10.  I sometimes feel helpless when I am in the middle of a very emotional 
situation. (PD) 
11. I sometimes try to understand my friends better by imagining how things 
look from their perspective. (PT) 
12.  Becoming extremely involved in a good book or movie is somewhat rare 
for me. (FS) (-) 
13.  When I see someone get hurt, I tend to remain calm. (PD) (-) 
14.  Other people's misfortunes do not usually disturb me a great deal. (EC) (-) 
15. If I'm sure I'm right about something, I don't waste much time listening to 
other people's arguments. (PT) (-) 
16.  After seeing a play or movie, I have felt as though I were one of the 
characters. (FS) 




18. When I see someone being treated unfairly, I sometimes don't feel very 
much pity for them.  (EC) (-) 
19.  I am usually pretty effective in dealing with emergencies. (PD) (-) 
20.  I am often quite touched by things that I see happen. (EC) 
21.  I believe that there are two sides to every question and try to look at them 
both. (PT) 
22.  I would describe myself as a pretty soft-hearted person. (EC) 
23.  When I watch a good movie, I can very easily put myself in the place of a 
leading character. (FS) 
24.  I tend to lose control during emergencies. (PD) 
25.  When I'm upset at someone, I usually try to "put myself in his shoes" for a 
while. (PT) 
26When I am reading an interesting story or novel, I imagine how I would feel 
if the events in the story were happening to me. (FS) 
27.  When I see someone who badly needs help in an emergency, I go to 
pieces. (PD) 
28.  Before criticizing somebody, I try to imagine how I would feel if I were in 
their place. (PT) 
 
NOTE: (-) denotes item to be scored in reverse fashion (6 minus their scoring) 
  PT = perspective-taking scale 
  FS = fantasy scale 
  EC = empathic concern scale 
  PD = personal distress scale 
   
 
Appendix 2: The Pre-designed Profiles for Study 1 
(Break up) Jennifer Law,  
Well, I don’t know if this will be interesting to anybody else, but the only 
thing I can think of is that two weeks ago my boyfriend and I broke up. We’ve been 
going out together since year 12 in school and had kept the relationship up since 
university. It has been great going out while we have been together at QMUL as well. 
I thought he felt the same, but things have changed. Now he wants to date other 
people. This has got me down and been on my mind, been a bit hard to cope.  
 
(Car accident) Rebecca Thornton,  
So, my friend was driving after we went shopping, and we ended up in a car 
crash. We were hit on the passenger side, front. The other driver was going much 
faster than the speed limit and crashed into us. All I remember from the crash was 
glass flying everywhere and the loudest, most terrible noise of metal crushing metal. 
We were ok because we wearing our seat belts, but we both got whiplash and I ended 
up with a broken rib. It was scary knowing that if we hadn't been wearing our seat 





(Mobile phone was stolen) Michael Sullivan, 
The upsetting thing that happened to me in the last month was my mobile 
phone was stolen. I went to Paris with my friends. We were focusing too much on 
taking photographs of an amazing view and not paying attention to what was 
happening around us. On getting back to the hotel after a long tube ride I noticed my 
iPhone was missing. My mother gave me the phone as a gift only 2 months ago.   
 
Neutral information about those 3 participants: 
1) Jennifer Law, I enjoy swimming, although I don’t swim very well. 
2) Rebecca Thornton, ----- I ride a bike to university every day.  
3) Michael Sullivan, ----- I run most mornings.  
 
Appendix 3: Debriefing Questions for Study 1 
1) Did it appear to you that there were, in fact, three other players competing 
alongside you at the exact time during this experiment? 
2) When deciding the amount of tokens to contribute towards the pot, was there a 
particular strategy or rule that you applied? 
3) Did you find any flaws with this experiment? Were the instructions clear to 
you? 
4) Did you know the three other players before you attended the experiment? 
5) What was your motive for attending this experiment today? 
 
Appendix 4: Pre-questions for Study 2 
Personal information 
Full Name:_______________ Gender: ________________Age:_________ 
Q1:  Describe an event that has happened to you that has made you happy in the last 
year.  
Q2:  Describe an event that has happened to you that has made you sad in the last 
year. 
Q3: What types of sports do you enjoy? 
Q4: What hobbies do you have? 
Q5: What’s your favourite food? 
 
Appendix 5: Three Pairs Value Stories for Study 2 
Stories  
High frequency value stories: (Family, Friends, Health) 
Family 
My grandfather had an operation recently. I went to visit him in hospital 
whenever I could. It has been worrying because I am really close to him and it’s been 





I speak to my best friend nearly every day. She is the closest person to me 
outside of my family. Recently we fell out. This isn’t the first time that this has 
happened, and I know that we can fix this, but it is still upsetting.  
Health 
I was riding my bicycle down the main road last month. I lost control and 
crashed into a lamppost. The bike didn't flip, thankfully, but my arm was severely 
injured. I had to go to hospital, and they put my arm in a sling. It took me 
approximately 3 weeks to recover.  
 
Low frequency value stories (Pet, Phone, Bicycle) 
Pet 
My pet dog Scruffy had an operation recently. I went to visit him at the vets 
whenever I could. It has been worrying because I am really close to him and it’s been 
very stressful and emotion for me and my family. But he is recovering now. 
Phone 
I speak on my mobile phone nearly every day. It is the object most close to me 
other than my laptop. Recently I broke my phone. It fell out of my bag. This isn’t the 
first time that this has happened, and I know that I can fix this, but it is still upsetting.  
Bicycle 
I was riding my bicycle down the main road last month. I lost control and 
crashed into a lamppost. The bike didn't flip, but unfortunately it did get bust up. I had 
to take it into the repair shop, because it was seriously damaged. It took 
approximately 3 weeks to get fixed. 
 
Appendix 6: Debriefing Questions for Study 2 
Debriefing questions: 
1) Did it appear to you that there were, in fact, three other players competing 
alongside you at the exact time during this experiment? 
2) When deciding the amount of tokens to contribute towards the pot, was there a 
particular strategy or rule that you applied? 
3) Did you find any flaws with this experiment? Were the instructions clear to 
you? 
4) Did you know the three other players before you attended the experiment? 
5) What was your motive for attending this experiment today? 


















Appendix 9: Post-question for High-empathy Condition (No-empathy Condition) 
for Study 4  
Name: ____________Gender: ______Age: ______Participant No._____________ 
 
Q:  Describe an event that has happened to you that has made you sad in the last year. 
(Q:  Describe a type of sports that you enjoy. ) 
 
          
   Participant No._______________ 
 
To what extent do you feel compassion or pity about your partners’ stories 
written in the note?  (1= not at all to 9 = very much) 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
not at all         very much 
 
 
Appendix 10: Debriefing Questions for Study 4 
1) When deciding the amount of tokens to contribute towards the pot, was there a 
particular strategy or rule that you applied? 
2) Were the instructions clear to you? 
3) Did you know how to get the maximal money for yourself ideally? 
4) Did you know how to make your partner to get the maximal money? 
5) Did you know how to get the maximal money for both of you? 
6) What did you think of the note about your partner? Was it real? 
 
